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PREFACE
In February 1995,1 invited children and youth living in an orphanage in Bolivia 
to join a writing group. The director gave me her permission with some misgivings about 
whether anyone would want to write. Twelve children, ranging in age from 7 to 15 years 
old, chose to join the group. We met in two small rooms off a large playroom in a 
recreation center on the orphanage grounds. Most days, younger children played in the 
large room and we shut the door on their busy chatter. Outside, the wind sweeping out of 
the valley and along the mountainside picked up strength nearly every afternoon. 
Surrounded by the muted voices of the young children through the door and the wind 
whistling in the windows we talked and wrote together two afternoons a week for two 
years. The children and the stories they wrote occupy my thoughts still.
In the writing group, children chose their own topics. Manuel wrote about a snail 
who only wanted a clean puddle to live in. Natalie wrote about a cat who seemed to 
know everything and would appear unexpectedly to give people advice or explain why 
something happened. There were stories about imagined family trips and soccer games 
with teams in the Bolivian league. I wrote as well. We talked about our writing in easy 
conversation as we worked, reading informally to one another and commenting on each 
other’s text or illustrations. I occasionally had formal conferences with each child and 
organized group readings. I typed stories the children chose to publish and bound the 
illustrated text into individual and group books. Writing was read formally to a larger 
audience on seven occasions during the two years. The larger audience included various
vii
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combinations of peers, housemothers, teachers, the directors of the orphanage, and other 
guests.
Prior to this group, my experience with writing workshop had been as a teacher in 
formal school settings. Like the director, I was unsure of how children would respond to 
my invitation. Unlike school, they were not obliged to attend. I did not even offer snacks 
to entice them to join the group. That the children enjoyed the writing group is evident in 
their continuing to come to write for two years. Both Ana’s and Eduardo’s comments 
about their writing capture something about what they found meaningful in the work of 
the writing group. Ana, at twelve years old, wrote a story about a princess that grew up 
with the animals in the forest, separated from her family. She explained writing the story 
in these words:
Primeramente pense algo bonito y me fui imaginado sobre mi pensamiento.
Mi parte favorita es cuando este muchacha encuentro dentro la selva algo 
muy asombroso para ella.
First I thought of something beautiful and then went on imagining all that 
was in my thoughts. My favorite part is when the girl found something in 
the forest very marvelous for her.
Eduardo, also twelve years old, explained to a group of visitors being shown around the
orphanage that “Here is where we write our own stories, we write what is in our
thoughts.” Enjoyment, on its own, is reason to write; however, I think there is more to
say about the needs and purposes of the children and youth who joined the writing group.
For my part, enjoyment was one reason that I started the writing group. The brief
prospectus I wrote for the Proyecto Zoe Writing Project opened with Lucy Calkins’
statement that “As human beings we write to communicate, plan, petition, remember,
announce, list, imagine...but above all, we write to hold our lives in our hands and to
viii
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make something of them” (1994). I state that the project “grew out of a love of writing
and the belief that it is important for children to learn to tell their stories in an authentic
voice.” After describing a workshop approach, I close the prospectus
Conceivably, being the author of her or his own stories can influence the 
child’s sense of power in shaping her or his life. Writing holds the potential 
to transform the way these young authors look at themselves and their lives.
(Ritter, 1995)
As I used this prospectus to start groups in other locations in the city and to talk with 
educators about the groups, I found myself taking this last passage on and off of the page. 
It seemed too bold, too presumptuous a claim. Could writing transform the way a child 
looks at herself and her life, particularly for a child who is on the bottom rung of a class- 
stratified society? Yet, this is what I hoped for the young writers. Given these hopes, 
what was my responsibility as a teacher? My usual responses regarding clarity, purpose, 
and grammar had a place, but felt inadequate to me. And then, of course, what are the 
needs and purposes of the children and youth? Caroline Heller suggests an answer to 
these questions in the idea of finding a witness.
In her ethnography of a women’s writing group in the Tenderloin district of San 
Francisco, Heller suggests that the women “came in one way or another to find witnesses 
as they lay claim for the richness of their complicated experiences” (1997: 18). Being 
witnesses for one another, as Heller uses the concept, describes something about the 
writing groups that I had been struggling to put into words. The idea that the young 
writers attended the group, at least in part, to find witnesses and to be known in a 
particular way seems right to me. The descriptive quality of Heller’s idea of witness 
leads me to believe there is something here of crucial value that we do not usually attend
ix
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to in educational theory. Thus, at the most general level of description, my dissertation 
investigates the idea of being witnesses for one another.
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ABSTRACT
CAN I GET A WITNESS?
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDING A WITNESS FOR LIBERATORY EDUCATION
By
Martha J. Ritter 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2005 
This dissertation is a philosophical inquiry into what it means to be a ‘witness’ 
and to ‘bear witness’; it is also an investigation into what place witness has in education.
I undertake this broad conceptual work to formulate a conception of witness that supports 
liberatory education -  education that aims at freedom from oppression.
The inquiry is rooted in work with writing groups in Bolivia, and the idea that 
young people may have come to the group to find witnesses. I critically appraise three 
contemporary proposals that employ the notions o f ‘witness’ and ‘bearing witness’ in 
liberatory education. My critique notes that the conceptions of witness employed are 
unduly restrictive in that they attend only or primarily to how students should listen to 
accounts of violence and oppression, and specifically indicate what students should do 
because of the testimony they have heard. I argue for a broader conception of witness 
that includes bearing witness to what we most value, as well as to violence, and that takes 
into account the fact that students themselves may, at times, be looking for witnesses.
From the clear cases analyzed in the dissertation, we can recognize on the part of 
the person looking for a witness a need to have one’s perceptions acknowledged in the 
face of incomprehensible refusal or steady indifference. We look for witnesses when
xi
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others turn away. To answer this need, the response of a witness is characterized by (a) 
listening with ‘moral humility’ and (b) acknowledging the other’s testimony. The 
conception of witness put forward in the dissertation is fundamentally a relational 
account. The moral and epistemological dimensions of this relation of witness are 
elaborated drawing on a pragmatist conception of truth and inquiry. Specifically, I argue 
that the relation of witness can be generative of situated knowledge, and is indeed 
sometimes required for the generation of situated knowledge.
Returning to the aims of liberatory education, the inquiry concludes that finding a 
witness fosters the relationships and the generative knowledge that allows the complex 
understanding of our lives required for liberation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Stated simply, my dissertation is a philosophical inquiry into what it means to be 
a ‘witness’ and to ‘bear witness’ and an investigation into what place witness has in 
education and in schools. I undertake this broad conceptual work to formulate a 
conception of witness that supports liberatory education -  education that aims at freedom 
from oppression.
It was through Caroline Heller’s work that I initially became intrigued with the 
stance of a witness in educational contexts. In her ethnography of a women’s writing 
group in the Tenderloin district of San Francisco, Heller suggests that the women came to 
the writing group to find witnesses. Drawn to the work of Brazilian educator, Paulo 
Freire, Heller explains “Freire was interested not only in how writing affects thinking, but 
in how writing might more deeply affect the quality of people’s lives, especially their 
perception of themselves as thinkers and as people who take action” (1997: 10). To 
borrow Heller’s synopsis, Freire put forth a model of critical literacy, often referred to as 
‘liberation education,’ based on people coming together to help each other build the 
language and the literacy needed to both see and challenge the ideologies that formed the 
dominant culture surrounding them. Freire looked to the process of ‘conscientization’ to 
revolutionize the social order so that the poor would be enfranchised. The premise of his 
education was resolutely political. The political work of the Tenderloin writing group 
was not as explicit as Heller expected, but she writes that the longer she was with the
1
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group, the more she “noticed participants in the group critiquing American life and life in
their neighborhood, often brilliantly” (17). She continues
But the real work of the group was both more ordinary and, I soon came to 
realize, more extraordinary than this. Most of the regular participants in the 
Tenderloin Women Writers Workshop came to the workshop not to change 
the world or even to complain about it. They came to be reassured that they 
had lived lives that were of value and that could be—through the precision of 
their own words—felt, understood, and remembered by others. Most came in 
one way or another to find witnesses as they made claim for the richness of 
their complicated experiences. (18)
Further, Heller notes, “it was in the achieving of this, and in the awakening of
sensibilities that allowed this achievement, that other, more explicitly social, political,
and educational functions were also accomplished” (18). This is a substantial educational
claim well worth careful attention.
Heller believed that what took place at the Tenderloin Reflection and Education 
Center fulfilled the underlying principles of liberation education and critical literacy.
And that the dynamics of the workshop offered a glimpse beyond the abstract political 
conversations that often surround the interpretation of these terms in the United States (as 
for example, in the work of Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren). Her study, Heller argues, 
urges us to consider a more complicated and more personal conception of liberation 
education than we have had until now. I support a more complicated and a more personal 
conception of liberation education, if by this we mean a conception that more fully takes 
into account the needs and purposes of those who come together in our classrooms.1 
Heller suggests that finding witnesses is vital to a new conception of liberatory education.
1 The purposes of the women were seemingly at odds with the stated aims of the center or 
if not at odds, they are at least different from these stated aims. Nelly Stromquist (1997) 
notes a similar tension between purposes in her research of critical literacy programs in 
Brazil.
2
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A witness, in Heller’s view, is someone who feels, understands, and remembers the other. 
Thus, the witness, it seems to me, must be attentive in a particular way. I want a robust 
conception of witness that is rooted in attentiveness to one another, similar to that which 
Heller describes, and one that can facilitate an understanding of how oppression works in 
our lives.
Liberatory education has its roots in settings such as Heller describes at the 
Tenderloin Reflection and Education Center. The resource center works with the 
residents and homeless of the Tenderloin, a neighborhood that is considered one of the 
roughest in San Francisco. Housing is predominantly low-cost single rooms, subsidized 
senior housing, or studio apartments. Families -  particularly South East Asian families -  
crowd into these small units because they are the cheapest housing in the city. Most 
Tenderloin residents live in the neighborhood because they could not afford to live 
anywhere else (Heller, 1997: 7). Paulo Freire’s own work began with the disenfranchised 
in Brazil in both rural and urban communities, and centered on groups of people coming 
together in ‘cultural circles.’ Referring to the goals of these groups, Paulo Freire writes 
“Forms of cultural action in such different situations as these have nonetheless the same 
objective: to clarify to the oppressed the objective situation which binds them to the 
oppressors, visible or not” (1970: 176). When translated to schools in the United States, 
and as I have also noticed in Bolivia, critical literacy is most generally practiced as a 
reading of texts with a particular set of questions, such as: Who’s missing from this text? 
How are people of color, women, men, and working people portrayed? Benjamin Endres 
claims that the paradigmatic example “for the critical pedagogue is the presentation of a
3
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text from a dominant culture or discourse to a student from a disadvantaged culture or 
discourse” (2001: 407). The primary aim of critical literacy, as illustrated in this 
paradigmatic example, has been for the oppressed to become aware of his or her own 
oppression; to see and challenge ideologies in the dominant culture surrounding them.
Caroline Heller, I believe, advocates a second aim for liberatory education: to
have another -  a witness -  recognize you and what you hold to be of value. In
connection with this second aim, and my own sympathies with it as an important part of
liberatory education, I direct our attention to the broad problem of not recognizing the
other’s account of his or her experience as part of not recognizing the other. In this I
want, on the one hand, to mind Lisa Delpit’s caution not to be too quick to ascribe false
consciousness. On the other hand, I want us to find a conception of witness that does not
commit us to necessarily accepting everything a person says about his or her experiences.
In regard to listening across differences, Delpit writes
We must keep the perspective that people are experts on their own lives.
There are certainly aspects of the outside world of which they may not be 
aware, but they can be the only authentic chroniclers of their own experience.
We must not be too quick to deny their interpretations, or accuse them of 
‘false consciousness.’ We must believe that people are rational beings, and 
therefore always act rationally. (1995: 47)
Though I agree that we must not be too quick to deny another’s interpretation; it cannot
mean that we must accept, always, the other’s interpretation of their experience as true or
right for that would be to claim that their understandings of complex social and political
phenomena are incorrigible.
2 Paulo Freire calls this the witness of the revolutionary leader, who is the literacy worker 
or educadora.
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To investigate the idea of being witnesses for one another, my inquiry begins with 
the following broad research questions:
(a) What does it mean to be a “witness” or to “bear witness”?
(b) What are the moral dimensions of being a witness and bearing witness?
(c) What are the epistemological dimensions of being a witness and bearing 
witness?
(d) What are the implications of witness for liberatory education?
The first three of these questions take on a more specific focus given my interest in the 
educational context expressed in fourth question.
Before outlining the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I lay out the criteria 
that I use to evaluate current conceptions of witness employed in education and seek to 
satisfy in my own conception of witness. Given the aim of articulating a conception of 
witness that can play a role in liberatory education in public schools within a plural 
society, I propose the following criteria for an adequate conception of witness:
1. will fit to some degree with ordinary usage;
2. will not be reducible to something else;
3. will privilege face-to-face encounters;
4. will not foreclose on attention to structural oppression, and;
5. testimony will be amenable to rational work
The first two are general criteria that need to be satisfied for any clear articulation of a 
conception of phenomena we experience in daily life, especially when that conception is 
meant to clarify some aspect of our ordinary experience or an ordinary notion we employ. 
If we were to have a conception diverge too much from ordinary usage then, effectively, 
we would be formulating a stipulative definition. Rather than a stipulative definition, I 
want a descriptive account of witness that links with the rich traditions associated with 
meanings of the term, as well as one that can be employed in an educational context with 
particular aims in mind. The second criterion is a requirement for any term that is to have
5
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a distinctive meaning. With my own conception of witness, as we shall see, satisfaction 
of this criterion will require that I show how, on my analysis, ‘witness’ is-not reducible to 
‘caring,’ a notion with which it shares some important features.
I put forth the third criterion -  that a conception of witness for liberatory 
education will privilege face-to-face encounters -  for two reasons. The first reason is that 
the idea of being a witness can nearly always be traced back to a face-to-face encounter, 
to seeing something for your self. Alternatively, it involves a form of address that 
logically presupposes another’s presence. There are cases of what we ordinarily call 
witness that do not entail a face-to-face encounter; however, I believe it would be a 
serious mistake to ignore the fact that to call for a witness is to call for someone to be 
present in the fullest sense possible to see, to hear, and to feel what the caller has 
experienced or is experiencing. Thus, I claim that an adequate conception of witness will 
privilege face-to-face encounters in the sense that it will recognize that the primary sense 
of witness entails such encounters, even though we also have robust secondary uses of 
the term which do not.
The second reason for acknowledging the signal importance of face-to-face 
encounters is that we are challenged by the actual presence of others in ways that we are 
not in more distant relationships, as say in the reading of novels. In his conception of 
‘witness’ as a form of rational contact between groups, Emmanuel Katongole notes 
“Significant as it is, fictional contact can never be a surrogate for the hermeneutical 
necessity of actual contact with real people” (2000: 286). Katongole argues that in actual 
contact there is a moral and epistemological challenge that is not found through contact 
with others in books, letters, and films. “[In fictional contact] one is neither able to be
6
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seriously challenged by, nor himself/herself able to help or hinder, benefit or harm, 
confront or dismay, the other” (286). There is something different when we are actually 
in front o f one another. Heller reports that she turned back out the door at the first 
meeting of the women’s writing group because she found herself overwhelmed at her 
unexpected reactions to the actual presence of the women. She left to come back another 
day better prepared for her own response. Although there is a challenge in accounts we 
read, it is not the same as being with another person. Nor, as Katongole suggests, can we 
help or benefit the other in the same way.
The fourth criterion is that an adequate conception of witness for liberatory 
education must not foreclose on our ability to see structural oppression. This criterion, 
admittedly, closely follows from my own interests. Heller claims that it was in finding 
witnesses that other social, political, and educational functions were also accomplished. 
Employing this criterion permits us to see in what sense Heller’s claim could be true. 
Further, we do use witness to refer to a stand against oppression or way of addressing 
oppression and violence. Witness is used in this way in each of the three proposals for 
witness in educational contexts that I critique in Chapter Three, all of which are broadly 
situated in liberatory education. For liberatory education, it is critical that a conception of 
witness not foreclose on our recognition of structural oppression.
To understand the significance of this criterion it is important that we have a sense 
of structural oppression in contrast to traditional usages of the term ‘oppression.’ In her 
analysis of structural oppression, Iris Marion Young observes that in “dominant political 
discourse it is not legitimate to use the term oppression to describe our society, because 
oppression is the evil perpetrated by the Others” (1990: 41). She notes that in its
7
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traditional usage, oppression means the exercise of tyranny by a ruling group and carries
a strong connotation of conquest and colonial domination. A paradigmatic example of
oppression as tyranny by a ruling group, Young claims, is the situation of the tribe of
Israel in Egypt. This traditional usage began to shift in social movements in the 1960s.
Young explains “In its new usage, oppression designates the disadvantage and injustice
some people suffer not because a tyrannical power coerces them, but because of the
everyday practices of a well-intentioned liberal society” (41). The new usage includes
the tyranny of one group over another, but also refers to the systematic constraints on
groups that are not necessarily the result of the intentions of a tyrant. Young claims
“oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the results of a few people’s choices or
policies” (41). She explains
Its causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the 
assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of 
following those rules. It names, as Marilyn Fyre puts it, “an enclosing 
structure of forces and barriers which tends to the immobilization and 
reduction of a group or category of people” (Fyre, 1983(a): 11). In this 
extended structural sense oppression refers to the vast and deep injustices 
some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and 
reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural 
stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market 
mechanisms—in short, the normal processes of everyday life. (41)
If we are to address relations of oppression, as liberatory education purports to do, then
we must become aware of assumptions and reactions within the normal processes of
everyday life that perpetuate oppression.
The fifth and final criterion -  that testimony will be amenable to rational work -  
may be thought to be controversial; however, I think it is in keeping with our ordinary 
understanding of witnessing that persons who offer testimony want to be believed. As I 
shall argue later, those who look for witnesses do want us also to pay attention to and
8
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weigh the judgments, assertions, and claims about the significance of their perceptions. 
Testimony is not incorrigible. For testimony to have an epistemological function, it must 
be open to assessment. This presupposes that we have ways of assessing it as true or 
dubious, reliable or false. Beyond the truth of the testimony, there is the further question 
of its significance. All of this is what I try to capture under the broad heading of “rational 
work.” By rational work, I mean simply that we offer and assess our reasons or evidence 
for our beliefs. As believers, we want to have it right or have a reliable account of what 
happened and what it all means (Misak, 2001). That the testimony is amenable to 
rational work does not mean that we exclude emotion from the response of a witness, nor 
that the reasons that we put forward must be devoid of emotion.
This criterion is tricky because we sometimes look to ‘witness’ or ‘testimony’ to 
challenge the status quo or ‘legitimate knowledge.’ In a manner similar to the women in 
the writing group, we may respond as a witness to voices that are not heard in official 
accounts. Further, the testimony may be fragile -  by which I mean the person may retract 
it quickly at any signal of distrust because the testimony challenges or disrupts our 
understanding of the ways things are and perhaps, the person who is giving the testimony 
cannot themselves recognize the experience as possible. Nonetheless, the response of the 
witness, if it is to have an epistemological function, cannot require that the witness accept 
just any account as the best account of how things are. Just how we take up the rational 
work is of critical importance: such work must be sensitive to the situation. Questions of 
when and by whom the rational work is taken up must be addressed.
Before leaving this discussion, I want to note that a final reason for insisting on 
the criterion that testimony be amenable to rational work is that education itself is a
9
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rational endeavor. In making this assertion, I follow R. S. Peters, who suggests that, 
ideally, when we speak of educating someone we intend something other than 
conditioning, indoctrination, or mere socialization. When we educate someone we 
engage in the practice of giving reasons; that is, we ask students to hold a belief because 
of the evidence or reasons there are for the belief. It is generally considered a sign of 
indoctrination if we intend students to hold beliefs regardless of the evidence for those 
beliefs. I turn now to an account of the subsequent chapters in this dissertation.
My inquiry into what it means to be a ‘witness’ and to ‘bear witness’ begins with 
a survey of religious usages of the terms. In the next chapter, Chapter 2 ,1 describe 
conceptions of being a witness and bearing witness from Judaic, Christian, Islamic, and 
Buddhist faith communities through examples that illustrate different senses in which the 
terms are used within each tradition. I conduct this survey because religious conceptions 
of what it means to be a witness are nearly inseparable from how we use the term, aside 
from a strictly legal sense of an eyewitness in a courtroom hearing. That being a witness 
involves a stand against oppression is arguably rooted in religious usages of the idea of 
‘prophetic witness.’ Common uses of ‘being a witness’ in psychotherapy, advocacy work 
for various causes, work for peace and reconciliation, as well as in education, are rooted 
in religious conceptions. As currently used in educational literature, the idea of being a 
witness most often explicitly draws on religious conceptions of witness. Apart from 
being nearly inseparable from other usages of ‘witness,’ religious usages are fertile soil in 
which to root a conception of witness for liberatory aims in education. At the same time, 
religious conceptions of witness may be said to be at the root of much of the violence and 
oppression we see or experience in our daily lives. For me, these concerns only serve to
10
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make it imperative that we understand the religious usages of witness. In Chapter 2 ,1 
identify a family of usages -  in Wittgenstein’s sense of a family -  of witness and bearing 
witness. These usages include being present to the pain and joy of the world, living in 
keeping with one’s beliefs, promises, or convictions within interpretive communities, and 
speaking on behalf of the other against oppression.
In Chapter 3 ,1 critically appraise three proposals in which the authors suggest that 
students respond as a witness as a means of addressing violence and oppression. Roger 
Simon proposes a ‘pedagogy of commemoration’ to challenge students to “rethink the 
logos for making sensible and justifiable practices within which one people establish 
relations of exploitation, dominion, or indifference in regard to another” (1994: 6).
Megan Boler proposes that students engage in a testimonial reading and collective 
witnessing as part of a ‘pedagogy of discomfort.’ Boler’s aim is to teach critical thinking 
“that seeks to transform consciousness in such a way that a Holocaust could never happen 
again” (1999: 157). Sandra Bloom and Michael Reichert argue that it is a moral 
responsibility of teachers and students to bear witness to the violence around them and, as 
a witness, to engage in social activism to stop the traumatic reenactment of violence 
(1998). While I broadly support the aims of these projects to address violence and 
oppression, my critique focuses on the conception of witness in each proposal and 
whether it satisfies the criteria I have outlined for an adequate conception of witness for 
liberatory education.
Both Simon’s and Boler’s proposals are firmly situated in critical literacy or 
liberatory education. Both address what might be called the opposite side of critical 
literacy from that which Freire addresses, in that Boler and Simon both aim for students
11
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to become aware of privilege and power in their assumptions about and actions toward 
others. Bloom and Reichert’s educational proposal is part of what the authors call a 
public health response to violence. This proposal is rooted in trauma theory; however, 
there are links to critical literacy through the strong foothold in liberation theology. 
Though each proposal has intriguing pedagogical features, none of the conceptions of 
witness meet the criteria that I have laid out for an adequate conception of witness for 
liberatory education.
I propose an alternative conception of witness in Chapter 4. Following Heller, I 
claim that each of us look for witnesses and thus begin with the assumption that students 
in our classrooms may, at times, be looking for witnesses. Thinking of particular persons 
in our classrooms as looking for witnesses is a significantly different perspective from 
other attempts to analyze the notion of ‘witness’ in educational literature. I begin with 
the needs of the person looking for a witness, rather than naming the responsibilities 
entailed in listening or responding as a witness. From my analysis of what I take to be 
clear cases in which someone is looking for a witness, I claim that we look for witnesses 
when it seems that everyone has turned away. We look for witnesses in a climate of 
indifference or outright refusal to listen to apprehensions that we believe others should 
attend to. Simply put, we can say that to be a witness is to be someone who does not turn 
away -  who listens and hears what the other has to say. I argue that witness is best 
conceptualized as a particular sort of relation akin to Nel Noddings’ conception of a 
relation of care. A ‘relation of witness’ is relational in the strong sense that we can 
identify a completion when a person looking for a witness does indeed find a witness.
12
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The completion sustains or restores trust and can make it possible for beliefs and 
experience to be spoken of and thus enter the epistemic community.
In Chapters 5 and 6, respectively, I explicate the moral and epistemological 
dimensions of my conception of witness as a relation. In Chapter 5 ,1 argue that we must 
be ready to respond as a witness because of the trust that is at stake in the completion. 
Conceptualizing witness as a response to a particular person makes my idea of witness 
susceptible to Alison Jagger’s critique of a relation of care, namely that in responding 
solely to the individual, caring forecloses on attention to structural oppression. I draw on 
Cheryl Misak’s interpretation of Charles S. Pierce’s conception of truth and inquiry to 
elaborate what it means to hear or acknowledge the other’s testimony, and make the case 
that my conception of witness does not foreclose on seeing structural oppression.
In Chapter 6 ,1 argue that the relation of witness has a significant contribution to 
make to the generation of situated knowledge, by which I mean knowledge that does not 
in itself perpetuate oppression. Maureen Ford persuasively shows that grounding 
educational practices in the standard view of knowledge obscures claims about 
oppression and privilege and inscribes relations of oppression and privilege in knowledge 
construction practices. Ford suggests that situated knowledges offer more to educators 
because they are (or at least aim to be) politically sensitive (1995: 183). 1 outline Donna 
Flaraway’s conception of situated knowledge and compare it to Misak’s conception of 
truth and inquiry to argue that pragmatists have long been engaged in the generation of 
situated knowledge. I argue that inquiry initiated in the relation of witness satisfies the 
criterion that the testimony be amenable to rational work.
13
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In Chapter 7, the final chapter of the dissertation, I argue that being witnesses for 
one another and attending to the conditions that support this relation should be part of our 
work in schools if education is to help us build relations less defined by oppression and 
violence. I give three examples of students that seem to be looking for a witness to show 
the significance of the relation of witness for liberatory education.
14
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CHAPTER 2
RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF ‘WITNESS’
In this chapter I describe conceptions of being a witness and bearing witness from 
Judaic, Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist traditions through examples that illustrate 
different senses in which the terms are used within each tradition. Understandably, I do 
not provide an exhaustive survey of the usages of ‘bearing witness’ and ‘witness’ within 
these religious traditions. I do cover familiar uses of the terms along with uses that may 
not be as well known to sketch a family, in Wittgenstein’s sense of the term, of religious 
conceptions of being a witness and bearing witness. We can mean quite different things 
when we refer to witness and bearing witness within one religion and within different 
faith communities; however, it is possible to identify a ‘family of usages’ of the terms 
‘witness’ and ‘bearing witness’ across different religious practices. In recognizing the 
ties between traditions, as well as the differences among religious faiths and traditions, I 
pay particular attention to how views of the responsibilities of a witness differently 
characterize how we are to approach one another and our relations with one another. For 
example, there is a strong difference evident in whether we think it our responsibility to 
convert others to our faith, to serve and act on behalf of the other, or to question our own 
understanding and thereby become vulnerable to the other.
I begin my analysis of ‘witness’ with a survey of religious usages because it 
seems that most conceptions of witness are never far removed from religious usages.
This is the case in educational contexts, as well as in psychology, conflict resolution,
15
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environmental conservation, and political activism. Of the proposals for ‘witness’ in 
educational pedagogy critiqued in the next chapter, two are explicitly rooted in religious 
conceptions and the third proposal is clearly in keeping with religious conceptions of 
witness. Further, it is likely that if we advocate ‘witness’ in education, those who adopt 
the proposal will connect the term to religious usages.
The fact that it is difficult to separate ‘witness’ from religious usages holds both 
strengths and dangers for any proposal advocating the idea of witness or bearing witness 
in public schools. In Humanity: A Moral History o f the Twentieth Century, Jonathon 
Glover states succinctly “The evils of religious intolerance, religious persecution and 
religious wars are well known, but it is striking how many protests against and acts of 
resistance to atrocity have also come from principled religious commitment” (1999: 405). 
The strength of religious commitment as a stand against oppression will be clear in the 
usages that I survey. For my project, religious conceptions of witness hold particular 
dangers in assumptions of conversion, possibilities of dogmatism, and strict boundaries 
on communities that foster the uncritically support parochial views or tribal affiliations. 
With the intent of conversion, one’s encounter with the other is dominated by how to 
effectively convince him or her of the truth of your position. A sole focus on conversion 
functions to make the other over in one’s own image, and does not allow a challenge to 
your own position. Dogmatism is found in narrow interpretations of scripture or 
teachings that are not held open as fallible. Closely related are questions regarding one’s 
responsibilities to the stranger — someone outside of the fold, the enemy perhaps. These 
are dangers of the terms, whether or not religious usages of the idea of witness are drawn 
on explicitly. We cannot proceed blind to these dangers. In my survey, I choose
16
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accounts or examples from each religion that, at least in part, answer the dangers and
illustrate the fertile soil that we draw on with religious conceptions of ‘witness.’
In selecting accounts for each religion, I have been careful to select those written
by people within the tradition. In other words, each reference cited in the section on
Judaism is someone who identifies him or her self as a member of the Jewish faith. In his
edited collection called Progressive Muslims, Omid Safi is clear on how he means to
speak of religion.
One level is the normative, theological way, when self-designated (or 
selected) representatives speak with the weight of authority, and feel 
perfectly entitled to make statements like “Catholicism states...” “Judaism 
teaches us th a t...,” and of course, “Islam states.. The other way of talking 
about religion is more historical and descriptive, less theological, and more 
people centered. The followers of this perspective are likely to say, “This 
Jewish group practice the following ritual, while other Jewish groups practice 
otherwise.. “These Muslim groups hold this interpretation of jihad, while 
their interpretations are opposed by the following groups. (2003: 21)
I work to follow his guidelines because it challenges a tendency to see religious
communities as unified and as something fixed, rather than as interpretive communities
of people each working out what it means to be a Muslim, a Christian, a Jew, or a
Buddhist. I include scripture or teachings from each religion.
Remembrance in Judaism
In the tradition of Judaism, what it means to be a ‘witness’ is rooted in the 
deliverance of the tribe of Israel from Egypt and the covenant made with God in the 
wilderness of Sinai. In the history recounted in Exodus, Moses was keeping the flock of 
his father-in-law, Jethro, when he saw a flame of fire out of a bush. The bush was 
blazing, yet it was not consumed. Moses stepped closer to see what was happening and
17
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heard God call to him out of the bush. God said to Moses
I have observed the misery of my people who are in Egypt; I have heard their 
cry on account of their taskmasters. Indeed, I know their sufferings, and I 
have come to deliver them from the Egyptians, and to bring them out of that 
land to a good and broad land, a land flowing with milk and honey, to the 
country of the Canaanites, the Hittites, the Amorites, the Perizzities, the 
Hivities, and the Jebusites. The cry of the Israelites has now come to me; I 
have also seen how the Egyptians oppress them. So come, I will send you to 
Pharaoh to bring my people, the Israelites out of Egypt. (Exodus 3:7-10)
Moses argued with God, but in the end agreed to lead the tribe. Pharaoh refused Moses’
request to let the tribe of Israel free, and there followed ten plagues—each brought on, it
is said, by Pharaoh’s continued refusal to let the Israelites go. At the tenth plague many
of the tribe of Israel fled from Egypt. The clearest moment of triumph is when God
parted the waters of the Red Sea and Moses led the people of Israel on to dry ground as
the Pharaoh’s army floundered in the sea behind them. After the crossing, the prophet
Miriam took a tambourine in her hand and all the women followed her dancing with
tambourines. Miriam sang to them “Sing to the Lord, for he has triumphed gloriously;
horse and rider he has thrown into the sea” (Exodus: 15:21).
On the third new moon after the Israelites escaped from Egypt they came to the 
wilderness of Sinai. Moses went up to the mountain and God spoke to Moses again, 
telling him
You have seen what I did to the Egyptians, and how I bore you on eagles’ 
wings and brought you to myself. Now therefore, if you obey my voice and 
keep my covenant, you shall be my treasured possession among all peoples. 
Indeed, the whole earth is mine, but you shall be for me a priestly kingdom 
and a holy nation. These are the words that you shall speak to the Israelites. 
(Exodus 19:4-6)
God also told Moses that he wanted to speak directly to the people of Israel so that they 
would trust Moses. In the midst of thunder, fire, smoke, and the sound of trumpets, God
18
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descended to the mountain and spoke to the people, giving them the Ten Commandments 
or what are referred to in Hebrew as the ten d ’varim, the ten sayings. The tribe of Israel 
were witnesses of God’s address. The memory of deliverance from Egypt and the 
covenant with God is passed from generation to generation. In retelling the memory, it is 
as if subsequent generations were also witnesses as if they too were present to hear God’s 
command.
One way the memory of deliverance from Egypt is passed on to children is in the 
celebration of Passover or Pesach. At the Passover Seder, the youngest child at the table 
recites the first question “What makes this night different than any other night?” The 
journey is recounted over the course of the meal in answer to the child’s first question 
and the questions that follow in the prayer book or Haggadah. While all Haggadah 
follow a similar format of questions and answers, there are many different versions of the 
prayer book. The version I want to draw attention to was read in Berlin at one of several 
Passover Seders for the She ’erith Hapletah or ‘the few who escaped’ soon after liberation 
of the camps. In A Survivor’s Haggadah, Yosef Dov Sheinson’s Yiddish text and Ben 
Benyamin’s woodcuts of life in the camps are interwoven with the traditional Passover 
liturgy to tell the story of deliverance from Pharaoh in Egypt parallel to the story of the 
few who escaped from Hitler. Both men are survivors of the camps. In the prayer book, 
the Yiddish words “We were slaves to Hitler in Germany” echo the biblical text “We 
were slaves to Pharaoh in Egypt.” The Hebrew injunction “In every generation one 
should regard oneself as though he had come out of Egypt” is followed by the Yiddish 
commentary “From parents to children, from generation to generation, the story of the
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Exodus from Egypt is passed on as a personal memory; it never pales or loses its luster.
In each and every generation one should regard oneself as though he had come out of
Egypt” (Touster, 2000: 49). Sheinson continues in Yiddish
Can anything be greater than the wisdom of the ancient commandment? Is 
there anything in the wisdom literature that better teaches us to hate and 
despise slavery and to love freedom, than the story of the bondage and 
exodus from Egypt? Does there exist any ancient memory that could serve as 
symbol for the present and future [better than this]. It is this promise that has 
helped our fathers and us. It is not just one alone who has risen up to destroy 
us; for they have risen up to destroy us in each and every generation. Still the 
Holy One, blessed be He, saves us from their hand. (51)
In the border of this page are the Hebrew words “This is our faith.”
The argument is often made that the obligation to remember the Holocaust is
equal to the obligation to remember the journey from Egypt. In other words, just as in
every generation one should regard oneself as though he [she] has come out of Egypt, so
should each and every generation regard themselves as survivors of Auschwitz. In
“Bearing Witness: Theological Implications Of Second-Generation Literature In
America, ” Alan Berger notes that the distinction between a witnessing generation and
those who come after but are commanded to witness is firmly rooted in Jewish history
and liturgy (1998: 252). Berger argues that this means we think not only of literal
survivors of the camps as witnesses, but also their children, their friends and families, and
members of the House of Israel. So for the children of survivors, Berger claims,
witnessing becomes a moral and theological imperative. It follows that “Second
generation writing [the writing of children of survivors] constitutes secular midrashim,
whose effect is to comment, even if obliquely, on the status of the covenant after
3 Haggadah literally means narrative or retelling and, by extension, is used to refer to the 
prayer book in which the journey from Egypt is retold.
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Auschwitz’’ (254). Midrashim are interpretations or commentaries on Biblical text, 
clarifying or expounding a point of law or elaborating a moral principle. We can think of 
midrashim as interpretations of what it means to live by the covenant. If midrashim are 
the response of a witness to God’s address, then we can say that second-generation 
writing is the response of a witness to the address of a survivor. In both cases, the 
commentaries are part of an interpretive practice through which the community works out 
the status of the covenant and what it means to live by the promise of the covenant. 
Second-generation writing can be thought of as commentary on the covenant and on the 
address of survivors and those who died in the camps. Like the memory of deliverance 
from Egypt, the memory of the Holocaust might be passed from generation to generation 
through particular practices of remembrance that rest on an interpretive discourse.
Emmanuel Levinas’ religious life as an Orthodox Jew, his work as a philosopher, 
and his contributions to the repair or restoration of Jewish life in Europe and Israel after 
the Holocaust all hold central the idea of being a witness. In identifying what he takes to 
be the uniquely Jewish elements of Levinas’ moral theory, philosopher Hilary Putnam 
explains that Moses’ numinous experience at Sinai is not taken as a model for the 
religious experience of the traditional Jew. Rather “the position of the traditional Jew is 
one of feeling a profound experience of being commanded by a God she has not had a 
numinous experience of. The ‘trace’ of God’s presence is the tradition which testifies to 
the commandment and the interpretive community which continues to work out what it 
means” (2002: 47). Putnam argues that Levinas universalizes certain Jewish themes in 
his moral theory, but he doesn’t attempt to convert gentiles to Judaism. Levinas -  as 
Putnam reads his work -  does not want the ‘universal’ audience to adopt the detailed
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mitzvot, which would be entailed in conversion to Judaism, but does universalize the 
commandment to iove mankind’ (47). Levinas calls the response to this command 
‘witness;’ it is a version of what can be called ‘prophetic witness.’ I give three accounts 
of prophetic witness, beginning with Levinas’ account.
Prophetic Witness
For Levinas, prophetic witness is a response to the ‘face of the other.’ In his 
book, Suffering Witness: The Quandary o f Responsibility After the Irreparable, James 
Hatley notes “In [Levinas’] version of prophetic witness, G-d is revealed in the others 
one confronts, particularly those who are in need” (2000: 118). The witness is called into 
an immediate relation with the other’s vulnerability. Hatley notes that for Levinas it is 
not the authority of the prophet or of G-d that commands one, but the proximity of the 
other’s susceptibility. “The command “sounds in one’s mouth as Isaiah’s “hinenif a 
response to G-d’s address that could be translated as “here I am, already at your disposal. 
In the wake of exposure to the other, one “becomes a heart, a sensibility, and hands 
which give” (CP, 168)” (Hatley, 2000: 120). Open in this way, one cannot be indifferent 
to the presence of the other.
Prophetic witness includes deliberative witness, indeed deliberative witness or 
speaking on behalf of the other is presupposed in sincere openness to the other. Speaking 
on behalf of the other follows the model of the prophet’s address. The prophet’s address, 
Hatley explains, expresses G-d’s outrage over the treatment of the poor and needy. As an 
example, Hatley cites the prophet Ezekiel’s address to the crowd. “The weak you have 
not strengthened, the sick you have not healed, the crippled you have not bound up, the
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strayed you have not brought back, the lost you have not sought, and with force and
harshness you have ruled them” (Ezekiel 45: 4). Hatley notes that it is the condition of
the heart that obsesses the prophet’s address. “The indifferent crowd listen to Ezekiel’s
words but “their heart is set on gain” (Ezekiel 33: 31)” (118). Hatley elaborates
The hardness of his audience’s hearts, their indifference to being moved by 
the suffering of others, is what the prophet seeks to resist. In Levinasian 
terms, “the words of the Lord” would have the prophet call his audience back 
to the face-to-face encounter with the other in which the susceptibility of the 
other to violation commands one not only not to harm her or him but also to 
take the bread from out of one’s mouth for the sake of the other {OB, 15).
(118)
“The prophet addressed his audience in order to bring them to a consideration not only of 
the face-to-face encounter but also of their judgments and actions in the wake of this 
encounter” (121). Hatley explains that the prophet could not simply be sincere but must 
also have articulated a vision, a figure, of justice. Sincerity -  melting of one’s heart -  is 
the motivation to speak on the other’s behalf, but paradoxically, at the same time, there is 
a judgement and a vision of justice that is articulated. Let me give two more usages of 
the idea of ‘prophetic witness.’ Both address the violence in Israel and Palestine to name 
a perceived wrong in the treatment of the Palestinian people in the state of Israel.
Marc Ellis, who identifies himself as an American Jew, holds that American Jews
uncritical support of Israel has undermined prophetic witness. He argues
Jews’ relationship to Israel has displaced their relationship with God, and the 
vicarious identification of most American Jews with the state of Israel has 
eclipsed their recognition of their identity and vocation as the people of Israel 
who are bound by an ancient covenant to the God of all nations. This 
vocation entails the obligation to criticize, with the unflinching insistence of 
the Biblical prophets, the community of Israel when it acts in violation of 
God’s will— of universal norms of justice. (Farber, 2003: 125-126)
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Commenting on the status of the covenant, Ellis writes “[T]he covenant remains today in 
a struggle for the life in the heart of every Jew, religious and non-religious alike. It is 
murdered or given life as the other, the Palestinian, is banished or embraced by the 
Jewish community” (1999: 91). Ellis asserts the heritage of the Jews is ethics -  not 
statehood. The single link that binds Jews, in Ellis’ view, is the legacy of Moses and the 
prophets. That legacy is the ethical imperative to stand against oppression. Ellis argues 
that the “only way to fulfill the covenant” in this era of Jewish empowerment (and the 
abuse of that power) is to “remember the victims of Jewish power” and “to embrace the 
Palestinian people as intimate to the covenant itself’ (1999: 59).
Using the term ‘prophetic witness’ in a similar way, Rabbi Michael Lemer
published a statement titled “Prophetic Witness” in Tikkun. Lemer writes “The TIKKUN
Community offers a voice of sanity and reason which recognizes that Israeli self-interest
(as well as Jewish morality) requires that Israel have a full reconciliation with the
Palestinian people” (2002: 8). Lemer continues
We insist that Palestinians and Israelis are equally precious in God’s eyes and 
that the loss of life on both sides is equally tragic and unnecessary. [...] In 
doing so, we approach both sides in a spirit of compassion for the terrible 
pain that both have suffered, and a passionate commitment to alleviate that 
suffering. Yet compassion requires speaking with honesty and integrity, even 
when that forces us to confront difficult truths. This is what we mean by 
Prophetic Witness. (8)
Following a succinct summary of the establishment of the state of Israel, Lemer asserts
“Every act of violence by Palestinians since then has been interpreted by us not as an act
of desperation by a displaced people, but as part of a scenario to wipe us out just like the
Nazis” (9). Lemer also believes that there has been a lack of understanding on part of
Palestinians toward the experience of Jews coming to the newly formed state of Israel.
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Lemer makes concrete recommendations toward resolution of the conflict and ends with 
a call for hope.
So many people have reverted to a deep depression of about the possibility of 
anything but endless war. Yet, it is that belief which is the most dangerous 
element of the picture and likely to be self-fulfilling. Our task is to proclaim 
another possibility and a call to honor the humanity -  This is our Prophetic 
Witness. (11)
Lemer emphasizes the hope in prophetic witness for restoration.
Ellis’ and Lemer’s prophetic witness have in common a critique of society; each 
names what he sees to be a wrong done to others. Ellis claims that prophetic witness as a 
vocation of the people of Israel who are bound in covenant to the God of all nations. For 
Ellis, this vocation entails the obligation to criticize the community of Israel when it acts 
in violation of God’s will -  of universal norms of justice. Lemer’s prophetic witness is 
rooted in a spirit of compassion and the idea that we are all equally precious in the eyes 
of God. In Lemer’s view, such compassion entails the obligation to speak with honesty 
and integrity even when that forces us to confront difficult truths. Both speak to 
challenge the status quo and to move others, much in the same way that Ezekiel’s address 
called attention to suffering that had caused by one’s own hand and was treated with 
indifference.
In sum, the idea of ‘witness’ in Judaic traditions is linked to remembrance of 
being delivered from oppression and entering into a covenant with God. The witness -a  
member of the House of Israel who came out of Egypt -has made a promise in response 
to God’s address from the Mount Sinai. Keeping the covenant entails an ongoing 
interpretive discourse within a community. The three views of prophetic witness have in 
common naming a wrong and moving others to action. Each debates to whom one’s
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responsibilities extend -  who counts as a neighbor -  and what these responsibilities 
entail. For Levinas and Lemer, prophetic witness is rooted in keeping the commandment 
to love one another. The family of usages includes: remembering as if one was present 
and therefore living in a particular way; a response to suffering and oppression rooted in 
the commandment to love one another; and, addressing others, moving them to action.
Christian Witness
Standing against the smooth marble facade of a clothing store on an elite 
shopping arcade in Glasgow, a man in a red plaid flannel shirt called out his witness in a 
hoarse voice. There was no one stopped to listen to him. I paused only a moment in 
front of him and a little longer by the store window to listen. The man told of how he had 
been lost, but now had a friend in Jesus. He spoke to convince us, those passing him on 
the street, that we too had a friend in Jesus. We had only to ask Jesus into our hearts.
The man’s speaking on the street comer to whomever would listen is an example of 
witnessing for Christ. In a similar vein, we can think of Billy Graham’s “massive global 
witnessing project.” The “Global Mission” was expected to reach 175 countries in 100 
languages, reaching a potential nightly congregation of 8 million for three nights through 
satellite coverage to more than 2,200 sites. One million volunteers were trained for the 
campaign. The number of volunteers, the news release states, is in keeping with the 
intent of the mission: one-to-one evangelism (Lee, 1995: 57). This kind of evangelism is 
one sense of the Christian conception of witness. It is rooted in Jesus’ commission to his 
disciples “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of 
the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything
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that I have commanded you. And remember, I am with you always, to the end of the age” 
(Matthew 28: 19-20). These verses are referred to as the ‘Great Commission’ and are 
often understood as a mandate to convert all others to Christianity. Being a witness and 
bearing witness -  in word and deed -  often has the intention of conversion, of bringing 
others to Jesus. For many Christians, persuading others that Jesus is the way to salvation 
is understood as a sacred obligation that defines what it means to be a Christian.
However, within Christianity, witness or witnessing is not only used in reference to 
converting others to Christianity. Broadly, witness is understood as living in keeping 
with your beliefs about what it means to be a disciple of Christ, to live by the gospels.
I look to three Christian traditions to illustrate different usages o f ‘witness’ -  a 
Quaker ethic, the prophetic tradition in African American churches, and Liberation 
Theology in Latin American Catholic churches. I choose these three traditions to 
illustrate senses of witness that emphasize a broad interpretation of prophetic witness as a 
challenge to convention or broadly accepted views of the way things are.
Quaker Witness
George Fox, one of the first leaders of the Society of Friends, refused to “doff his 
hat or give titles of respect” as he went around England in the mid-1600s (James, 1936: 
320). Fox’s refusal to take off his hat is an act of witness. The Quakers, among other 
separatist sects such as the Ranters and the Levelers, emerged during England's Civil War 
period, 1640 to 1680. These groups called for radical changes in society motivated their 
reading of the Gospels. For Quakers, this meant expressing their beliefs through acts of 
nonviolent civil disobedience that often landed them in jail. George Fox’s refusal to
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“doff his hat” is one example. A second example from the early Quakers is Margaret
Fell’s insistence on speaking in public forums at a time when only women in the Royal
family were allowed to speak. Phyllis Mack writes
A primary tenet of early Quakerism was that the hierarchical character of 
gender relationships, indeed of all social relationships, was a product of 
human sinfulness, an outcome of the original Fall from Grace. That Fall had 
shattered humanity into fragments, and the placement of those fragments, far 
from reflecting the moral and aesthetic unity of a universal chain of being, 
were unnatural and imperfect forms of expression and oppression, social 
hierarchies that were to be overcome through the painful annihilation of the 
outward self. (In Brown and Stuard,1989: 39)
The belief that the hierarchical character of social relationships are a product of sin,
underlies Margaret Fell’s challenging the Restoration monarchy’s policies, even though
she spent long periods in prison for it. This belief also underlies George Fox’s refusal to
remove his hat; the action would acknowledge a social hierarchy he believed was false.
William James explains Fox’s action “It was laid on George Fox that these conventional
customs were a lie and a sham, and the whole body of his followers there upon renounced
them, as a sacrifice to truth, and so that their acts and the spirit they professed might be
more in accord” (1936: 320). “That their acts and the spirit they professed might be more
in accord” is a key feature of Quaker witness. The steadfast insistence that one’s actions
be evidence of one’s beliefs has, without question, contributed to the ability of Quakers to
challenge social norms.
A second defining feature of Quaker witness is that each person forms her or his 
own witness. Witness or bearing witness is an act of conscience. Quakers understand 
conscience to be a shard of universal truth, God’s voice imbedded in the self, which is 
called ‘the light’ or ‘the seed’ (Mack in Brown and Stuard, 1989: 37). In current day 
meetings, Quakers speak of two kinds of light that might be experienced in “centering
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down,” the first of five stages in what Gray Cox calls the Quaker ethic. The first kind of 
light is a warm engrossing light and the second is experienced as the light of a beacon 
that beckons one on. Cox explains that “In meeting, people called on by this second sort 
of light tend to grimace, change the ways their legs are crossed and occasionally feel their 
pulse accelerate as the find themselves about to speak” (1985: 9). This is the experiential 
basis for ‘prophetic’ Christianity. This light leads to an experience of disturbed care—a 
feeling of addressing a concern and being addressed by it, at the same time. The concern 
is often called a ‘leading.’ One ‘gathers consensus’ and ‘finds clearness’ regarding this 
leading. The fifth stage of the ethic is bearing witness. Gray Cox explains that bearing 
witness is “not best understood as ‘action’ in the traditional sense of the term, that is, the 
adoption of some means to achieve a goal” (14). The motivation is not achieving some 
end such as peace, but it is, primarily, the conviction that they must bear witness to the 
truth.
Among early Quakers, Quaker women, as well as men, commonly traveled to 
other Quaker communities to enlist others in a particular cause.4 Susan Mosher Stuard 
notes that
While women might join a cause suggested by other Quakers, such as the 
abolition of slavery advocated by the witnessing of a traveling minister,
Quaker women were free to set their own priorities. Furthermore, they were 
enjoined to aid a member of their meeting to formulate her witness even if 
they could not in conscience share it. (Brown and Stuard, 1989: 17)
This last part is especially important. It does happen that a person’s witness may put
them at odds with their congregation. Stuard notes that “Like mindedness was never a
4 My grandmother’s grandmother, Martha Bates, traveled widely in Oklahoma and 
Kansas, before a spilt in the Quaker church largely curtailed this practice for women on 
the more conservative side of the spilt.
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necessary result of thinking prayerfully together about problems” (17). Bearing witness 
is seen as an act of conscience that in the end can lead a woman out of meeting. Stuard 
reports “The dictates of conscience were too individual and disturbing to the norms of 
society for Quaker women to avoid separation from their communities at all times. 
Persevering in the face of isolation has often proved to be the most challenging trial in a 
Quaker woman’s life course” (21). There is a complex blend of individual and 
community in the Quaker ethic. It is vital to ‘sound’ your thinking against others, and yet 
there is something very individual in following the dictates of your conscience. Like- 
mindedness is not required, although one is expected to listen to argument and different 
points of view.
I have named three elements or responsibilities of witness in Quaker practice: 
insistence that one’s actions be evidence of one’s beliefs; forming your own witness; 
bearing witness in response to a leading of conscience, understood as a shard of universal 
truth. We also see a call to conscience in the African-American church.
African-American Prophetic Tradition
Speaking to a university student body on the occasion of Martin Luther King’s 
birthday, Rev. Eugene Rivers referred to the “life and witness of Dr. Martin Luther King 
Jr.”5 Rivers wanted the primarily White student body in the gymnasium to recognize that 
it is a challenge to comprehend the meaning and significance of Martin Luther King’s 
life. We most often consider his message in sound bites, perhaps no more than a phrase 
put at the bottom of a poster published by McDonalds. But our celebration, Rivers
5 Rev. Eugene Rivers spoke at the University of New Hampshire in January 1999.
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claimed, would be a meaningless gesture unless we commemorated the significance of 
King’s message by telling uncomfortable truths. Rev. Rivers noted that King’s witness 
was a prophetic voice and we need prophets. In a style unfamiliar to most of the 
audience, Rivers moved in and out of the cadence of a charismatic preacher and at one 
point commented “I know you’re white, but if someone could just shout ‘I hear you’ now 
and then, I’ll know you’re out there.” Rivers called us to remember that King spoke of 
freedom, liberation, and opportunity for all people. King spoke to transform society, not 
to sell a hamburger.
Martin Luther King Jr. provides a clear example of the prophetic tradition in 
African American churches. As Rivers notes, it is the whole of King’s life that gives 
witness. Dr. King stood on principles rooted in his Christian faith. When King spoke of 
equality, he meant universal equality based in the conviction that we are all equal in the 
eyes of God -  a “beloved community”—not only equality for blacks. June Jordan 
reflects in an essay on Martin Luther King, Jr. that “it took [her] a long time to 
understand that “Beloved Community” means everybody is sacred. Nobody is excluded 
from that deliberate embrace” (Jordan, 1998: 256). King defended the civil rights 
movement on moral and religious grounds. His terms of transformation were clear. In 
1967 in Atlanta, King spoke of love “If you are seeking the highest good, I think you can 
find it through love. And the beautiful thing is that we aren’t moving wrong when we do 
it, because John was right, God is love” (2001: 192).6 And in the next breath, he 
addressed the economic structures that perpetuate injustice.
6 The excerpts here are taken from Martin Luther King Jr.’s address “Where Do We Go 
From Here?” delivered at the Eleventh Annual Convention of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference in Atlanta, Georgia on August 16, 1967.
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I want to say to you as I move to my conclusion, as we talk about “Where do 
we go from here?” that we must honestly face the fact that the movement 
must address itself to the question of restructuring the whole of American 
society. There are forty million poor people here, and one day we must ask 
the question, “Why are there forty million poor people in America? And 
when you begin to ask that question, you are raising a question about the 
economic system, about the broader distribution of wealth. [...] And I’m 
simply saying that more and more, we’ve got to begin to ask questions about 
the whole society. (193)
Rev. King reminds the listeners that we are called upon to help the discouraged beggars
in life’s marketplace, but we must also come to see that the edifice that produces beggars
must be restructured (193). King ends with the hope that we will be able to transform
dark yesterdays into bright tomorrows.7 We can find similar commitments to siding with
the oppressed, recognizing structures that produce oppression, and hope in liberation
theology as it emerged in Latin America.
/
Liberation Theology
A clear example of conversion as domination of others is the conquest of the New 
World. The history of the church in Latin America, as in so many places, has been to 
maintain the status quo and to teach submission with the promise of a reward in Heaven. 
This conquest was not unilaterally supported in Spain. Bartolome de Las Casas, for one, 
wrote to the King of Spain in 1550 to argue that for the sake of his own salvation he must 
stop the domination of people in his name. Christian theologian, Frederick Herzog, 
believes that Las Casas’ challenge is to rethink Christology (the nature of Christ) in the 
light of Matthew 25:31-36, Ephesians 4:15, and the knowledge of what actually took
7 Hope is the fourth element that Cornel West identifies in his conception of ‘prophetic 
thought.’ Elements also include discernment, connection, and tracking hypocrisy. 
West’s usage of ‘prophetic thought’ draws on liberation theology in African American 
Christian traditions.
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place on these shores (1994). These are the verses Herzog draws to our attention:
For I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me 
something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I needed clothes 
and you gave me clothing, I was sick and you took care of me, I was in prison 
and you visited me. Then the righteous will answer him, "Lord, when did we 
see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink?
When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and 
clothe you? When did we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you? The 
king will reply, "I tell you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least of 
these brothers of mine, you did for me. (Matthew 25: 35-36)
By speaking the truth in love, we must grow up into him who is the head, into 
Christ. (Ephesians 4:15)
On this account, then, witness is serving the least among us and speaking the truth in
love. Service to the poor and needy is given precedence over conversion to Christianity.
In the seminal text, A Theology o f  Liberation, Gustavo Gutierrez notes that
Matthew’s text is very demanding -  “Anything you did not do for one of these, however
humble, you did not do for me.” Gutierrez argues that this means “to abstain from
serving is to refuse to love; to fail to act for another is as culpable as expressly refusing to
do it” (1971: 198). The text, Gutierrez reasons, demands a new ethic arising from the
universal principle of love -  a charity that exists “only in concrete actions (feeding the
hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, etc.); it occurs of necessity in the fabric of
relationships among men” (199). We are responsible for the suffering of others. We are
not only responsible for causing harm, but for failing to serve, to act for another.
Gutierrez continues
Charity, the love of God for men, is found incarnated in human love— of 
parents, spouses, children, friends— and leads to fullness. The Samaritan 
approached the injured man on the side of the road not because of some cold 
religious obligation, but because his “heart was melting” (this is literally what 
the verb splankhnizein means in Luke 10: 33), because his love for that man 
was made flesh in him. (199)
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The witness, then, is called to serve and act for another, to live by this ethic of universal 
love.
Liberation theology in Latin America was formalized in the 1968 assembly of the 
Latin American church in Medellin, Columbia. The four central ideas of the movement 
are
(a) A preferential option for the poor. The church must align itself with 
poor people as they demand justice.
(b) Institutional violence. Liberation sees a hidden violence in social 
arrangements that create hunger and poverty.
(c) Structural sin. Liberation theologians argued that there is a social 
dimension that is more than the sum of individual acts. Neocolonialism is 
one example. By extension, the redemption from sin won by Christ must 
be more than the redemption of individual souls. It must redeem, 
transform the social realities of human life.
(d) Orthopraxis. The term is meant as a counterpoint to the insistence on 
orthodoxy, meaning correct belief. Liberation theologists argue that what 
is most fundamental is correct action-that is, effort leading to human 
liberation. (Allen, 2000).
These central ideas are strongly influenced by a Marxist analysis of class struggle. The
Vatican has since taken a strong stance against liberation theology, largely because the
‘base communities’ existed independent of clerical oversight and seemed to represent a
model of “church from below” (Allen, 2000). As in the African-American prophetic
traditions, the reading of the Bible does not focus on submission, but rather on freedom
from oppression. Notice a focus on the structures of oppression as Martin Luther King
Jr. had began to move to in the year before he was assassinated.
In sum, prophetic witness is a critique of society. Fox’s refusal to take off his hat 
is an act of witness, understood in a Quaker ethic as an act of conscience. This act is 
evidence of the belief that all people are equal in the eyes of God. Notably, for the 
Quakers, this equality did include women. We can say that the whole of Martin Luther
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King Jr's life gave witness to his conviction that all men are equal in God's eyes. Within 
the prophetic wing of Black church, witness is speaking out against oppression in a way 
that one claims one’s humanity or equality with all others in what King called the 
‘beloved community.’ For King, among others, speaking out against oppression includes 
helping the poor who are discouraged, but also questioning the structures of society that 
produce poverty. Liberation theology, as it emerged in Latin America, proposes an 
understanding of the nature of Christ that calls Christians to respond to the suffering of 
others and accept responsibility not only for causing harm, but also for failing to act. The 
witness is called to serve and act for the other. We can see a similar emphasis on the 
structures of society in all three examples of prophetic witness. A family of usages of 
witness from Christian traditions includes: bearing witness focused on conversion; acting 
in keeping with your beliefs, your reading of the Bible; a critique of society that includes 
working for justice, and; accepting responsibility for those in need by serving and acting 
on their behalf.
Bearing Witness in Islam
There are five pillars of faith in Islam. The first pillar or practice of faith is 
shahadah, which is translated as bearing witness or testimony. Daily prayers, or salat, 
form the second pillar of Islam. Making the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca, fasting during 
Ramadan, and alms-giving are the third, fourth, and fifth practices or pillars of Islam. Of 
the five pillars, I focus only on the shahadahs. The two testimonies are said first in a 
profession of faith in converting to Islam and are repeated in prayers said five times each 
day facing the direction of Mecca. The first shahadah is the phrase “La ilaha ilia ’ Llah,”
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which is usually translated as “There is no god but God.” And the second testimony is 
“Muhammadun rasul Allah” or “Muhammad is the messenger of God.” The shahadahs 
proclaim the unity of God and Muhammad as a prophet of God. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 
explains that at the heart of Islam stands the reality of the oneness of God, “the One Who 
is at once transcendent and immanent, greater than all we can conceive or imagine, yet, as 
the Quran [...] attests, closer to us than our jugular vein” (2002: 3). Attestation to the 
oneness of God -  called tawhid -  is the axis around which all that is Islamic revolves (3).
Nasr writes of the relationship between witness, martyr, and the supreme
testification or shahadah to the oneness of God. He notes that etymologically martyr
and witness are related in Arabic, as they are in Greek. The term ‘martyr’ in Arabic is
shahid, while the word for ‘witness’ is shahid. Both words are related to the term for the
supreme testification, shahadah.8 Nasr continues
In the truly spiritual sense, the shahid is the person who has bom witness 
with his or her whole being to Divine Oneness. He or she has made the 
supreme sacrifice of his or her own life for the sake of God, a sacrifice that 
has been truly for God and not for any worldly cause. Such people go to 
paradise because they have given their life in all sincerity to God. (270)
In reference to the shahid, or martyr, Nasr asks the reader to recall the hadith of the
Prophet, “The ink of the scholar is more precious than the blood of the martyr.” Nasr
understands the hadith to mean “that although martyrdom is such an exalted state, the
inner jihad leading to knowledge of God and His revelation (hence the ink of the scholar)
is of even higher value” (270). Both are senses of ‘witness.’ I will take up the inner
8 The English term ‘martyr’ is derived from the Greek word martos, which also means 
witness. Nasr makes the point that in both Christianity and Islam “martyr” has the same 
root meaning, and furthermore in both traditions the same symbols are used to describe 
the martyr.
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devotion and the effort to extend a moral or just society in turn; however, I will not 
emphasize the term jihad. For non-Muslims the idea of a jihad  brings to mind only 
terrorism and violent action, a ‘holy war.’ As the roots of jihad  speak primarily to the 
question o f true intention or devotion, the term can be translated as effort or striving in 
the path o f God. I will use devotion rather than the term jihad?
Remembrance of God -  Inner Devotion
In Islamic traditions, Nasr explains, man (or person) is not seen primarily as a
sinful being to whom the message of Heaven is sent to heal the wound of original sin, but
rather as a being who still carries his primordial nature within himself, under layers of
negligence (6). Nasr elaborates
The message of Islam is addressed to that primordial nature. It is a call for 
recollection, for the remembrance of a knowledge kneaded into the very 
substance of our being even before our coming into this world. In a famous 
verse that defines the relationship between human beings and God, the 
Quran, in referring to the precosmic existence of man, states “’Am I not your 
Lord?’ They said: ‘Yes, we bear witness’” (7:172). The “they” refers to all 
the children of Adam, male and female, and the “yes” confirms the 
affirmation of God’s oneness by us in our pre-eternal ontological reality. (7)
God is understood to be both transcendent and immanent; or both beyond human
experience and within one’s experience, present to us always. Nasr explains “The heart
of Islam is also the Islam of the heart, which is that spiritual value, or ihsan, that enables
us “to see God everywhere” and to be His “eyes, ears, and hands” in this world” (314).
This idea is expressed in the Quran sura “Whithersoever ye turn, there is the Face of
9 Jihad is the effort to live a devout life -  The performance of all acts of worship involve 
jihad -  one cannot pray five times each day without effort. Jihad is required in acts of 
worship, in our relation with God, but our relations to humans should also be carried out 
ethically and ju stly -th is  requires effort, jihad. (Nasr, 2002)
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God.” (2:115). Shams of Tabriz, a Sufi, expresses the same idea “The Kaaba is in the 
middle of the world. All faces turn toward it. Take it away, See! Each is worshipping 
the soul of each.” In Sufism, or what is referred to as the mystical path within Islam, 
repeating the sha.had.ahs with sincere intention is one way of coming to experience 
firsthand the unity of God, to experience God everywhere.
Justice and the Moral Society -  Devotion Turned to Others
In the same vein as the prophetic tradition of Judaism and Christianity,
Muhammad calls his followers to work against oppression.
The prophet Muhammad advised Muslims, ‘Help your brother [the Muslim] 
whether he is the oppressor or the oppressed.’ When the Prophet was asked 
how to help him if he is the oppressor, he replied: ‘Hold his hand from 
oppression’ (Al-Juzuyyah, 1993). The Hadith points out: ‘Every one of you 
is a shepherd and each one of you is responsible for his flock’ (Nagati, 1993).
(In Al-Krenawi and Graham, 2000: 293)
This effort to help your brother is made because you are a witness.
In Progressive Muslims on Justice, Gender, and Equality, editor Omid Safi
asserts “A progressive Muslim agenda is concerned with the ramifications of the premise
that all members of humanity have this same intrinsic worth because, as the Qur’an
reminds us, each of us has the breath of God breathed into our being” (2003: 3). Safi
challenges the interpretation of jihad as “holy war” against Westerns and the Muslim
apologist interpretation of jihad as a purely inner struggle against our selfish tendencies.
In Safi’s view, neither “interpretation takes into consideration the possibility of engaging
and transforming the social order and the environment in a just and pluralistic fashion
that affirms the humanity of us all” (8). Justice lies at the heart of Islamic social ethics.
“Time and again the Qur’an talks about providing for the marginalized members of
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society: the poor, the orphan, the downtrodden, the wayfarer, the hungry, etc.” (9). In the 
Sunni tradition, Safi states, “there is the vibrant memory of the Prophet repeatedly talking 
about how a real believer is one whose neighbor does not go to bed hungry’ (9). Safi 
holds that we should think of all humanity as our neighbor. “The time has come for us to 
be responsible for the well-being and dignity of all human beings if we wish to be 
counted as real believers” (9). This claim is remarkable similar to Michael Lemer’s and 
to Mark Ellis’ prophetic witness in Jewish faith, and to the Christology that Herzog 
proposes is at the heart of liberation theology in Christian faith.
The guidance for efforts for justice should be based in a ‘generous reading’ of the
Quran and Prophetic example, argues Rabia Terri Harris. In Windows o f Faith: Muslim
Women Scholar-Activists in North America, Harris emphasizes that “Islam is surrender.
It means learning to cede control” (2000: 185). But, in her view, this trust is not passive
or lazy. She writes “We know that jihad, effort, is necessary to our well-being. Human
beings are created to act: without action there can be no divine service” (186). Harris
argues that “Social action (al-jihad al-asghar, the lesser struggle) is directed toward
alleviating forced passivity” (186). Passivity imposed is oppression. To know in what
ways we should make our efforts for justice, against oppression, Muslims are “left the
Prophetic example and al-Qur’an al -Karim, the Generous Reading, for guidance” (190).
The reading of the Quran, Harris argues, should not be left in the hands of a few clerics.
She argues that the interpretation of what God has said and done should be open.
Surely those who must be guided, to whom the message was sent, are the 
ones who are intended to absorb it. And surely Allah is capable of speaking 
to the people we are, to all of the people we are, just as we are capable of 
speaking to each other. Allah has designed us for hearing from the 
beginning. (190)
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Harris argues that the narrowness and rigidity exemplified in narrow literal readings of
the Quran is a direct consequence of not wanting to listen, of unwillingness to take
responsibility for listening. For Muslims, Harris argues,
our appointed object is more and more dependably to come to embrace the 
truth: to be faithful to it. This goal requires a vigorous and unrelenting 
examination of ourselves, our world, and our guidance. And it is here that 
the social project of sincerity runs into its greatest difficulty, for such 
examination requires a degree of energy that many people are unwilling or 
unable to devote. (191)
In the struggle for justice, Harris believes, Muslims must all look truthfully and with
devotion to follow the signs Allah has laid out for those who will listen.
Safi broadens Harris’ generous reading of the signs further to an openness to 
engage in sources of compassion and wisdom, no matter where they originate. Such 
engagement is the sign of pluralism, the strength of pluralism, in Safi’s view. Safi notes 
that studying Christian liberation theology, for example, might ultimately help us recover 
voices that speak out on behalf of the oppressed in Islam. Safi is clear that “Islam” as 
such teaches us nothing. “The prophet Muhammad does. Interpretive communities do. I 
would argue that God does, through the text of the Qur’an. But in the case of texts, there 
are human beings who read them, interpret them, and expound their meanings. Even our 
encounter with the Prophet is driven by different (and competing) textual presentations of 
his life, teachings, and legacy. In all cases, the dissemination of Divine teachings is 
achieved through human agency. Religion is always mediated” (22). We cannot afford 
to close discussions.
In sum, bearing witness as a statement of faith is the first pillar of Islam. It is 
understood as an attestation to the oneness of God; saying the shahadahs confirms God’s 
oneness and for the Sufis, is an experience of God’s oneness. Being a witness means
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devotion. This devotion may be focused inward in prayer and practices of remembrance. 
And although spoken of as inward devotion, it is expressed outwardly in hospitality or 
welcoming the stranger. Being a witness also entails a commitment to extend a just and 
moral society. Devotion is based on the example of the prophets and on scripture. The 
interpretive community -  who is allowed to read the signs -  is debated. Harris argues 
that it should extend to all Muslims, not just clerics.
Buddhism
In an interview about his novel, Anil’s Ghost, Michael Ondaatje said that he felt a 
kind of responsibility to write the book set in Sri Lanka’s civil war.10 Ondaatje, who 
himself emigrated to Canada from Sri Lanka, says that in researching the book he 
listened to people as a witness. As he listened to people tell him of their experience of 
the war, he said that he did not judge, but rather tried to understand what it would be like 
to live with the fear caused by the war. In the novel, Anil Tissera returns to her native Sri 
Lanka as a forensic anthropologist with an international human rights organization after 
an absence of more than fifteen years. There is frequent violence in the streets. Men and 
women have disappeared. In their investigation, Anil and Sarath, her colleague, enlist the 
help of Ananda to reconstruct the face of the victim from a skeleton. Before the war, 
Ananda had been someone who was to paint eyes on the Buddha image in a ceremony 
called Netra Mangala. The ceremony is explained to Anil: “Netra means “eye.” It is a 
ritual of the eyes. A special artist is needed to paint eyes on a holy figure. It is always
10 Ondaatje notes “from the mid-1980's to the early 1990's, Sri Lanka was in a 
crisis that involved three essential groups, the government, the antigovemment insurgents
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the last thing done. It is what gives the image life. Like a fuse. The eyes are a fuse. It
has to happen before a statue or a painting in a vihara can become a holy thing” (2000:
97). Ondaatje elaborates “The eyes must be painted in the morning, at five. The hour the
Buddha attained enlightment. ...Without the eyes there is no existence. The artificer
brings to life sight and truth and presence” (99). At the end of the novel, Ananda
performs Netra Mangala, painting the eyes on a new statue of Buddha. Ondaatje writes
“This is what he felt. As an artificer now he did not celebrate the greatness of a faith.
But he knew if he did not remain an artificer he would become a demon. The war around
him was to do with demons, spectres of retaliation” (304). I recount this passage
because of the central idea of ‘sight’ in Buddhist traditions. The term ‘witness’ seems to
be quite recently adopted in Buddhist traditions in response to violence. We find witness
in practices of ‘Engaged Buddhism.’
In an interview American Buddhist, Gary Snyder was asked if there were ways
that Buddhism might benefit from Christian or Occidental religious traditions. Gary
Snyder answered that practitioners from Western culture and being probably from
Christian or Jewish backgrounds, are already bringing those things into Buddhism, by
virtue of their personalities and their background. Snyder continues
My own view is that Buddhists can profit from, but wouldn’t necessarily 
want to emulate, an understanding of the Christian concern for history, and 
the historical fact of the Christian concern for personality, as a kind of 
leavening in the evolution in Buddhist thought. I think that the Buddhist 
sects also have to admire the commitment of certain Christian sects, such as 
the Quakers, to peace, and the Christian idea of witness and bearing witness 
as a matter of conscience. It has pitfalls from a Buddhist standpoint, pitfalls 
of ego-stimulation. But that side of Christian engagement is admirable. It 
certainly can be learned from. Buddhists can learn from, or at least take note
in the south, and the separatists guerillas in the north. [...] Today the war in Sri Lanka 
continues in a different form” (Author’s Note, cover page).
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of, the section of the Church that is doing liberation theology. Buddhism has 
been quiescent, socially, for much of its history, and what and how it 
becomes more active in the social sphere is going to be very interesting. I’m 
sure it will, because in the West everybody gets more social. And also the 
power makes a difference: political action, political involvement, makes a 
difference in a pluralistic democracy, whereas in a traditional Asian culture 
there’s very little direct political action possible. (Ingram, et al, 1988: 25)
Snyder describes a change in social involvement in Buddhist practice, a change that may
have been influenced by other religious traditions, but is not limited to Buddhism in the
West. Here I consider three examples of witness in Buddhist practice -  Thich Nhat Hanh
and the Tiep Hien Order, Bernard Glassman and the Peacemaker Order, and the Think
Sangha.
Engaged Buddhism
Thich Nhat Hanh was exiled from his country in 1966 because of his work for
peace. In a journal entry written on July 12, 1965, Hahn states “Engaged Buddhism in
Vietnam teaches that good works do not need to be reserved for the pagoda, but can be
extended to towns and villages” (1966: 196).11 Thu, a young man working at the
monastery in Saigon, replied to a question about his work “People are suffering so much
that even the Buddha no longer sits in the temple all the time” (196). Hanh explains
It does not make sense for students of the Buddha to isolate themselves inside 
a temple, or they are not his true students. Buddhas are to be found in places 
of suffering. Thu said it perfectly. We do not to need to borrow the words of 
Teilhard de Chardin, Karl Barth, or Martin Buber to tell us what do to. We 
are already, in our own way, bringing about a revolution in Buddhist 
teaching. Young people like Thu are leading the way into new streams of 
Buddhist thought and action. They are giving birth to an engaged Buddhism. 
(197)
11 The journals, titled Fragrant Palm Leaves, were kept during the years 1962-1964. 
The journals were published in English translation in 1998.
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Here we can see a change in Buddhist practice in response to the suffering of people, 
particularly the suffering brought on by the war. Hanh says that the only reason Buddha 
was in the temple was because people put him there. The founding of the Tiep Hien 
Order in the middle of the Vietnam War was a break with the 2500 year tradition of 
apoliticism (Knabb, 2002).
Hanh speaks directly of being a witness in his poems on the war in Vietnam. One
such poem is titled “The Witness Remains.”
Flarebombs bloom on the dark sky.
A child claps his hands and laughs.
I hear the sound of guns, 
and the laughter dies.
But the witness 
remains.
Thich Nhat Hanh comments on this poem that flarebombs are to detect the presence of 
enemies. He writes “When you are dominated by fear, anyone can be seen as an enemy, 
even a little child. The witness is you. And me” (1993: 26). We are the ones who see in 
a way dominated by fear and also the ones who can hear the child’s laughter die. In his 
teaching, Thich Nhat Hanh stresses that in Buddhism the most important precept of all is 
to live in awareness, to know what is going on. To live in awareness entails recognizing 
our responsibility to one another, seeing our selves as co-responsible. As I understand it, 
as witnesses, we are co-responsible for the bombs and the child’s laughter dying.
We can also see the idea of witness in Hanh’s work in reconciliation. He explains 
“Reconciliation is to understand both sides, to go to one side and describe the suffering 
being endured by the other side, and then to go to the other side and describe the 
suffering that is endured by the first side. Doing only that will be a great help for peace.”
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(1987:70). Here we see an emphasis on compassion and understanding of both sides 
similar to Michael Lemer’s statement of prophetic witness that involved an 
understanding of both sides in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict.
Zen Peace-Making Order
The Zen Peacemaker Order founded by Roshi Bemie Glassman in 1994. In the 
prologue to his book Bearing Witness, Glassman recounts that he wanted a place to 
explore questions such as: “What keeps us feeling separate from each other? What keeps 
us thinking we know the right way? What keeps us from seeing our unity, from 
appreciating everything as it is? And what are the peacemaking forms that will help all 
beings experience their interdependence? From this exploration three tenets have 
emerged: not-knowing, bearing witness, and healing. In Glassman’s terms, the first tenet, 
‘not knowing,’ demands separation from the familiar, conditioned world of knowing and 
thus, allows the opening of a beginner’s mind. The second tenet, ‘bearing witness,’ 
emphasizes being fully present to the suffering and joy in oneself and in the world. And 
the third tenet is ‘healing oneself and others’ through returning to the world with the 
aspiration of liberating oneself and others from suffering.
Glassman writes about these tenets in connection with the regular retreats the 
Order holds in Auschwitz. “At Auschwitz it is not hard to let go of fixed ideas. The place 
itself, with its endless gray skies overlooking miles of barbed wire and crumbling 
extermination compounds, is so terrifying that no matter how much we prepare for the 
visit, no matter how much we've read about it or pondered, it overwhelms us” (1996).
The group reads the names of people who were killed in the gas chambers. Glassman
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explains
For telling names is like telling stories. When we recite the name out loud, 
dead bones come to life, the bones of men, women, and children from all 
over Europe. They lived, some grew up, some married, some had children, 
and all died. Their names become our names, their stories, our stories. That is 
what happens when we bear witness.
In bearing witness to a situation, Glassman holds, we become each and every aspect of
that situation. Thus, when we bear witness to Auschwitz, at that moment there is no
separation between us and the people who died. Further, Glassman points out, there is
also no separation between us and the people who killed. “We ourselves, as individuals,
with our identities and ego structure, disappear, and we become the terrified people
getting off the trains, the indifferent or brutal guards, the snarling dogs, the doctor who
points right or left, the smoke and ash belching from the chimneys. When we bear
witness to Auschwitz, we are nothing but all the elements of Auschwitz.” Glassman
continues “If I really bear witness, if I become all the voices of Auschwitz, then it is
myself that I am forgiving, no one else. [...] When we're bearing witness to Auschwitz,
we're doing nothing other than bearing witness to aspects of ourselves. Only when we
see that all these demons are nothing other than us, can we actually take action.” Joan
Halifax, a teacher in the Peacemaking Order, puts it this way “We are the story as we
bear witness; we become one with the story” (1999: 178).
Think Sangha
Think-Sangha is a diverse group of Buddhists from different parts of the world 
which has focused on producing Buddhists critiques of social structures and alternative 
social models, and providing materials and resource people for trainings, conferences, 
and research on social issues and grassroots activism. I relate the work of the group at a
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meeting in Thailand with the theme “Buddhist Responses to Modem Violence.”
Jonathon Watts explains that the participants were asked to talk about how their 
Buddhist identity influenced, either as a support or as a hindrance, their social activism. 
The group was introduced to Johan Galtung’s work concerning direct, structural, and 
cultural violence. Galtung posits three different faces of violence:
1. Direct violence, which is the act of actual harming.
2. Structural violence which is the systems, institutions, and structures 
that may lead to direct violence, yet which also embody a whole 
process of violence.
3. Cultural violence, which is the symbols, images, and customs that 
legitimize structural and direct violence. (Watts, 2003: 24)
The relation between the three can be understood with the image of an iceberg -  direct
violence is the apex of the iceberg poking out of the water, structural and cultural
violence form its base. The latter two may be hidden from sight depending on the
perceiver’s social awareness. Watts adopts a use of bearing witness to mean breaking the
silence.
Ouypom Khuankaew, who works in the Buddhist women’s activist network 
called the International Women’s Partnership (IWP), runs workshops across southeast 
and south Asia on women’s leadership, empowerment, and nonviolence. She began the 
session following the outline of structural violence with four women telling their stories. 
These accounts of experience, Khuankaew explains, point to the need for a radical 
reinterpretation of the central concepts, such as the idea of ‘karma.’ Khuankaew used the 
idea of ‘structural karma’ to refer to the way the teaching of karma in Buddhism has 
come to devalue women and create a structure (and a culture) of patriarchy into which 
both women and men are inculcated (25). She argued that intention must be taken into 
account in the teaching of karma. In their work, the women’s activist network enlarged
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the perspective of karma from the popular interpretation - “what you did” to include the 
issue of complicity - “what you didn’t do”—and finally to one also imbued with 
intention—“what you can do” (25). Khuankaew notes that women need to move beyond 
seeing their suffering as a result of individual karma for which they are to blame -  to 
identifying violence, understanding root causes, looking for solutions, then working for 
change (26). Karma can be understood as intentional, moral action and not passive 
acceptance of the results of past acts.
Watts concludes
Over these days we developed an experiential process which began with 
storytelling and the sharing of personal experiences, and then moved into 
deeper structural analysis of the issues that emerged from these stories.
Along the way, we found ourselves deeply engaged in “ethical praxis,” that 
is, working as a dialogical community to explore and negotiate acts of 
personal-social transformation. (29)
The act of storytelling, in Watts’ view, does not only expose injustice, but acts
therapeutically. For the speaker, it serves as an act of bearing witness and gaining
recognition after a long period of existing in silence and marginalization. For the listener,
it can awaken feelings of remorse and compassion in being witness to the real pain of
others (29). The storytelling establishes trust. If this trust is not established in the first
act of storytelling, then structural analysis will not be embedded in an ethical praxis of
dialogical communication. Watts uses the term ‘bearing witness’ to refer to telling an
experience of violence, breaking the silence. Watts holds that this Buddhist model of
ethical praxis goes beyond theorizing about dialogical community by some western
thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas. The difference that Watts sees is that it integrates the
nonargumentative but completely essential act of storytelling and second, it integrates the
act of inner transformation as an essential foundation to ethical praxis. The women’s
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work in the International Women’s Partnership provides a framework for profound 
interpretations of accepted doctrine through bearing witness and responding as a witness.
I have given three examples of ‘witness’ and ‘bearing witness’ in what might be 
called engaged Buddhism. The term ‘witness,’ if understood to have to do with social 
justice and a struggle against oppression, represents a fairly recent change in Buddhist 
practice. The family of usages of the term ‘witness’ is more limited in Buddhist practice, 
because the term does seem to be largely adopted. However, as Thich Nhat Hanh points 
out, the roots of social involvement can be traced in Buddhist thought. These roots 
include compassion, sight, and a sense of ‘oneness.’ Bemie Glassman defined bearing 
witness as being fully present to the suffering and joy in oneself and in the world. We are 
the elements of Auschwitz, all the voices of Auschwitz. We are the story as we bear 
witness -  it is thoroughly experiential. The women’s work as portrayed in the meeting of 
the Think Sangha is a clear example of interpretive communities within Buddhist 
practice.
Conclusion
The three Abrahamic traditions have much in common in the way that witness is 
used. In each faith, we can find the idea of witness as a stand against oppression. A 
family of usages includes: speaking on behalf of the other against oppression; being 
present to the pain and joy of world; and living in keeping with one’s beliefs, promises, 
or convictions within ongoing interpretive communities. The same can be said of 
Buddhist traditions. The accounts I have selected illustrate the fertile soil that we draw 
on when we speak of religious conceptions of witness. I named three dangers in the
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introduction to this chapter: the assumption of conversion; dogmatism; and closed 
boundaries on the community and on who is allowed to interpret scripture. The examples 
support the position that the dangers can be addressed within faith communities.
Writing on the relation between religion and ethics, Emmanuel Katongole states 
“In the absence of a “story of stories,” rational contact between traditions takes the form 
of witness” (172). In his view, “witness, as a form of contact between historically 
constituted traditions, affirms the realization that no one tradition is in possession of the 
truth. If that were the case, then contact between historical constituted traditions would 
take the preferred form of imposition or enforcement. Instead, the historical nature of 
truth makes contact between groups as necessarily hermeneutical” (172). Katongole sees 
witness as a kind of confrontation between historically constituted forms of truths, an 
interpretive dialogue which is capable of generating critical attentiveness by which truth 
is dialectically recognized, revised, or extended (172). We’ve seen this kind of witness at 
work within the interpretive practice I have described in this chapter. Such a conception 
of witness does not exclude, and indeed, supports, the connection between witness and 
oppression, interpretive practice, and living in keeping with your beliefs.
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CHAPTER 3
‘WITNESS’ IN EDUCATIONAL LITERATURE
In this chapter, I critically appraise three contemporary proposals that employ the 
notions of ‘witness’ and ‘bearing witness’ in education. In the first proposal, a 
“pedagogy of commemoration,” Roger Simon argues that students should take on the 
obligations of a witness to remember particular events of what he calls ‘historical trauma’ 
in a way that does not reproduce relations of hate. In the second proposal I examine, a 
“pedagogy of discomfort,” Megan Boler advocates a testimonial reading practice in 
which students engage in ‘collective witnessing’ to trace how our emotions may be 
informed by dominant discourses in ways that result in learned patterns of inattention. In 
the third proposal, Sandra Bloom and Michael Reichert assert that a “collective 
responsibility to bear witness” is vital to control ever-widening cycles of violence 
engulfing society. Students and teachers are asked to respond as witnesses to the 
violence that they see around them. In each of these different proposals, being a witness 
or witnessing is a particular kind of response that works to eliminate relations of violence 
and oppression. Two conceptions of witness, that of Simon and that of Bloom and 
Reichert, explicitly draw on religious usages of witness as a stand against violence.
Boler’s conception of witness is in keeping with these usages, even though she does not 
explicitly draw on them.
Both Simon’s and Boler’s pedagogy are firmly rooted in liberatory pedagogy. As 
noted in Chapter 1, in the paradigmatic example in liberatory education a teacher presents
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a text from a dominant discourse to students from a disadvantaged group with the aim of 
empowering those students to see and challenge ideologies in the dominant culture 
surrounding them (Endres, 2001: 407). In Simon’s and Boler’s pedagogy students 
examine texts; however, both seem to assume that the texts are presented to a privileged 
group with the aim of becoming aware of privilege. Bloom and Reichert draw their 
conception of witness from actions that are rooted in the commitments expressed in 
liberation theology; they call us all to bear witness to the violence so that we can liberate 
ourselves from “the traumatic re-enactment of violence” (1998: xiii). However, the 
pedagogy itself is only briefly outlined and does not refer liberatory education, nor cover 
any of the expected territory of a critical read of a text. Bloom and Reichert’s proposal is 
less traditionally rooted in liberatory education.
I appraise the conception of witness in each of the three proposals utilizing the 
criteria for an adequate conception of witness laid out in Chapter 1. These criteria, as I 
have articulated them, are as follows.
An adequate conception of witness:
1) will fit to some degree with ordinary usage;
2) will not be reducible to something else;
3) will privilege face-to-face encounters;
4) will not foreclose on attention to structural oppression, and;
5) the testimony will be amenable to rational work.
I begin the review with Roger Simon’s conception of witness within a ‘pedagogy of 
commemoration. ’
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A Pedagogy of Commemoration
In an article entitled “The Pedagogy of Commemoration and the Formation of 
Collective Memory,” Roger Simon introduces his project by reciting the Jewish proverb 
“Forgetting leads to exile; remembering leads to redemption” (1994: 5). Left unqualified, 
Simon asserts this proverb may be a delusion. As an example, Simon points to Bosnia 
where the legacy of memory is “the reproduction of an enmity in which one’s identity is 
enhanced by the removal and annihilation of another” and that “within this legacy, hate is 
engendered by memory and returns recursively to simplify memory” (5). Linking 
memory to justice, Simon asks “Given the possibility that the antonym of “forgetting” is 
not “remembering” but justice, I am commanded to see, hear, and remember. But then, 
how should I do so? What forms of memory can give just recollection to this violence 
without reproducing relations of hate?” (6). Simon suggests that to find redemption we 
must attend to how we remember and to how we ask students to remember particular 
events. He is concerned with the commemoration of four historical events in particular: 
the conquest of the ‘New World’; the Middle Passage; the Holocaust; and the 1981 
massacre of women at the Ecole Polytechnique in Montreal. These events of ‘historical 
trauma’ are selected because each “incorporates, as one aspect of its specificity, violence 
perpetrated on persons because of their membership in a larger group conceived of in 
terms of particular common characteristics” (6). Simon states that he sees a “just 
recollection of violence” as a component of a larger agenda to re-examine “the place and 
function of difference in the North American cultures that have been strongly influenced 
by 1500 years of Christian European epistemologies” (6). Although he does not 
elaborate this larger agenda, Simon’s immediate aim is to formulate a pedagogy which
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allows students to “rethink the logos for making sensible and justifiable practices within 
which one people establish relations of exploitation, dominion, or indifference in regard 
to another” (6). At the center of Simon’s proposed pedagogy is the idea of the student as 
witness.
A commemorative pedagogy is defined as “when we as educators intentionally try 
to provoke remembrance through an engagement with some text, image, or person-to- 
person encounter” (10). We engage students in these images and narratives, Simon 
asserts, with the intention of “provok[ing] structures of meaning and feeling which could 
be drawn upon in the determination of one’s present actions and future possibilities” (10). 
Simon lists four common attitudes of listening to narrative accounts or viewing artwork:
(a) Relative indifference characterized by the question “What does this 
have to do with me?”
(b) Defensive skepticism, where one listens for historical inaccuracies that 
might justify a narrative’s dismissal.
(c) Ethnographic curiosity which confers on the story and the storyteller the 
status of ‘objects’ whose meaning must be rendered familiar to the 
listener on the listener’s own terms.
(d) Intense self-identification with the persona of the story. (12-13)
Simon argues that none of these positions are adequate because “What can be heard from 
these positions presents little basis for producing living memories that might impact on 
one’s actions and the moral character of non-indigenous cultural identities” (13). A key 
concept we see invoked in this quotation is that of a ‘living memory.’ From Simon’s 
statement we can understand living memory as a memory that informs our decisions and 
the kind of relations that we have with others. A living memory has an impact on who 
we see ourselves to be and, potentially, Simon suggests, “the moral character of one’s 
cultural identity.” In his account, witness is proposed as a position or attitude of listening 
that can produce living memory.
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Roger Simon draws his conception of a witness “metaphorically from a depiction
of the primal Exodus of the Jewish people from Egypt” (20). Simon writes
During this Exodus, which culminated in the revelations at Sinai, the Jewish 
people were called to “be present” to a showing and telling that had the 
power to alter basic conceptions of how people thought about the interrelated 
moments of the past, present, and future. Additionally, this witnessing 
experience enabled and obligated those who saw and heard to, in turn, tell or 
show to others [in this case, to later generations] what they had seen, heard, 
felt-not just as individuals but as a people connected to others within a set of 
determinate networks defined within an historical conjuncture. (20)
‘Being present’ as a witness changes who we take ourselves to be as individuals and as a
people in relation to others and obligates us to remember this in what we say and do.
Simon proposes that an act of witnessing should be comprised of the following elements:
(a) A witness embodies a position in which she or he can be addressed 
simultaneously as an individual and as a member of one or more 
communities.
(b) In the very organization of the act of witnessing, a witness is called upon 
to participate in a practice of commemoration and thereby is recursively 
constructed as a member of a public network that supports and sustains 
such a commemoration.
(c) A witness is required by the very process of undergoing an act of 
witnessing to do the work of comprehending the alterations in 
subjectivity initiated by what one has heard, seen, or felt.
(d) A witness takes on the obligation to tell others who participate in social 
networks with the witness what one has seen, heard and felt and to begin 
to act toward others in a way informed by the experience of witnessing.
(20)
In drawing on the Exodus from Egypt, Simon secularizes the theological imperative in 
the Jewish faith to pass the memory of the flight from Egypt and the revelation at Sinai 
from generation to generation. The student is put in the position of a witness who is 
addressed by an image or narrative and takes on an obligation to remember, as the tribe 
of Israel was addressed by God and promised to remember.
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The teacher’s responsibility is to engage students in experiences that demand (or
command) them to be present as a witness. Indeed, Simon recommends that teaching
practices be evaluated on the basis of how strongly the selected testimony addresses
students as a potential witness. Simon elaborates:
Whether visiting a museum or memorial; or engaging in historical texts, 
survivor testimony, literature, poetry, drama or visual art; or participating in 
vigils, rituals, or re-stagings, this notion of witnessing may be useful as one 
normative point of reference for interrogating the practices of 
commemorative pedagogy. Thus, one might ask of commemorative 
pedagogy: how does it address a potential witness, how does it “call” that 
person to participate in a network of other people committed to witnessing, 
how does a practice attempt to make its representations personal to potential 
witnesses so that these representations may be inscribed in living memory, 
and how does it attempt to initiate actions which might accrue from the 
experience of witnessing? (20-21)
In large part, it is the strength of the particular narrative or image that creates the
conditions for “witnessing” the historical event, thereby producing a ‘living memory.’
Simon gives an example of what this pedagogy might have looked like in relation to
commemorative events of the Quincentenary of Columbus’s arrival in the New World.
The pedagogy he has in mind would entail “finding a way for non-natives-as individuals
who draw meaning from their own cultural identities—to directly engage in the history of
European-initiated genocide and colonialism without distancing themselves from this
history” (21). To engage students in this history, Simon suggests that rather than focus
on Columbus as a man, we should have asked “By what right had the crown of Castile
occupied and enslaved the inhabitants of territories to which it could make no prior
claims based on history?” Pursuing an answer to this question would open a path to this
same debate in 15th century Spain, a debate in which Bartolome de la Casas was a
prominent speaker, thus allowing students to “disremember a mono-dimensional
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Occidentalism” (22). Such research allows non-natives to claim a complex legacy. This 
more complex legacy, in turn, becomes part of a living memory that impacts who 
students see themselves to be in relation to one another as individuals and as members of 
groups.
Simon acknowledges that the obligations a student must take on as a witness are 
demanding. The selection of powerful testimony is one way motivation is addressed. 
Simon further addresses the question of motivation when he suggests that “any 
commemorative pedagogy must pay attention to the organization of a particular 
kavannah or embodied cognizance that enables and encourages a person to engage with 
the substance and structures of witnessing” (21, bold in Simon’s text). In another article, 
Roger Simon and Claudia Eppert suggest that a willingness to accept the obligations of 
witnessing must be nurtured in what becomes a ‘community of memory.’ In such a 
community, “practices of remembrance are contested, shaped, and deepened by 
consideration of the shared significance of what has been heard, seen, or read” and the 
“obligations of bearing witness or re-testifying can be worked out” (1997: 187). In my 
reading ‘kavannah ’ usually refers to sincerity in prayer -  he who has “directed his heart.” 
Rabbi Velvel Spiegler translates kavannah as attention, awareness, mindfulness, or being 
present. One way to cultivate attentiveness, Spiegler suggests, is by “listening carefully 
to what others are saying without busily constructing thoughts in response.” Simon takes 
up the idea of kavannah as attentiveness explicitly in an article titled “Innocence Without 
Naivete, Uprightness Without Stupidity: The Pedagogical Kavannah of Emmanuel 
Levinas” (2003). Writing about response to the testimony of a Holocaust survivor,
Simon describes kavannah as an upright attentiveness toward the other, a sense of being
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moved or astonished by the other. A pedagogy and classroom culture that values this 
kind of attentiveness, as I understand it, supports and motivates students to take up the 
obligations of witnessing.
To recount, according to Simon, the practice of remembrance has the potential to 
challenge “the logos which makes justifiable the practices by which one people establish 
relations of exploitation, dominion, and indifference in regard to another” in that 
accepting the obligations of a witness generates ‘living memory’ (1994: 6). Simon lists 
common ways of listening to or reading testimony that lack the potential for such change 
because, in his view, what is heard from these positions provides little basis for living 
memories that impact one’s moral character and actions. By definition, accepting the 
obligations of a witness produces living memory- a complex memory that impacts our 
actions toward others. Cultivating kavannah, understood as a sincere attentiveness to the
19other, supports carrying through the obligations of a witness. In practice, the 
commemoration of historical trauma is intentionally provoked by narrative accounts or 
artwork selected by the teacher on the basis of its power to address students as witnesses. 
I turn now to an examination of how Simon’s conception of witness satisfies the criteria 
for what I have called a conception of witness adequate for use in liberatory education.
Simon explicitly ties his conception of witness to the primal Exodus from Egypt. 
The four elements that comprise the obligations of a witness follow from the theological 
imperative for the House of Israel to remember the flight from Egypt and the covenant 
with God. Simon draws on the normative sense of memory in Judaic conceptions of
12 Note that for Simon this attentiveness is not included as an obligation that one assumes 
in witnessing. This is in contrast to Levinas’ conception of witness.
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witness, a memory that defines what it means to be a member of the House of Israel. In 
the conception of witness Simon outlines, the significance of an event of historical 
trauma is worked through in a community of memory, as the significance of the Exodus 
and the covenant, including what it means to live by the covenant, is worked out in 
Jewish communities. Simon’s conception is in keeping with usages of the term ‘witness’ 
as carrying a memory within Jewish religious traditions. Prophetic witness, as such, is 
not referred to in Simon’s conception of witness. By prophetic witness, I mean an 
account such as Michael Lemer’s statement published in Tikkun in which he responds to 
the violence in Israel and the occupied territories. However, in that students bear witness 
or re-testify by telling others what they have heard, seen, and felt as one of the 
obligations of witnessing in Simon’s conception, such re-testifying could be ‘prophetic 
witness’ if what is said entails a critique of society. This critique is expected because of 
the normative value attributed to the response of a witness; the response should lead to 
relations that are less dominated by violence. The connection of ‘witness’ to being a 
witness against oppression, though arguably rooted in the religious traditions of 
Abraham, is used broadly in relation to the idea of ‘witness.’ As for example, journalists 
who see it as their obligation to let the world know what is happening so that the account 
can be set straight and with the hope that others knowing will bring change.13
13 Ann Cooper, of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reports that eight 
journalists were killed in Sierra Leone in a matter of weeks, but with a new peace 
agreement, some reporters returned. One Sierra Leonean journalist explains “It is not 
easy for someone in my capacity to stay away from the country.” Cooper continues “He 
had an obligation, he said, to help report on what was going on. In other words, he had to 
be there to witness, and report on the news” (1999:11).
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More generally, outside of religious usages, we connect the idea of witness to 
accounts of events -  traumatic or otherwise. We understand that the witness is someone 
who was there in person to see what happened and to hear what was said. But it is 
important to note that in the normative sense that Simon draws on, memory is passed 
down as i f  one were also present in the Sinai. This means that ‘witness' does not only 
refer to someone who was there in person, but also to someone who carries the memory. 
Thus, a witness need not have been actually being present in person to an event or to the 
address of another to re-testify or bear witness. The witness can be once removed or 
many more times more distant from actually being present in person to an event or the 
address of another. Although the usages are complex, Simon’s conception of witness 
meets the first criterion in that it is in keeping with ordinary usages of the term.
Simon’s conception of witness does not meet the second criterion in that ‘witness’ 
is reducible to seeing violence. Witness is reduced to seeing and carrying a memory of 
violence of historical trauma in order to enter into relations that are less violent. Simon 
prescribes what students are to see and what counts as testimony, while at the same time 
not giving enough guidance in regard to how students might recognize testimony outside 
of school contexts.
At first glance, Simon’s conception of witness does not seem to privilege face-to- 
face encounters in that there is no mention of students or the teacher listening to one 
another in a way that fulfills the obligations of witness or witnessing. Simon and Eppert 
are concerned with remembering particular events of historical trauma and so it is these 
distant addresses that are privileged. But I believe it is a mistake to conclude that 
Simon’s conception of witness does not privilege face-to-face encounters. In the Judaic
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conception of witnessing as remembrance, we can trace the memory back to a face-to- 
face encounter: being present to God’s address in the Sinai. Many argue that a similar 
face-to-face encounter with those who were imprisoned and those who died in the death 
camps of the Third Reich must be remembered. In both, the witness carries the memory 
as z'/’he or she was present to the address of the other.14 In the fact that one carries the 
memory as if she or he were present, face-to-face encounters are privileged in Simon’s 
conception of witness. But this is a confusing sort of privilege when taken out of the 
context of religious usages. In terms of pedagogy, hearing an address as if one were 
present is not the same as being actually present. As Katongole notes, there is a moral 
and epistemological challenge in face-to-face encounters that cannot be duplicated in 
imaginative encounters.
As a particular way of listening, the obligations of a witness that Simon outlines 
can be met in face-to-face encounters.15 It seems to me that meeting these obligations in 
face-to-face encounters would, at a minimum, support Simon’s aim of challenging 
students to “rethink the logos for making sensible and justifiable practices within which 
one people establish relations of exploitation, dominion, or indifference in regard to 
another” (1994: 6). Also, working with Simon and Eppert, Sharon Rosenberg focuses on 
historical event of violence against women and, in particular, the shooting of fourteen 
women in classrooms at a University in Montreal in 1989. Rosenberg argues that “the 
significance of bearing witness to violence lies not only with how it may call a witness 
into an ethical relation with, in the instance of the massacre, the fourteen murdered
14 The ‘Other’ here may be God’s address, the address of the Haftling in the camps, or 
the address of the survivor of the camps.
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women, but also how it may open spaces for those already subjected to (gendered) 
violences to remember differently those legacies and how they may weigh now” (1997:
5). She queries
How might students and teachers take account of the traumas differently 
brought into school lives? What would it mean to create conditions upon 
which these traumas might be witnessed as part of the daily, on-going work 
of feminist pedagogy? (129)
In order to take account of the traumas brought into school lives or the potential address
of those present, a pedagogy of commemoration would seem to require or call for
listening as a witness to one another in the classroom.
The fourth criterion is that a conception of witness cannot foreclose on attention 
to structural oppression. The obligations require that witnesses see themselves as 
members of groups and thus there is a structural component built into the conception.
But whether or not we can see structural oppression is tied to rational work. If we accept 
the account as true, it seems that we will often foreclose on the kind of questions that 
would include an examination of structural oppression. Simon and Eppert address the 
concern that we must accept the testimony as true; however, we need to say more about 
the way that claims are examined. The normalized rules may foreclose on seeing or 
hearing claims of oppression.
Simon’s close adherence to the Exodus from Egypt and the Judaic conception of 
witness is problematic in regard to the criterion that the testimony be amenable to rational 
work. One problem is the presumed relation between change and inquiry in that Simon 
presupposes that change precedes inquiry. A second problem is the inheritance of a first
15 Simon first writes of the responsibilities in terms of a practice of listening, but the 
examples that he gives is of viewing art work and secondly of reading text.
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person account -  as if you were there -  being transferred to any first person account. I 
explain each concern in turn. In naming the obligations or elements of witness, Simon 
states that “a witness is required by the very process of undergoing an act of witnessing to 
do the work of comprehending the alterations in subjectivity initiated by what one has 
heard, seen, or felt” (1994: 20). He does not elaborate on how he uses subjectivity, but 
briefly stated, I take subjectivity to be the experience of ‘what its like to be’ a certain 
conscious being. That the act of witnessing does indeed make such alterations in 
subjectivity is a normative point on which Simon evaluates the effectiveness of the 
pedagogy and the testimony selected by the teacher. The assumption of a change or 
alteration in subjectivity is inherent in and inherited from the metaphor of the primal 
Exodus. God spoke in lightening and thunder to the tribe of Israel and thus there was 
little choice but to be changed. On Simon’s account, students -  as witnesses -  are present 
to a particularly powerful telling. Students are changed by this telling and then take 
account of the change. This assumed relation between change and inquiry is problematic 
in that it does not take into account how hard we sometimes have to work at making 
changes and in that we do want to have a way of guarding against being changed by 
misleading or false accounts. This leads to the next point.
On the second problem, memory is handed down as the memory of journey is 
handed down in the celebration of Passover celebration and as Alan Berger argues, along 
with many others, that the memory of the Holocaust should be passed through the 
generations. Utilized in Simon’s conception of witness for a pedagogy of 
commemoration, this means that students accept the account as true and begin figuring 
out what it means -  “a consideration of the shared significance of what was heard, seen,
63
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
or read” (1997: 187). In Simon's account, the students work out the change in 
themselves and the shared significance for how we live together. The problem is that 
students do not question the veracity of the testimony. Does it matter to this discussion, 
for example, that in Rigoberta Menchu’s account of the civil war in Guatemala, not all of 
the events portrayed as her experience actually happened to her and her family?16 Simon 
does seem to recognize the lack of questioning the testimony as a problem. In a later 
article the question of judging the accuracy of the text, as well as the significance of 
testimony is taken up. He and Claudia Eppert suggest that the witness must listen with a 
double attentiveness, of which the first form is to judge the accuracy and historical 
significance of testimony and the second form is a consignment of oneself as an 
apprentice to the provision of the testimony (1997: 178-179). To judge the accuracy of 
testimony, the authors advocate using what is already there-the normalized rules for 
making valid assertions. This is rational work and so Simon’s conception of witness does 
meet this criterion. However, in their answer, Simon and Eppert do not acknowledge that 
we may need to challenge to the normalized rules.
In sum, Simon’s conception of witness meets the first criterion for conceptual 
clarity in that the conception is in keeping with ordinary usages of ‘witness.’ That 
witnessing has to do with a particular kind of seeing and hearing to address relations of 
violence and oppression is in keeping with normative uses of what we might call 
‘prophetic witness.’ However, Simon’s conception of witness reduces the response of a 
witness to a response to historical trauma. In that the conception of witness can be traced
16 Rigoberta Menchu’s book I, Rigoberta Menchu: An Indian Woman in Guatemala 
(1984) has been at the center of an extended controversy over the truth of her account.
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back to a direct encounter with the other, we can say that the conception of witness does 
privilege face-to-face encounters, even though Simon does not take this up. The 
testimony is amenable to rational work, but more needs to be said about how the 
testimony is challenged to say that the conception does not foreclose on attention to 
structural oppression.
A Pedagogy of Discomfort
In Feeling Power: Emotions and Education, Megan Boler traces a history of 
discourses of emotion in education. She states “the first premise of Feeling Power is that 
within education, as in the wider culture, emotions are a site of social control” (1999: 
xvii). Boler makes the case that “students and teachers have been controlled and shaped 
by dominant discourses of emotion, which [she] identifies as the moral/religious, 
scientific/medical, and rational discourses of emotion” (xvii). Arguing that emotions can 
be developed as sites of resistance to dominant discourses, Boler proposes a “pedagogy 
of discomfort” as one way of inviting emotions into critical and ethical inquiry. Central 
to Boler’s proposed pedagogy is the practice of ‘collective witnessing’ and ‘testimonial 
reading.’ Boler links witnessing to genealogy, claiming that “the direction for a 
pedagogy of emotions is genealogy: not confession, not therapy or spectating and 
voyeurism, but witnessing” (18). Drawing on poststructural concepts, Boler argues that 
“emotions are not simply located in an individual or a personality, but in a subject who is 
shaped by dominant discourses and ideologies and who also resists these ideologies
Some of this controversy, to give just one example, is analyzed in Dorothy Smith’s article 
“Rigoberta Menchu and David Stoll: Contending Stories” (2003).
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through emotional knowledge and critical inquiry” (20). Summarizing Foucault’s
concepts of archeology and genealogy, Boler writes:
Archaeology describes a way to analyze the discourses that subject 
individuals to the internalization of capitalist and patriarchal power, values, 
and ideologies (Foucault, 1980:85). Genealogy describes how we can 
glimpse resistances to this subjectification: At the same time as discourses of 
discipline and control emerge, the subjects of power also are able to develop 
“subjugated knowledges” and thus resist and transform power. Power is not 
monolithic, but is a dynamic flux that thrives within social relations. (20)
Boler goes on to say that “What we least understand is how these lived relations of power
manifest in terms of emotions and structures of feeling” (20). She makes the strong
claim that understanding the relation of emotions and power is required if we want to act
to shift power relations. Boler’s aim is an acknowledged shift in power relations. She
wants action, a measurable change in her students and society. Like Roger Simon, Boler
looks to witness to support or bring a transformation of consciousness. Boler sees
education “as a means to challenge rigid patterns of thinking that perpetuate injustice and
instead encourage flexible analytic skills, which include the ability to self-reflectively
evaluate the complex relations of power and emotion” (157). She writes “As an educator
I understand my role to be not merely to teach critical thinking, but to teach a critical
thinking that seeks to transform consciousness in such a way that a Holocaust could never
happen again” (157). In this section, I describe the practices of testimonial reading,
collective witnessing, and bearing witness that Boler offers as a means of effecting this
powerful transformation of consciousness.
Boler explicates the practice of a testimonial reading by contrasting it to reading 
which ends in empathy. Both Dewey and Rosenblatt, Boler notes, wrote “optimistically 
of their faith in the ‘social imagination’ developed in part through literature which allows
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the reader the possibility of identifying with the “other” and thereby developing modes of 
moral understanding thought to build democracy” (155). Boler urges us to ask who and 
what benefits from the production of empathy and suggests that this model may be doing 
our social vision more harm than good (156). Like Simon, Boler cautions against over- 
identification as it forecloses on our ability to see difference, and thus forecloses on our 
ability to take responsibility for our position.17 Boler does not believe that empathy has 
the potential to lead us to anything close to justice; indeed, she writes “passive empathy 
produces no action towards justice but situates the powerful Western eye/I as the judging 
subject, never called upon to gaze at her own reflection” (161). This concern leads to the 
question “How might we read, not through an ethics of universal reversibility? What 
would a reading practice look like, if not founded on the consumptive binary self/other 
which threatens annihilation of the other’s difference?” (165). In answer, Boler proposes 
the practice of testimonial reading.
In a testimonial reading, by definition, the reader must take responsibility for her
assumptions and actions. Boler elaborates:
The primary difference between passive empathy and testimonial reading is 
the responsibility borne by the reader. Instead of a consumptive focus on the 
other, the reader accepts a commitment to rethink her own assumptions, and 
to confront the internal obstacles encountered as one’s views are challenged.
(164)
17 The problem is that we are likely to feel ourselves as oppressed, when indeed we may 
be the oppressors. In the case of the Holocaust, in feeling empathy Christians might 
identify with the suffering of Jews, but to position such suffering as universal misses that 
it was violence of one group against another. James Moore argues that seeing Auschwitz 
as a symbol of inhumanity against all humans ignores the particularity of Auschwitz, “the 
bald fact that this was a killing place where the victims were primarily Jews and the 
perpetrators were primarily, if only nominally, Christians” (2001: 438).
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Boler does not abandon empathy, indeed, she holds that “empathy offers a connection 
and communication we don’t want to lose” (165). She writes “What is at stake is not 
only the ability to empathize with the very distant other, but to recognize oneself as 
implicated in the social forces that create the climate of obstacles the other must 
confront” (166). A testimonial reading, Boler proposes, is an active reading practice that 
involves the reader challenging her own assumptions and world views” (166). Boler 
relates this task to Shoshana Felman’s and Dori Laub’s description of a “crisis of truth” 
in the face of trauma. The reader has a responsibility as a “co-producer of truth”; a 
responsibility which “requires a committed interrogation of the reader’s response as she 
faces the other’s experience” (166). In this interrogation, the reader “can identify the 
taken-for-granted social structures of [her] own historical moment which mirror those 
encountered by the protagonist” (170). Boler writes that a “testimonial reading pushes us 
to recognize that a novel or biography reflects not merely a distant other, but analogous 
social relations in our own environment, in which our economic and social positions are 
implicated” (170). To restate, in a testimonial reading the reader has a responsibility to:
(a) Rethink her assumptions and worldviews.
(b) Confront the internal obstacles she encounters as her views are challenged.
(c) Identify taken for granted social structures of her own historical moment.
(d) Recognize herself as implicated in the social forces that create the climate of 
obstacles the other must face in analogous social relations.
It is taking up these responsibilities that distinguishes a testimonial reading from passive
empathy. Each responsibility requires the reader to look to herself, rather than put herself
in the other’s shoes.
To meet these responsibilities, Boler proposes the practice of ‘collective
witnessing’ as opposed to individual self-reflection. Individual self-reflection, in Boler’s
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view, will not allow the reader to meet these responsibilities because we cannot, on our 
own, become aware of our ‘inscribed habits of inattention.’ Socially determined 
inscribed habits of inattention refer to what we learn to pay attention to or, in other 
words, to see and not to see. Boler defines witnessing as an “entree into a collectivized 
engagement in learning to see differently” (176). It is not quite clear what Boler means 
by a collectivized engagement. The responsibilities of the witness that Simon names 
require that we see ourselves as members of groups, of collectivities. Recognizing 
analogous situations would seem to require identification with a group or groups. And 
Boler, like Simon, does see us related to one another in cultural histories. However, 
because collectivized engagement is opposed to individual self-reflection, it thus seems 
best understood as group discussion within the classroom.
Boler conceptualizes collective witnessing as both inquiry and a call to action. As 
inquiry, witnessing is linked to genealogy-to a tracing of our emotions within a social 
context to learn to see what we are in the habit of not seeing or what Boler calls our 
‘inscribed habits of inattention.’ A pedagogy of discomfort, Boler explains, is an 
invitation for
educators and students to engage in critical inquiry regarding values and 
cherished beliefs, and to examine constructed self-images in relation to how 
one has learned to perceive others. Within this culture of inquiry and 
flexibility, a central focus is to recognize how emotions define how and what 
one chooses to see, and conversely, not to see. (176-177)
Boler elaborates that “in contrast to the admonition to “know thyself,” collective
witnessing is always understood in relation to others, and in relation to personal and
cultural histories and material conditions. To honor these complexities requires learning
to develop genealogies of one’s positionalities and emotional resistances” (178). The
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pedagogy aims “to invite students and educators to examine how our modes of seeing 
have been shaped specifically by the dominant culture of the historical moment” (179). 
The call to action takes up the question: What now, now that we see differently?
Boler also uses bearing witness or witnessing, interchangeably, to refer to a 
‘medium of perception.’ She explains that in learning to recognize these patterns of 
emotional selectivity, one also leams to recognize when one spectates versus when one 
witnesses. Spectating does not involve a critical analysis of the images, but rather “we 
permit ourselves easy identification with dominant representations of good and evil” 
(184). Witnessing involves this critical analysis. Boler notes that recognizing discomfort 
usually brings a sense of either guilt or innocence. This is a trap to be avoided, in Boler’s 
view. “Through learning to see how and when one spectates or bears witness it becomes 
possible, as least provisionally, to inhabit a more ambiguous sense of self not reduced to 
either guilt or innocence. In this process one acknowledges profound interconnections 
with others, and how emotions, beliefs, and actions are collaboratively co-implicated” 
(187). Seeing how we are co-implicated, students and educators may experience their 
identity as threatened. Witnessing—this critical analysis— “involves recognizing moral 
relations not simply as a “perspectival” difference-“we all see things differently”-but 
rather, that how we see or choose not to see has ethical implications and may even cause 
others to suffer” (195). Both bearing witness and collective witnessing support the 
testimonial reading that Boler hopes will result in action that actually shifts power 
relations.
The effort of a testimonial reading is undertaken as an act of love. One of Boler’s 
university students states in conclusion to a response to MA US that “The collective guilt
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which overpowers many of us should not be the reason for examining the Holocaust. We
need to explore the origin of the cruelty of it” (172). Boler writes
To explore the origins of this cruelty requires not only multifaceted historical 
studies, but testimonial reading. Neither empathy nor historical knowledge 
alone suffices to shoulder the responsibilities of this task. To excavate the 
structures of feeling that mediate testimonial reading is, in a sense, a labor of 
love. (172)
I understand Boler to mean that the reason we take on the difficult task of a testimonial 
reading, and the collective witnessing it entails, is a sense of love or connection to others.
In sum, for Boler, the responsibility assumed by the reader is the defining factor 
of a testimonial reading. This responsibility is not so much to the author of the text, the 
persona in the text, or to the events reported or portrayed in the text, but to others in 
analogous social relations. The reader meets this responsibility by engaging in collective 
witnessing, which is defined as both inquiry and a call to action. The inquiry involves 
collective engagement in becoming aware of one’s ‘inscribed habits of inattention,’ and 
thus involves learning to see differently. We learn to see differently through tracing the 
history of our emotions, including how they are shaped by dominant discourses and 
where we resist dominant discourses. The reader sees herself in relationship to others 
and acknowledges “how emotions, beliefs, and actions are collaboratively co­
implicated.” Witnessing requires us to accept that there are ethical implications of what 
we see or chose to not see. This leads us back to the call to action. As a result of seeing 
differently, witnessing instead of spectating, we are called to act so that there is a shift in 
power relations.
That witnessing that has to do with seeing is in keeping an ordinary sense of the 
term. Boler defines witnessing as an “entree into a collectivized engagement in learning
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to see differently” (176). Boler is interested in a particular kind of seeing, a seeing that 
leads to action and to an actual change in the conditions of society. In collective 
witnessing, students become aware of and learn to see beyond what Boler calls ‘inscribed 
habits of inattention.’ This awareness is gained through conversation with others in the 
classroom, as I understand Boler’s proposal. In collective witnessing, students learn to 
see injustice and are moved to action, to take a stand against oppression. This stand 
against oppression is in keeping with broad usages of witness.
Although there is not an explicit connection to a religious usage of ‘witnessing,’ 
Boler’s conception is in keeping with a prophetic idea of witness. In fact, Boler’s 
conception is a good example of how the term ‘witness’ often merges with and draws on 
religious usages implicitly. Let me show the similarity in aims and in language with 
Cornel West’s conception of prophetic thought. West names four basic components of 
prophetic thought:
(a) Discernment -  which leads to a deep and broad analytical grasp of the 
present in light of the past.
(b) Connection -  One must value and feel empathy for fellow human 
beings. This means not treating them as stereotypical images, but as
, fellow beings worthy of respect.
(c) Tracking hypocrisy -  in a self-critical manner, rather than a self- 
righteous manner -  this demands that we retain our own humility. We 
must be open to opinions different than our own.
(d) And lastly hope. (Reed and Johnson, 2000: 173)
West explains that “It is the love ethic of Christian faith—the most absurd and alluring 
mode of being in the world—that enables me to live a life of hope against hope without 
succumbing to a warranted yet paralyzing pessimism or to an understandable yet 
miserable misanthropy” (1993: xi). Here we see much of the same language and similar 
aims to Boler’s conception of witnessing. Love need not be rooted in a Christian ethic.
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Emmanuel Levinas roots love in God’s covenant with the people of Israel. Love or 
respect may also be rooted in ethics (and is perhaps best rooted here). Boler’s conception 
of witness is normative in the same sense as ‘prophetic witness’ in that she advocates a 
critique of society.
Boler’s conception of witness seems to meet the first criterion in that witnessing 
is in keeping with the ordinary usage of being someone who sees what has happened or is 
happening and acts against violence and injustice. However, the way that Boler uses the 
specific terms ‘testimonial reading’ and ‘collective witnessing’ are unique to her project. 
So it is only in a broad sense that we can we say Boler’s conception of witness is in 
keeping with ordinary usages of what it means to be a witness. Perhaps because she 
veers into a stipulated usage of witnessing, Boler’s conception of witness also fails to 
meet the second criteria of not being reduced to something else. Boler proposes the 
practice of collective witnessing to allow us to see our ‘inscribed habits of inattention’ or 
unquestioned assumptions that blind us to our implication in the experience of others. 
Witnessing is reduced to seeing how our emotions are shaped by dominant discourses 
and how we are part of the climate of obstacles that the other faces.
Turning to the third criterion, it would seem that because Boler advocates a 
‘testimonial reading’ of any text, students could listen to or read each other’s texts and 
the teacher might give a testimonial reading to student writing and engage in collective 
witnessing. But as was the case with a ‘pedagogy of commemoration’ in the previous 
section, Boler does not provide examples of witnessing in response to a person who is 
physically present in the classroom. We can say that the responsibilities of the reader in a 
testimonial reading could be met in a face-to-face encounter. This is not to say, however,
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that such encounters are privileged or its primary significance recognized. I argued that a 
face-to-face encounter was privileged in the conception of witness that Roger Simon put 
forward because the conception can be traced back to such a face-to-face encounter. 
However, Boler’s conception of witness cannot be traced back to a particular kind of 
address. Boler holds we can engage in a testimonial reading of any text and so the 
address is wholly general. Boler does argue that our responsibility is to others in 
analogous situations, thus we might trace the address forward to analogous situations and 
these may sometimes be in a face-to-face encounter. But again, there is nothing to 
indicate that she privileges such an encounter. Further, Boler does not explain how we 
might determine analogous situations. I believe we should be cautious about transferring 
our understanding of the past to what we assume to be analogous situations, particularly 
when making unilateral decisions that the situation is indeed analogous. This caution is 
in keeping with Boler’s position, which I accept, that we should not assume a 
reversibility of positions in moral reasoning.
Tracing our emotional responses can direct our attention to structural oppression. 
We are not usually aware of our emotional responses as being cultural shaped, and 
indeed, more often we experience our emotions as true, i.e. an honest response to the 
situation or person, ‘just the way I feel.’ Boler’s use of witnessing -  following Foucault 
-  brings the “truth” of these emotions into question. Foucault queries the fact that these 
are my feelings versus responses I have been socialized or conditioned to have. Through 
collective witnessing we become aware of our internal obstacles to seeing how emotional 
responses may be shaped by dominant discourses of emotion. Boler’s account of 
witnessing thus seems to easily meet this criterion in that we become aware of how our
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emotions are shaped by dominant discourses, and we know that dominant discourses can 
be oppressive when they inscribe relations of privilege and oppression. But there is a 
catch. The catch is that she prescribes only one response: to see how we are part of the 
climate of obstacles that the other faces. However, it is possible that we may not be a 
part of that climate of obstacles. As Rosenberg points out, we may become aware of our 
own oppression and gain new perspective on our own experience. Or we may gain new 
insight into obstacles that we are all up against in a sense, as is often the case in how 
oppression works within the good intentions of a liberal society. The responsibilities that 
Boler outlines limit our thinking on our possible relations to oppression and to discourse 
of dominant ideologies. Further, as with Simon’s account of witness, to ascertain 
whether or not Boler’s conception of witness forecloses on structural analysis requires an 
examination of the epistemology that is assumed in the rational work.
Boler outlines a strong version of critical inquiry that takes into account how our 
emotions can prevent us from seeing. But in collective witnessing we look to our own 
assumptions, and it is these assumptions that are tested through rational work. Boler does 
not refer to challenging the assumptions in the text. So despite the fact that there is a 
strong focus on inquiry, the testimony itself does not seem to be amenable to rational 
work. However, before we too quickly dismiss Boler’s conception of witness, I want to 
emphasize what I take to be one of the strengths of Boler’s position. Boler writes that “at 
the same time as discourses of discipline and control emerge, the subjects of power also 
are able to develop “subjugated knowledges” and thus resist and transform power” (1999: 
20). Boler does not elaborate on subjugated knowledges, but collective witnessing is 
aimed at the development of such knowledges. If we turn to Sandra Harding, we see that
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subjugated knowledge refers to the view of how the power relations work by those who 
wield little power. One critique of subjugated knowledge is that the position of 
oppressed is taken to be true, beyond question. Boler seems to make a similar kind of 
assumption, even though it is not clear that it is the position of the oppressed that is 
necessarily privileged, because on her account the text to which we give a testimonial 
reading may be written by anyone. In Boler’s account in collective witnessing we are not 
given any help in figuring out what one does in conflicting situations and how to decide 
on a reliable testimony. Boler’s conception of witness does not meet the criterion that the 
testimony be amenable to rational work in the sense that those engaging in collective 
witnessing are not presumed to question the assumptions in the testimony.
To summarize, Boler’s conception of witness is broadly in keeping with ordinary 
usages of witness as someone who sees and who acts against oppression. However, the 
conception she employs is reductive in that she directs attention only to the conditions 
needed for people in privileged positions to see and act to eliminate oppression. Her 
conception of witness does not privilege face-to-face encounters, although the 
responsibilities could be met in face-to-face encounters. In the emphasis her work places 
on how dominant ideologies shape our emotions, we can say that the conception does not 
foreclose on attention to structural oppression; however, much more needs to be said 
about the epistemology assumed in the inquiry she describes. Boler ascribes to a strong 
version of critical thinking as the reader is expected to interrogate her or his response to 
the text; however, the assumptions in the testimony or text are not questioned. Thus, 
Boler’s conception of witness fails to meet the fifth criterion.
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Bearing Witness to Violence
In Bearing Witness: Violence and Collective Responsibility, Sandra L. Bloom and
Michael Reichert describe what they call an epidemic of violence in our culture; an
epidemic, they argue, which invades all of our relationships. The authors hope to convey
the essential message
that it is a fundamental and absolute moral responsibility that we each find a 
way to bear witness to the pain and suffering that is all around us, and that 
starting from the position of this testimony we must join together to liberate 
the human body, mind, and soul from the rack of traumatic re-enactment that 
is stretching our social body to the limit of endurance. (1998, xiii)
Bloom and Reichert assert that we all are affected as witnesses because all those who
minister to victims of violence are likely to experience secondary trauma. On their
account, the only viable response to being witnesses is social activism. The alternative to
social activism, in Bloom and Reichert’s view, is to be a helpless bystander, watching the
parade of violent perpetuation, unable or unwilling to do anything about it (xii). The
authors make the case that society can be healed from trauma in much the same way that
individuals can be healed. Without this healing, we are all caught in widening cycles of
violence. Healing is integration, by which Bloom and Reichert mean the ability of any
system to function harmoniously as a whole without attempting to destroy any parts of
the whole (167). The authors see integration as the vital goal of remembering the past,
both for individuals and society as a whole. Bloom and Reichert urge us to bear witness
to the violence that we see around us so that we can heal our social body and change our
trauma-organized society. Like Simon and Boler, Bloom and Reichert’s proposal
addresses relations of violence and ground our response in a responsibility to the other.
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Bloom and Reichert’s proposal for schools is firmly rooted in trauma theory.
Trauma theory challenges an individualistic philosophy based on the assumption that
each person is accountable for his or her failures and shortcomings. Bloom and Reichert
assert “We know now that our unitary and individualistic sense of self is a socially and
cognitively structured illusion. We do not have any control over our lives as long as we
are tied to the unmetabolized events of a personal and transgenerational past” (156). The
deviant person has had to accept the full weight of responsibility for his or her problems.
Trauma theory challenges this assumption and provides us with a model in which we
must share the burden for another’s problems or deviant behavior (156). As Bloom and
Reichert see it, the implication of trauma theory is that we must rethink our responsibility
to one another. The argument is framed as a rhetorical question:
We know that in any interaction with another person we have the potential to 
heal or to harm, and that our intervention or lack thereof, may be a major 
determinant of the other person’s behavior. Given this, what is our 
responsibility? Is it as wrong to fail to protect, to fail to act to help as it is to 
actively hurt? If so, then we are all victims AND we are all perpetrators, and 
another deep structure crumbles under our feet. (156)
Bloom and Reichert advocate sharing the burden of both the perpetrator and victim to
heal the trauma of individuals and society in order to break the cycle of violence. We are
all responsible for the violence in our society; in a real sense, we are our ‘brother’s
keeper.’
We have a mutual responsibility to each other, Bloom and Reichert argue, that
extends to a global level now that we have “entered an age of such intense global
interdependency” (1998: 91). The authors write
The fundamental question is whether witnesses to the mistreatment of other 
people have an obligation to act. What is our moral responsibility to each 
other? Are we in fact “our brother’s keeper?’ (91)
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The authors clearly take the answer to be yes, we do have an obligation to act -  to help 
the other, our brother/sister, and to respond to the violence that we see. Bloom and 
Reichert relate their conception of bearing witness to “the concept of testimony that came 
out of Chile in the 1970's, when psychologists, priests, nuns, and other caregivers put 
their own lives on the line by collecting testimonies from former political prisoners who 
had been tortured” (278). Bloom and Reichert call on us to speak up about the violence 
around us, like the priests, nuns, therapists, and caregivers in Chile. We can contain the 
forces that produce violence “only if bystanders choose to become witnesses and 
rescuers, instead of silently colluding with the perpetrators” (91). We become witnesses 
by speaking up, by bearing witness.
Bloom and Reichert believe it is particularly important for health care workers 
and others who spend a lifetime in the trenches to speak up, to bear witness against the 
violence they see in their client’s lives (278). Teachers, Bloom and Reichert assert, have 
the responsibility to bear witness by speaking and acting against the violence they see in 
students lives by (a) creating a safe environment in schools, and (b) teaching children to 
be rescuers, rather than bystanders. I outline each responsibility in turn.
According to Bloom and Reichert, teachers, as witnesses to violence, should 
engage in social activism by working to change the structure of schools to provide an 
environment that is “therapeutic and preventative” (219). Schools must play a major 
rehabilitative role for children. In “Creating Sanctuary in Schools,” Bloom writes 
“Ideally, each classroom would be run as a therapeutic community, a safe place within 
which the children could experience emotional modulation on a constant basis” (1995: 
422). She elaborates on what this would look like
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The best metaphors for creating sanctuary are found in theater and the 
concert hall. In discussing what we are trying to accomplish, the stage 
metaphor is useful because we are trying to redirect the traumatic 
reenactment scenario. We want to provide environments within which the 
individual’s particular complex of trauma-organized and self-destructive 
habits can be understood and then redirected, much like a play director 
directs the actors of a stage. [...] Our job is to participate in their personal 
drama enough to understand the lines and the expected outcome, but to then 
change the direction of the play, redirect the traumatic scenario so that trauma 
is not repeated. (1995: 429)
Bloom emphasizes that classroom and school communities can function in this way, so
that the group becomes the agent of change for the individual. But that this can only
happen in a context of safety and trust. Bloom and Reichert elaborate on psychological,
social, and moral safety.
We can feel psychological safe when our selfhood is respected and when we 
are in environments in which our own separate identity is affirmed and 
reinforced. We can feel socially safe when we are in environments with 
other people, all of who agree on basic rules of how to behave with each 
other and who are willing and able to contain and help modulate each other’s 
overwhelming emotional experiences. We are in an environment of moral 
safety when there is an agreed upon, compassionate way of making sense of 
the world, a process for working through hypocrisy, and a shared vision of 
future possibilities. (1997: 68)
Working to create such an environment is the kind of social activism Bloom and Reichert
have in mind.
Bloom and Reichert advocate that we teach children to be rescuers or helpers, 
witnesses rather than bystanders. They believe that there is much to be learned from 
looking at bystanders who do help, because they define a different reality. Bloom and 
Reichert do not elaborate on how such study might be part of the curriculum. The study 
would seem to include those in Europe who hid others during the Holocaust or people 
who provided safe hiding places as part of the Underground Railroad. The authors also
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mean taking care of one another in the classroom and school—helping rather than
excluding those who are alienated and act violently toward others. Bloom notes
At present, the attitude of “I am my brother’s keeper” is not a value to which 
children have any consistent exposure, and yet it is the only attitude that can 
get us out of the deteriorating spiral of alienation within which our culture is 
presently gripped. If we cannot do anything to change the homes that these 
children live in, then we must expand their options. Let us provide them with 
an alternative reality. (1995: 422)
The authors suggest school-based programs that teach conflict, problem solving, and
anger-management skills to children and programs to counter traditional gender role
stereotypes and expectations should be in place in all schools.
In sum, Bloom and Reichert draw on trauma theory to make the case that the
only hope we have of healing our society from an epidemic of violence depends upon our
meeting a collective responsibility to bear witness. Healing is defined as integration,
which in its strongest sense means to help break the cycles of violence in the lives of
1 o
those who have been harmed and those who have harmed. The authors argue that we 
can heal society in the same way that we can help individuals to heal. The term ‘witness’ 
is used in two ways. In one sense, we are all witnesses to violence in that we are affected 
by the violence in the lives of others, if not directly in our own life. To be a witness is 
simply to be someone who is in an environment where violence occurs to someone, not 
necessarily one’s self. In a second sense, witness refers to someone who engages in 
social activism by bearing witness and stepping forward to help others, to rescue another. 
Bloom and Reichert do not to propose a pedagogy in the way that Simon and Boler do;
18 The authors are inconsistent on this point. There is a strong emphasis on the victim 
and very little said about the perpetrator of violence in Bearing Witness; however, in 
Violence (2000), Bloom focuses on prisons and the criminal justice system in the United 
States.
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bearing witness and stepping forward as a witness is part of a broader response to 
violence framed as a public health response to an epidemic of violence.
Bloom and Reichert directly refer to a conception of witnessing from liberation 
theology as it emerged in Latin American churches. As noted in the previous chapter, 
liberation theology advocates solidarity with the poor as they demand justice. During the 
repressive regime of General Pinochet in Chile, testimony regarding those who had 
disappeared or had been tortured was collected by priests, nuns, and others to provide an 
accurate record of what happened -  an account that challenged the public record. For 
Bloom and Reichert bearing witness or speaking on behalf of another, is a moral 
obligation. The commitment to liberation from violence is clear, as is a commitment to 
social activism; however, there is not an analysis or an informed critique of society.
Those collecting testimony in Chile, as in other Latin American countries such as El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, were deeply involved in movements for political change 
informed by a Marxist analysis of class struggle. But Bloom and Reichert do not analyze 
oppression as a source of violence or a form of violence. Indeed, there is no mention of 
oppression. In this omission, they miss much of the power of the conception of witness 
within liberation theology. So while Bloom and Reichert do draw on the stand against 
oppression in prophetic witness, it is in a limited sense as compared, for example, to what 
happened in Chile.
More generally, Bloom and Reichert use the term witness to refer to someone 
who sees, but in contrast to the bystander who simply watches, the witness steps forward 
to do something to stop the violence. Bloom and Reichert’s conception of witness is in 
keeping with ordinary usages of witness as someone who sees, who is present, and speaks
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about what they have seen and heard. However their account is problematic in that they 
give no indication they are aware of the difficulties of seeing what is happening around 
us. To elaborate, 1 draw on Richard Quinney, a criminologist, whose book Bearing 
Witness to Crime and Social Justice is what he calls a personal journey of witnessing.
Quinney argues that the primary object of attention of criminologists ought to be
suffering, not crime. It would seem that attention to suffering would be unavoidable
because prisons are full of suffering, but. Surprisingly, attention to suffering cannot be
assumed. Quinney argues that criminologists, prison guards, and police officers are in
many ways trained to not see or attend to the suffering, or at least not the suffering of the
prisoner sentenced for a crime. Quinney writes
We are all witnesses to the life of our times. We are witnesses in one way or 
another to the joys and the sorrows of being human in a particular time and 
place. We are witnesses to the sufferings around us and within us. And at 
times we are moved by conscience to observe and report these sufferings.
“This thing I am telling you about, I saw with my own eyes,” reports a 
woman who witnessed a mass killing a century ago. Such witnessing comes 
out of awareness, and is an act of conscience. If actions more physical in 
nature follow, they do so because there has been awareness and there has 
been witnessing. (2000: ix)
The idea that witnessing follows awareness might seem like an odd distinction, but we
are often unaware of much that surrounds us. Quinney points to the need for awareness,
before we are able to see and to be witnesses. Quinney, like Megan Boler, recognizes
that there is much that prevents us from being aware and thus from seeing. Quinney
gives an example of how those in law enforcement are trained not to see the suffering of
those charged with a crime. This kind of training that blinds us to certain people’s
suffering parallels, I believe, Boler’s culturally inscribed habits of inattention that
function largely through our emotions. Bloom and Reichert’s conception of witness is in
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keeping with ordinary usages of witness as someone who sees; however, their assumption 
that we are aware of the violence in our lives and the lives of others is somewhat naive.
In short, although they expect their notion of witness to cover a wide ground, the absence 
of any discussion of the difficulties in actually witnessing violence entails a rather limited 
usage. Bloom and Reichert’s conception of witness is collapsed to a response to 
violence.
With regard to the third criterion, that of requiring a privileging of face-to-face 
encounters, we can say that Bloom and Reichert’s account fully satisfies it. They make 
much of the fact that witnessing requires that we look around at others and step forward 
to do something. Face-to-face encounters are privileged, but it is not quite clear how our 
stepping up to social activism is informed. In the end, being a witness on Bloom and 
Reichert’s account doesn’t have to do with understanding the other or our selves in light 
of their testimony in order to change the conditions of society.
We can note that Bloom and Reichert’s conception of witness very nearly 
forecloses on attention to structural oppression. Without inquiry, something like the 
collective witnessing that Boler describes and the community of memory that Simon and 
Eppert refer to, the only possibility of our seeing structures of oppression is if  they are 
featured in the testimony. Ironically, this is in strong contrast to the commitment of 
liberation theology, which includes the idea of institutional violence. And lastly, turning 
to the question of whether the testimony is amenable to rational work, we see that it is 
not. Bloom and Reichert provide a chapter featuring the figures on violence in families, 
and the figures are staggering. However, in contrast to Simon and Boler, there is no 
mention of an interpretive community connected with witnessing to help us to understand
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our own experience or that of others. Their conception of witness does not include 
inquiry into our own normative assumptions or the person’s own perceptions of their 
situation.
In sum, we can note that Bloom and Reichert’s conception of witness meets the 
first criterion of fitting with ordinary usage in that it too draws on the normative sense of 
witness as a stand against violence. That the witness is someone who steps forward to 
tell what they have seen and heard is in keeping with common usages. However, I’ve 
argued that on both counts, on the seeing and the stepping forward, the conception 
offered is thin. Bearing witness and being a witness are reduced to a response to 
violence, without a interpretive community to understand the violence. On the third 
criterion, face-to-face encounters are privileged, but there is not the emphasis on 
understanding the other’s testimony or one’s own implication in the violence the other 
faces. The testimony is not amenable to rational work, and the conception of witness 
forecloses on attention to structural oppression in that inquiry is not emphasized.
Conclusion
The authors we considered in this chapter -  Simon, Boler, Bloom, and Reichert — 
all write of bearing witness to violence. I conclude that while all three accounts are 
intriguing both for the educational aims they pursue and the pedagogy they employ, they 
fail to offer us an adequate account of bearing witness for liberatory education.
Each of the conceptions is in keeping with ordinary uses of the witness. The 
connection to oppression, though arguably rooted in religion, is used broadly outside of 
religious traditions. The witness is present to an event or to a person’s telling of an event.
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In each, the witness is someone who sees and takes responsibility to do something about 
what they have seen. The responsibility that the witness takes to liberate them, to liberate 
us all connects these two ideas of witness. The witness sees or hears and then does 
something toward liberation, toward justice. In each proposal the conception of witness 
entails certain responsibilities to the other. Simon lists four obligations that follow from 
a Judaic conception of what it means to answer God’s address in the Sinai. Keeping 
these obligations, by definition, forms a living memory -  a memory that impacts one’s 
moral character and one’s actions. For Boler, the responsibility to others is met by 
becoming aware of our inscribed habits of inattention and resisting them. Collective 
witnessing is connected to awareness: coming to see those whom we do not see and the 
ways that we may be part of the obstacles that the other faces. For Bloom and Reichert, 
we have a responsibility to bear witness -  to speak of what we see in order to stop the 
cycles of violence. Bloom and Reichert take their conception of witness, at least in part, 
from liberation theology as it emerged in Latin America. The witness is committed to 
social activism. The witness sees and takes action on the behalf of others -  to make 
society less violent, to liberate us. So in each conception of witness, there is a focus on 
liberation from violence and oppression. The normative value is clear. The witness sees 
and steps forward to take action -  to liberate us all from violence and oppression. In each 
case, witness is reduced to seeing or acting against violence or trauma. There is a broader 
meaning of witness in religious usages and in broader ordinary usages.
Bloom and Reichert’s conception seems to privilege face-to-face relations. 
Simon’s conception of witness can be traced back to a face-to-face relation. Boler’s 
conception of witness does not meet the criteria that a conception of witness privilege
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face-to-face encounters. Simon and Boler conceptualize witness as an answer to an 
address, but do not consider the address of others in the room. None privilege the 
challenge that Katongole notes and none help with Heller’s sense that we look for 
witnesses.
Bloom and Reichert’s conception of witness -  as they elaborate it -  very nearly 
forecloses on seeing structural oppression. Simon and Boler do not foreclose and indeed 
the responsibilities they articulate as part of witnessing tend to draw our attention to 
structural oppression. But to be clear -  more needs to be said about the epistemological 
project. None adequately address structural oppression and our complex relations to 
oppression or violence represented in a text. On the question of rational work only the 
conception of witness that Simon and Eppert put forward is one in which the testimony is 
amenable to rational work. Simon, Eppert, and Boler put forward conceptions of witness 
in which our response to the testimony is amenable to rational work. In Bloom and 
Reichert’s conception of witness -  neither our response nor the testimony seem to be 
amenable to rational work. Thus, in the end, none meet the criteria laid out for an 
adequate conception of witness for educational contexts.
I propose that witness-bearing is not only a practice of listening, but moves 
between speaking of our experience, the memories that work to define who we see 
ourselves to be, and listening to both those present in the room with us and to distant 
others. This opens the space, I believe, for attentiveness to be practiced between persons 
within the classroom, as well as toward distant others. A conception of witness that 
includes both speaking of and listening to accounts of freedom and oppression supports 
the intention of responding to the suffering of others and transforming our relations to
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them more fully than does conceptualizing witness solely as a practice of listening. My 
goal is to conceptualize witness in such a way that it supports the recognition of complex 
relations o f oppression and leads to some way of testing the veracity of the claims made 
in the address, as well as our response. What is just under the surface, not explicitly 
stated in any accounts that we’ve considered thus far, is the relational nature of the 
address. In my own account of witness, in the next chapter, we will come closer, I 
believe, to a conception of witness that can support Heller’s call for a more personal and 
complex critical pedagogy.
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CHAPTER 4
CAN I FIND A WITNESS?
In her ethnography of a women’s writing group in the Tenderloin district of San 
Francisco, Caroline Heller suggests that the women “came in one way or another to find 
witnesses as they lay claim for the richness of their complicated experiences” (1997:18). 
My efforts to develop a conception of witness begin here, with the idea that we do 
sometimes look for witnesses and students in our classrooms may, at times, be looking 
for witnesses. Thinking of particular persons in our classrooms as looking for witnesses 
is a significantly different perspective from other attempts to analyze the notion of 
‘witness’ in educational literature. Simon, Boler, Bloom, and Reichert attend to how we 
should listen or respond as witnesses and what we should do because of the testimony 
that we have heard. It is my view that not fully considering why particular persons look 
for witnesses has limited the understandings of what it means to respond as a witness that 
we have discussed thus far.
Because the idea that we look for witnesses, and indeed, sometimes beseech 
others to respond as a witness is central to the conception that I put forward, my analysis 
rests on clear cases in which a demand for a witness is explicitly and powerfully stated. I 
develop a conception of witness as a relation between two persons by examining, in turn, 
why we look for witnesses and what it means to respond as a witness. Specifically, I 
describe how looking for a witness and responding as a witness are experienced in 
relations between particular persons, in a way similar to Nel Noddings’ description of
89
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
caring relations. Noddings holds that only a face-to-face encounter can be called a caring 
relation, because only in this situation can the person caring be sure that her care is 
received as care. In Noddings’ terms, letting the one caring know in some way that one 
feels cared-for ‘completes’ the encounter or relation. In the third section of this chapter, I 
argue, similarly, that there is a completion for a relation of witness in the strong sense of 
the sort that Noddings stipulates for a caring encounter. It is this feature, especially, that 
distinguishes my account from the conceptions of witness presented in the previous 
chapter.
The footing is always tricky in writing about witness because the terms ‘witness’ 
and ‘bearing witness’ constantly slip and change position. I keep the terms in place for 
conceptual clarity. I consistently use ‘bearing witness’ to refer to a person speaking or 
giving testimony, as for example, a woman in the Tenderloin writing group might bear 
witness in reading her work. I name bearing witness or giving testimony as one side of 
the relation. I use the terms bearing witness and testimony interchangeably. On the 
second side of the relation is a person who responds as a witness. My use of ‘witness’ 
refers to a particular kind of response on the part of the person who listens. It is possible 
that I could reverse the terms and refer to a person speaking as a ‘witness’ and a person 
listening as ‘bearing witness.’ This would also be in keeping with common usages of the 
terms. I make the choice to use ‘witness’ to refer to the response because it is in keeping 
with Heller’s suggestion that the women in the writing group looked for witnesses. 
Responding as a witness is also in keeping with Roger Simon’s, Megan Boler’s, and 
Sandra Bloom and Michael Reichert’s conceptions of witness presented in the previous 
chapter. I use the term ‘bearing witness’ to refer to a person speaking or giving
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testimony and ‘witness’ as a response, a particular way of attending to the other’s 
testimony within what I call a ‘relation of witness.’19
Looking for a Witness
In this section, I present clear cases of looking for a witness and cases in which 
we can infer from the situation that a person is looking for a witness. I examine when 
and why we look for witnesses to describe what can be said to characterize the 
consciousness of a person looking for a witness. In this description, I follow the lead of
Nel Noddings in her investigation of how caring is experienced to describe ‘what we are
20like’ when we engage in caring encounters (2002: 13).
June Jordan explicitly calls for a witness in the title to her essay on Anita Hill and 
the Senate hearings regarding Clarence Thomas’ appointment to the Supreme Court. In 
“Can I Get a Witness?” Jordan writes
Clarence Thomas was supposed to be on trial but he was not [...]
And so, at the last, it was she, Anita Hill, who stood alone, trying to tell the 
truth in an arena of snakes and hyenas and dinosaurs and power-mad dogs.
And with this televised victimization of Anita Hill, the American war of 
violence against women moved from the streets, moved from hip-hop, moved 
from multimillion-dollar movies into the highest chambers of the U.S. 
government.
And what is anybody going to do about it? (1992: 218)
19 Although I use the terms consistently in elaborating my conception of witness, I cite 
literature in which the terms are not used consistently in the same way. Thus, the terms 
continue to slip.
20 By focusing on how caring is experienced, Noddings does not say what either person— 
the one-caring or the one cared-for—will or should do, except in the most general sense. 
And she notes that caring does not entail any particular actions.
91
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
She says that she will write a letter to Anita Hill and “tell her that, thank God, she is a 
black woman who is somebody and something beautiful and precious and exquisitely 
compelling” (219). Jordan calls for action, saying in her letter “if this government will 
not protect and defend her [Hill], and all black women, and all women, period, in this 
savage country-if this government will not protect and defend us from poverty and 
violence and contempt-then we will change the government” (219). And for “those 
brothers who disappeared when a black woman rose up to tell the truth, listen [...] I have 
been speaking on behalf of a good black woman. Can you hear me? Can I get a 
witness?” (219). Jordan calls for a witness with force and elegance. Her outrage is clear. 
The questions call for a response, an answer.
A similar demand for a witness can be found in Thich Nhat Hanh’s poems written 
during the long years of war in Vietnam. A Zen Buddhist monk, himself from Vietnam, 
Thich Nhat Hanh practices what he calls ‘engaged Buddhism,’ which means that he 
actively and directly works for social change and for peace. In a poem titled 
Condemnation, Hanh speaks to the reader directly and urgently. The poem begins with a 
demand to listen.
Listen to this:
yesterday six Vietcong came through my village,
and because of this, the village was bombed.
Every soul was killed.
In the next lines, Hanh describes the destruction of the bombs and gives the reader a 
sense of the missing life-the life that should be there in the village and was there just the 
day before. Echoing the first demand that we listen, Hanh asks that the listener be a 
witness.
Whoever is listening, be my witness.
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I cannot accept this war.
I never could, I never will.
I must say this a thousand times before I am killed.
He closes the poem “Humans are not our enemies-even those called the “Vietcong.” If 
we kill our brothers and sisters, what will we have left? With whom shall we live?”
Hanh uses the imperative “be my witness” to leave no doubt that he is addressing us— 
those who read the poem.
Thich Nhat Hanh, along with other monks and lay members, worked to help
rebuild villages destroyed in bombing raids. He writes that many of them died doing this
work because people suspected them of being on the other side. Hanh maintains they
were not on either side, but sought to understand both sides. He explains
We tried to tell people our perception of the situation: that we wanted to stop 
the fighting, but the bombs were so loud. Sometimes we had to bum 
ourselves alive to get the message across, but even then the world could not 
hear us. They thought we were supporting a kind of political act. They 
didn’t know that it was a purely human action to be heard, to be understood.
(1987: 69)
Looking for a witness, too, I believe, is this purely human action of looking to be heard 
and understood. But this is not yet specific enough, because we almost always want to be 
heard and understood. From the explicit demands for a witness voiced by Jordan and 
Hanh, it seems that we look for witnesses in the face of an incomprehensible refusal on 
the part of others to acknowledge perceptions we believe should be acknowledged. But 
the refusal to acknowledge another’s perceptions may not always be as explicit as in 
these examples. This refusal may show up as indifference or general disbelief. Veterans 
of the war in Vietnam often faced all three of these responses when giving accounts of 
their experience in the war or, to use the terms that I employ, bearing witness to the war.
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In August of 1967, journalist Jonathon Schell asked a GI in Vietnam what he was 
going to tell people when he returned to the United States. The man responded “Maybe 
when I go home I’ll just crawl back inside myself, and not say a word. Things are so 
violent nobody would believe it. And I don’t want to die of frustration trying to convince 
them” (Anderson, 1998: 15). Schell heard the remark-“they wouldn’t believe it back 
home”-many times in Quang Ngai Province. But what the veterans found on their return 
was more complex than disbelief. Most veterans were met with a refusal to ask about or 
to listen to, much less to consider their perceptions of their experience in the war. Thich 
Nhat Hanh has organized meetings and retreats with United States veterans of the 
Vietnam War and notes that many of the veterans said the retreats were the first time they 
had been able to speak candidly of their experience.
Wayne Karlin, a Vietnam veteran who writes on his experience of the war and on
violence and its effects, recalls
I think we felt-and still do in many ways-that we came back from the war to 
an atmosphere that prevented our experience from coming out. It was as if 
our own experience-the thing that had changed us from what we were into 
people who looked at the world with completely different eyes-meant that we 
could no longer look at ourselves, our country, and all of the beliefs that we 
had grown up with with the same eyes. It was an atmosphere that negated all 
that and said it isn’t true. It said: “No, you shouldn’t look at it this way.
Here are the models that already exist; you should look at what you did and 
what happened through these lenses.” We knew this wasn’t true. (Anderson,
1998:83)
Karlin believes writers have the ability to avoid that kind of convenient wishful thinking 
and to find stories that would allow readers to see the truth (83). Karlin’s stories 
challenge the way veterans, and indeed, all of us, were told to look at the war. Karlin 
wants to name the wrong and is prevented from doing so by the lens prescribed to him. 
Prescribing a lens to interpret or make sense of another’s experience when it is forced on
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the person bearing witness can be a form of refusal to acknowledge another’s 
perceptions.
Staying with the example of the Vietnam War, we can see that a premature focus
on healing without sufficient regard to what has happened can also function as a refusal
to acknowledge the other’s perceptions. In response to those who insist on a focus on
healing, Karlin writes about the massacre at My Lai
I’m not sure what “healing” means. Because we are writers, language is 
important to us; the definition of words is very important to us. [...] Good 
writing has to say: “Here is the truth. Here is the horror. Here are the real 
victims. Here are the real victims of My Lai. [...] To define healing, we 
need to look at what this was and ask what do we do with it now. (Anderson,
1998:83-84)
Karlin examines his experience in Vietnam-speaks or bears witness—with the intent of 
facing what happened and asking what we do with it now. He looks for a precise 
definition of healing that does not allow healing to become a kind of denial in itself.
What we do now, he says, depends on truthfully naming the wrong. Karlin pushes us, as 
he struggles himself, to get it right. We can infer that Karlin does look for a witness, 
because he speaks and writes about the war in an atmosphere where he consciously 
knows others do not want to listen. Despite our indifference and haste to move on, Karlin 
urges us to weigh what he says. He is not concerned that we draw the same conclusions 
about the war as he does, but Karlin wants his perceptions to be acknowledged.
To see how widespread and even common it is to look for witnesses, let me return 
to Heller’s account of the Tenderloin Women’s Writing Group and her suggestion that 
the women there came to find witnesses. As noted in Chapter 1, Heller began to attend 
the meetings with an interest in the political functions of the group. She writes that the 
longer she attended the workshop the more she “noticed participants in the group
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critiquing American life and life in their neighborhood, often brilliantly” (1997: 17). She 
continues:
But the real work of the group was both more ordinary and, I soon came to 
realize, more extraordinary than this. Most of the regular participants in the 
Tenderloin Women Writers Workshop came to the workshop not to change 
the world or even to complain about it. They came to be reassured that they 
had lived lives that were of value and that could be-through the precision of 
their own words-felt, understood, and remembered by others. Most came in 
one way or another to find witnesses as they made claim for the richness of 
their complicated experiences. (18)
Heller draws on Barbara Meyerhoff s observation to describe the need for witnesses:
This thirst for self-recovery, including the need for others to witness one’s 
most acute and pressing perceptions, has a life in the margins of the 
mainstream in ways that those who live amid more secure surroundings may 
not experience quite so urgently-unless the sources of their sense of self, the 
different facets of what they believe to be their identities, are imperiled or 
lost. (Meyerhoff, 1992 in Heller, 1997: 41)
In broadly linking finding a witness to self-recovery, Meyerhoff describes a need to tell
others something of our lives, both what we have lived through and what gives our lives
value. We look for witnesses when this need is not satisfied. For example, one woman
in the writing group struggled to get her thoughts down on paper as she and her daughter
moved from shelter to shelter. Yet she came to read her writing to others. In her writing,
she was able to give her own account of her life and claim her love for her daughter. The
woman looked for witnesses in the face of an indifference and open scorn.
Mary TallMountain’s reading from a novel she was writing further illustrates 
what laying claim for our experience, including what we most value, can look like. 
TallMountain was bom into an Athabaskan family in Alaska; she was adopted as a young 
child and lived most of her life far from the Yukon. In her writing, TallMountain 
describes “pictures that are in her mind always”- “moccasins falling soundless on the
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boards, o f spruce gum that mended the fish wheel, of Papa’s boson’s cap, and of holy 
salmon on the holy ancient land” (Heller, 1997: 132). Her writing is rich in description 
of both persons and the land. Following the reading, Heller recounts 
Mary is silent for several moments, as is the group
Salima: You bowed your head when you read that.
Maria: Yes, you did. It makes me feel very calm.
Mary: It does me, too. It makes me feel calm today. I am glad you said
that.
Maria: That was your family?
Mary: This was me. My family, and the village. (128)
Heller describes the reading as an invitation to feel and understand Mary TallMountain’s 
perception of her family and herself. Heller relates “For months after this meeting of the 
workshop, memories from it would return to me at unexpected moments, and I’d 
suddenly feel transported as I’d felt sitting in the group that day, when it felt as though a 
door was being opened by [...] Mary, and all of us not only wanted to walk through it; we 
were, it seemed, filled with gratitude that we were being invited to” (129). It is 
significant that TallMountain looked to people present in the room with her to find 
witnesses. Experience was claimed in intimate conversation, as we can see represented 
in TallMountain’s statement “This was me. My family, and the village.” It is also 
significant that TallMountain spoke of what she most loved. The women in the writing 
group often sought to have acknowledged what they most loved and valued. We can say 
that TallMountain looked for witnesses to acknowledge who she sees herself to be and 
what she sees to have overriding value, as it is these perceptions of hers that are most 
often met with indifference or disbelief.
From these cases, we can see that we look for witnesses when others turn away.
If we think in terms of what characterizes the consciousness of a person looking for a
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witness, we can recognize a need or a desire to have one’s perceptions acknowledged in 
the face o f incomprehensible refusal or steady indifference. June Jordan explicitly calls 
for a witness in a situation of what she clearly conveys is to her an incomprehensible 
refusal to acknowledge the wrong in the conduct of the Senate hearings. Thich Nhat 
Hanh beseeches us to look at the suffering caused by the war, a suffering so obvious and 
yet apparently so unheeded. He reminds us of the monks who took the most extreme 
measures to have their apprehensions acknowledged. Wayne Karlin encodes his 
apprehensions in stories that allow readers to see the truth of his experience, and the 
experience of other veterans. He is not concerned that we draw the same conclusions 
about the war as he does, but he wants us to know his perceptions and consider them. 
Mary TallMountain wants others to see her and what has value in her life as she 
expresses it. She wants to be recognized as a particular person. In these latter two cases, 
the need to be heard and understood becomes more urgent because of a context of 
indifference.
In sum, we look for a witness to acknowledge our perceptions in situations when 
it seems that everyone has turned away. June Jordan and Thich Nhat Hanh directly call 
for a witness. The eloquence of their testimony creates a space for us to respond as 
witnesses, to answer “Yes, I hear you, I will be your witness.” Wayne Karlin speaks in 
an atmosphere where few, if any, want to hear his perceptions of his experience in the 
Vietnam War. Karlin also relies on the eloquence of writing to push others to consider 
the truth of what happened in the war. In her reading of her work, Mary TallMountain 
trusts the women in the writing group to be witnesses. It is their response that will
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acknowledge her perceptions of who she is and what she values. In each case, the person 
bears witness by voicing perceptions he or she wants others to take into account.
Responding as a Witness
I shift now to the second side of the relation of witness to focus on the person who 
responds as a witness. Given our understanding of why we look for witnesses, it follows 
that we want the person who responds as a witness to be present to us -  to listen to and 
acknowledge our perceptions. In this section, I describe what characterizes the 
consciousness of a person who responds as a witness by elaborating what’s involved in 
not turning away from the other, or stated differently, in being present to the other.
Caroline Heller nearly missed being present to respond to Mary TallMountain as a 
witness. Entering the room for the first meeting, Heller writes that she was surprised by 
her own unexpected judgments. She relates “The room smelled stale and sweaty. Street 
noises overwhelmed my attention. I imagined those in the room to be damaged and 
unstable, and in their presence, I felt my own sturdiness to be less durable, too” (1997: 
11). Heller explains that her emotions were so strong she turned back out of the door and 
left to return the next week better prepared for her responses. Heller continues “... it 
seems most important to say that neither my romanticization nor my fears did justice to 
either the vibrant life and creative explorations or the horrid realities of Tenderloin life as 
I began to witness them through the workshop participants” (13-14). Thus Heller 
reminds us of what we cannot know except by being with and listening to others. Heller 
physically turned around at the door, but there are many ways of turning away. For 
example, as noted in my discussion of Wayne Karlin’s position, we can turn away from
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acknowledging the apprehensions of veterans by adopting a premature focus on healing, 
by prescribing lenses through which to view the experience, and by refusing to listen.
We must not turn away if we are to respond as witnesses.
The idea that the person who responds as a witness can not turn away can be 
found in each of the conceptions of witness in the previous chapter. As we saw, Roger 
Simon names four ways of listening that contrast to listening as a witness: listening with 
relative indifference, defensive skepticism, ethnographic curiosity or intense self- 
identification. These four attitudes can be said to be ways we turn away from another’s 
testimony. Megan Boler’s conception of witness addresses how our emotions prevent us 
from seeing or listening to the other, thus we can say that our emotions as shaped 
unreflectively by dominant ideologies can function to turn us away. In Sandra Bloom 
and Michael Reichert’s usage of witness it is our belief that the other’s problem does not 
concern us or is not our responsibility in any way that turns us away from the other. Not 
turning away is essentially a way of meeting the other; however, this still does not say 
what does characterize the consciousness of someone who is present as a witness. The 
chief features of the consciousness of the person who responds as a witness are (a) an 
attentiveness characterized by ‘moral humility’ and (b) a willingness to acknowledge the 
other’s testimony. I elaborate each of these features in turn.
Attentiveness
A certain kind of attentiveness is required to listen to another’s perceptions when 
many others have refused to listen or in a general atmosphere of indifference. Nel 
Noddings notes that “perhaps the first thing we discover about ourselves as carers in
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caring encounters is that we are receptive; we are attentive in a special way” (2002: 13).2/
Noddings is clear that this attention is not empathy. Empathy is defined as a projection
or intellectual identification with another. Noddings characterizes the attentiveness of
care as more receptive than projective, and as not primarily intellectual. Drawing on
Simone Weil’s account of attention, Noddings writes
Reception, not projection, marks the attention described by Weil. The 
reception is not totally passive. A soul (or self) empties itself, asks a 
question, or signals a readiness to receive, but the state that develops is 
thoroughly relational. When I attend in this way I become, in an important 
sense, a duality. I see through two pairs of eyes, hear with two sets of ears, 
feel the pain of the other self in addition to my own. My initial self is 
vulnerable and will be changed by this encounter. (15)
Noddings holds that the self is relational in that it is shaped by encounters with other
human beings, objects, ideas, and other nonhuman beings. We are changed by every
encounter. I understand this may entail a range of changes between a barely perceptible
change and a radical change that has far ranging influence on our lives. In listening with
the kind of attentiveness that Simone Weil describes, we open ourselves to the other in a
way that we become more vulnerable than we might otherwise be in the encounter. This
same idea of attentiveness characterizes the consciousness of the person who responds as
a witness.
In characterizing their own way of meeting the other, both Nel Noddings and 
Megan Boler raise concerns about empathy. Noddings rejects empathy because of the 
intellectual identification and projection of one’s self onto the other that empathy entails. 
Boler rejects empathy on the basis of the lack of responsibility one assumes in empathy. 
In Boler’s view, empathy is largely passive because one imagines one’s self as the other
21 Noddings also uses the term ‘engrossment’ to describe this attentiveness (1984).
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and thus fails to recognize one’s self in relation to the other or to someone in an 
analogous situation. Both critiques reject the reversibility of positions assumed in 
empathy. I want to be clear that the attentiveness that characterizes the consciousness of 
a witness does not rest on the assumption that we can imaginatively understand the 
other’s position; indeed, we are attentive precisely because we cannot understand the 
other’s position except by listening. Iris Marion Young’s work in communicative ethics 
further elaborates why the response of a witness cannot rest on an assumption of moral 
reciprocity.
Young argues that it is ontologically impossible to imaginatively put one’s self in
another’s position. She proposes a concept of “asymmetrical reciprocity” as an
alternative to ‘symmetrical reciprocity’ in moral deliberation. In Young’s view
A communicative ethics should develop an account of the nonsubstitutable 
relation of moral subjects. Each participant in a communication situation is 
distinguished by a particular history and social position that makes their 
relation asymmetrical. [...] A communicative theory of moral respect should 
distinguish between taking the perspective of other people into account, on 
the one hand, and imaginatively taking their position, on the other hand.
(1997: 39)
Young argues that moral reciprocity conceived as reversing standpoints is politically
suspect, as well as ontologically impossible. Moral respect between people, Young
claims, entails reciprocity between them in the sense that each acknowledges and takes
account of the other. Young advocates an openness to others that is rooted in the
assumption that you cannot fully know the position of the other. She explains
It is more appropriate to approach a situation of communicative interaction 
for the purpose of arriving at a moral or political judgment with a stance of 
moral humility. In moral humility one starts with the assumption that one 
cannot see things from the other person’s perspective and waits to learn by 
listening to the other person to what extent they have had similar experiences.
(49)
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Young is interested in the times that we “get out of ourselves” and learn something new. 
She argues that if we always look to find a common experience and to fit what we hear 
into our experience, we will not or cannot transcend our own experience. For Young, 
moral humility is due in any situation of communicative interaction. Young notes that 
her conception of ‘moral humility’ is similar to Laurence Thomas’ notion of ‘moral 
deference.’ Thomas suggests that people in relatively socially privileged positions owe 
moral deference to those in “diminished social categories.’ The difference, Young 
clarifies, is that in moral humility, I only admit that I lack knowledge of the other; in 
moral deference, I recognize that the other has the knowledge that I lack (168). I describe 
moral deference here because Thomas describes in much more detail how we listen to the 
other.
Laurence Thomas proposes the attitude of ‘moral deference’ as a required part of
77“the appropriate moral posture toward those who have been oppressed” (1993: 248). 
Thomas explains
The idea of moral deference is true to the moral reality that the mark of an 
immoral society is the erection of emotional walls between persons. It is true 
to the reality that social immorality cannot be eliminated in the absence of a 
firm grasp of how it has affected its victims. (245)
Listening with an attitude of moral deference is meant to help us gain this firm grasp.
Thomas sees moral deference as a mode of learning through which one acquires a
sensibility to the way in which a self-respecting oppressed person lives in the world. He
writes
Moral deference [...] is not an activity for the faint of heart. For it is a matter
22 Thomas does not explicate what else he sees to be a part of an appropriate moral 
posture to those who have been oppressed.
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of rendering oneself open to another’s concern, and letting another’s pain 
reconstitute one so much that one comes to have a new set of sensibilities-a 
new set of moral lenses, if you will. (247)
In opening one’s self to another’s concern, we work to understand another’s experience
in terms of what is salient for her in the way it is salient. Like Young’s conception of
‘moral humility,’ moral deference rests on the assumption that we cannot imaginatively
put ourselves in the position of another, as Heller could not understand the lives of the
women in the Tenderloin group except by being present to listen openly to them.
Attentiveness characterized by an attitude of moral humility is the first feature of 
the response of a witness, but listening does not in itself answer the address of the person 
bearing witness. The second feature I propose is that the witness must acknowledge the 
other’s testimony. Acknowledgement, as I elaborate it, does not entail agreement with all 
that the other says.
Acknowledgment
In a caring encounter, as Noddings describes it, the person caring first receives the 
other and then responds in some way. In responding to the other, the consciousness of 
the person caring is characterized by what Noddings calls ‘motivational displacement.’ 
She explains “A’s [the person caring] motive energy begins to flow toward B [the cared 
for] and his projects” (2002: 17). The person caring helps the cared-for on in his or her 
project. Here witness and caring encounters diverge. In responding as a witness, 
acknowledgment follows listening to the other with an attitude of moral humility. We 
look for witnesses to have others acknowledge perceptions that we feel should be 
acknowledged. Acknowledgement is experienced as taking the testimony into account.
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This does not mean that one need agree that the testimony is true and that it is significant 
in the way that the person bearing witness holds it to be significant. The account given in 
bearing witness is not incorrigible; the testimony is amenable to rational work. Even as 
this point is made, however, the qualification must also be stated: When and by whom the 
rational work is carried out is not always the same and must be considered when opening 
the testimony to critique.
If we characterize attentiveness as listening to the other, we might characterize 
acknowledgement as hearing the other. Lisa Delpit, for one, makes a distinction between 
listening and hearing. In Other People’s Children, she quotes a black woman teacher 
who says “They won’t listen; white folks are going to do what they want to do anyway. 
It’s really hard. They just don’t listen well. No, they listen, but they don’t hear-you 
know how your mama used to say you listen to the radio, but you hear your mother? 
Well, they don’t hear me” (1995: 21). It is not clear to me just what Delpit means. Does 
hearing your mother mean that you jump up and do what she asks you to do? Or is it 
more that what your mother says to you carries a certain weight? In either case, hearing 
assumes a responsibility to the person who speaks and to what is said. In the conception 
of witness I put forward, acknowledgement fits with the sense that one recognizes the 
weight of the testimony. Acknowledgement is characterized by a willingness to carefully 
consider the other and what is said. We might think of acknowledgment as letting the 
other’s testimony sink in. Although, acknowledgement does not entail agreement, our 
awareness of the other and his or her testimony can be the beginning of an inquiry that 
extends far beyond our encounter with a particular person.
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Mary Solberg, in writing of her experience of living and working in El Salvador
during that country’s civil war in the 1980s, provides an example of what I mean by
inquiry begun in the acknowledgement of another’s testimony. She writes of how
listening to people speak of their experience affected her.
... living there, going to sleep and waking up there, breathing air and 
smelling that dust, listening to people speak, bore down on me in my own 
flesh (in Spanish, en carne propia), and I began to apprehend how things 
were in a way I had not been able-or perhaps willing-to acknowledge before.
I could no longer turn away and willfully or unwittingly plead ignorance.
(1997: ix)
She writes about her urge to try to “fix” what was wrong and reflects that such works 
“betrayed [her] incapacity or refusal to apprehend the depth and breadth and intensity of 
what was wrong and of the reach of its consequences” (x). Sometimes, as in this case, 
immediately trying to fix what is wrong can parallel a premature focus on healing as a 
way of turning away. Her challenge, Solberg writes, was how to live, knowing of such 
suffering and of her implication in it (x). Solberg’s response is that of a witness. Like 
Heller’s account of the women’s writing group, Solberg’s account emphasizes how 
different it was to be there -  listening to others speak of their lives and seeing the 
situation in person. She understood herself to be accountable to the those who had shared 
their lives with her, writing “To live as if  they were no longer present, to erase them from 
my consciousness, would have been immoral and crazy-making” (xii). For Solberg, 
acknowledgement was the beginning of the inquiry of how to live that extended beyond 
her years in El Salvador. That inquiry of some sort will result from acknowledging the 
other’s testimony is likely.
In summary, listening with moral humility is a kind of receptive attention to 
another person in which we work to understand how the other sees the situation. We
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listen, at least in part, because we cannot understand another’s position imaginatively. 
Acknowledgment is a taking in of the weight or significance for both the other and for 
ourselves of what we have heard and, often times, beginning inquiry or joining in inquiry. 
It is, at least in part, the fact that many are indifferent to or outright refuse to hear 
particular groups of people or particular accounts that leads a person to look for a 
witness. In the next section, I consider what can happen when a person who looks for a 
witness finds someone who does not turn away to make the case that witness can be 
conceptualized as relational in a strong sense.
Witness as a Relation
My conception of witness is relational in that it examines what it is to find a 
witness from the side of the person bearing witness and from the side of the person who 
responds as a witness. In a stronger sense, it is relational in that I argue for a conception 
of witness that requires a kind of completion in the form of a communication between the 
person who looks for a witness and the person who responds. This conception is in 
keeping with some usages of witness and thus, is not a purely stipulative or programmatic 
definition.
I propose a primary or strong sense of a ‘relation of witness’ as follows, with A 
referring to the person who speaks or bears witness and B referring to the person who 
listens or responds as a witness:
a) B is attentive to A and listens to A ’s testimony with moral humility.
b) B acknowledges what A has said.
c) A signals to B that she feels B has acknowledged the testimony.
If put into words, A would say that B  has met her trust.
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The completion rests with the person who gives testimony -  A signals to B that she feels 
the other has heard her.23 We experience finding a witness as finding someone we can 
trust. Annette Baier's conceptualization of trust as a three-part predicate -  “A trusts B 
with valued thing C” -  is helpful in elaborating this felt sense of trust (1996: 101). We 
who might respond as witnesses are trusted to listen to and acknowledge the other’s 
testimony, which means we are entrusted with the other’s most pressing perceptions.
I do not claim that face-to-face encounters are required for the strong relational 
sense of witness, one in which there is a completion. In other words, the relation can be 
completed at a distance, as say in a letter such as June Jordan sent to Anita Hill. This 
does not mean that my conception does not privilege or give precedence to face-to-face 
encounters. As vital as Jordan’s letter might be to Anita Hill, we should recall Jordan’s 
reprimand of the brothers in the room who turned away. Only Senator Kennedy stood to 
protest how the hearings were being conducted. Hill needed a witness then, even though 
the belated response is still vital to Hill’s trust that she will be heard and that her claims 
will be taken up by a larger community. Therefore, there is a completion. If Hill had not 
found a witness, we would still say that she bore witness in stepping forward to speak to
2j This completion closely follows Nel Noddings’ conceptualization of a relation of care. 
For Noddings, a caring relation is a face-to-face encounter between two persons, one 
caring and one cared-for. She specifies that
(A, B) is a caring relation (or encounter) if  and only if
i) A cares for B-that is, A ’s consciousness is characterized by attention 
and motivational displacement-and
ii) A performs some act in accordance with i), and
iii) B recognizes that A cares for B. (2002: 19)
The third requirement completes the encounter. The carer (A) looks to see that her care 
is received -  that the cared-for (B) does feel that he or she is cared-for. Without the 
completion, Noddings is clear, the encounter or relation cannot be called a caring one.
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the press and eventually in the Senate hearings.24 I call this a secondary sense of witness, 
in contrast to a primary sense in which the person looking for a witness does indeed find 
a witness.
June Jordan, Thich Nhat Hanh, and Wayne Karlin bear witness in their writing. 
Jordan and Hanh create a rhetorical space for us to feel the urgency of responding as a 
witness. The eloquence of their testimony creates a space for us to respond as witnesses, 
to answer “Yes, I hear you, I will be your witness.” Karlin also relies on the eloquence of 
writing to push others to consider the truth of what happened in the war. And we can 
respond to their testimony. I do not want to discount the role that this response has in our 
lives, in creating a world or relations less dominated by axis of oppression. And yet, the 
response is still different than being there in person. We can feel the difference if we 
consider the retreats that Thich Nhat Hanh organized for Vietnam Veterans when they 
had returned from the war. Many of the veterans recounted that the retreats were the first 
time that they had spoken candidly of their experience. The presence of another who was 
willing to listen and who they sensed was willing to take up what they had to say seems 
required for speech in this situation. Even though I grant that the completion can happen 
at a distance, it does not hold the same potential for both people in the relation that a 
face-to-face encounter holds.
I draw on Laurence Thomas’, Dori Laub’s, and Patricia Hill Collins’ conceptions 
of ‘witness’ to show that we can sometimes need the presence of an addressable other to 
narrate our experience and to illustrate how we can be both challenged and nourished in
24 June Jordan was one among many who wrote to Anita Hill. Another response to Hill’s 
testimony is found in C. Morris’ book Bearing Witness: Sexual Harassment And Beyond- 
-EverywOman's Story (1994).
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face-to-face encounters. The idea of trust or a trust alliance between the person speaking 
and the person listening as a witness is central in each conception.
Laurence Thomas reminds us of the trust inherent in bearing witness and
responding as a witness and of the nature of the work sometimes required to build that
trust. In Thomas’ view, moral deference is required in order to make moral decisions that
do not perpetuate oppression because it allows one to acquire insight into the particular
ways that social immorality harms. Thomas argues
We can best get at what moral deference involves, and its importance, by 
thinking of what it means to bear witness to another’s moral pain with that 
person’s authorization. To bear witness to the moral pain of another, say,
Leslie, with Leslie’s authorization, is to have won her confidence that one 
can speak informedly and with conviction on her behalf to another about the 
moral pain she has endured. It is to have won her confidence that one will 
tell her story with her voice, and not with one’s own voice. Hence, it is to 
have won her trust that one will render salient what was salient for her in the 
way that it was salient for her; one will represent her struggle to cope in the 
ways that she has been getting on with her life; that one will convey 
desperation where desperation was felt, and hurt where hurt was felt. And so 
on. (245)
Thomas uses bearing witness to mean the act of speaking on the behalf of another. 
Through listening with an attitude of moral deference, one understands the other’s 
experience and, importantly, earns the trust of someone who is weary of trusting.
Thomas emphasizes that this trust is not to be taken lightly; earning the tmst of another is 
a great moral responsibility. One should not then abuse the trust or merely withdraw 
from the person (247). Thomas says just what we must do: understand the other’s point
25of view so thoroughly that we could tell the story in her or his voice. The trust he 
describes as integral to and aimed at with moral deference is central here to our
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discussion of witness as a relation. For Thomas, a face-to-face encounter is necessary to 
restore trust, because trust has been so damaged or betrayed. One must seek out the 
other. Dori Laub also speaks of seeking out another in order to hear an account of 
another’s experience.
Dori Laub’s work illustrates just how fundamentally a person bearing witness
needs to presuppose that there is another, an addressable other. His work lends weight to
the strong sense of witness that requires a completion. That there must be, as part of the
logic of bearing witness, an addressable other, seems to indicate how powerfully the
sense of a response is part of witnessing. In Testimony: Crises o f Witnessing in
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, Laub describes the particular circumstances of
the Flolocaust as preventing the possibility of witnesses both outside and inside the event.
Laub writes “As the event of the Jewish genocide unfolded, however, most actual or
potential witnesses failed one-by-one to occupy their position as a witness, and at a
certain point it seemed as if there was no one left to witness what was taking place”
(1992: 81). Witnesses on the outside failed to say anything against what was taking
place. This failure of witnesses on the outside affected the prisoners’ ability to be
witnesses for them selves. Laub explains
To understand it [witness from inside] one has to conceive of the world of the 
Holocaust as a world in which the very imagination of the Other was no 
longer possible. There was no longer an other to which one could say 
“Thou” in the hope of being heard, of being recognized as a subject, of being 
answered. The historical reality of the Holocaust became, thus, a reality 
which extinguished philosophically the very possibility of address, the 
possibility of appealing, or of turning to, another. But when one cannot turn 
to a “you” one cannot say “thou” even to oneself. The Holocaust created in
25 Note that this does not mean that we necessarily will tell the other’s story in his or her 
voice, the point is more that we understand it well enough that we could bear witness or 
speak on their behalf.
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this way a world in which one could not bear witness to oneself. (82, 
emphasis in Laub)
Laub refers to Martin Buber’s I-Thou relationship in which other human beings are seen 
as a person or a subject and not addressed as an “it” or an object. The Nazi system 
worked to convince the victims of their inhumanity (82). Without witnesses on the 
outside, in Laub’s view, the prisoners were unable to narrate their experience even to 
themselves because they came to question their own humanity. There were some 
attempts at bearing witness, Laub notes, in that there were some who chronicled events, 
diaries were written and buried, pictures taken in secret, and messengers and escapees 
tried to inform and warn the world of what was taking place (84). These were doomed to 
fail however, in Laub’s view, because the event was “beyond the limits of human ability 
(and willingness) to grasp, to transmit, or to imagine” (83). Laub holds that the act of 
bearing witness to the Holocaust still can and should take place belatedly. As one
example of such bearing witness, Laub points to the Fortunoff Video Archive project
26designed to enable survivors to bear witness.
The archive project allowed survivors to tell their experience by providing the
witness that was missing earlier. Laub asserts that “the absence of an addressable other,
an other who can hear the anguish of one’s memories and thus affirm and recognize their
realness, annihilates the story” (1992: 68). The survivor requires a listener to bear
witness or to tell of her experience. The addressable other becomes a witness before
whom the story can be recounted. Laub states
Bearing witness to a trauma is, in fact, a process that includes the listener.
For the testimonial process to take place, there needs to be a bonding, the
26 The archive project was founded in 1979 by a New Haven grassroots organization and 
adopted by Yale University in 1981.
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intimate and total presence of an other-in the position of one who hears. 
Testimonies are not monologues; they cannot take place in solitude. The 
witnesses are talking to somebody: to somebody they have been waiting for 
for a long time. (70-71)
The survivor may not understand or consciously remember the events until spoken in the
presence of a witness. Laub argues that in this situation, the listener and survivor share
the responsibility for recounting experience in the camps because it is the presence of
another that allows the event to be told. In this process of witnessing, facts are
established and there is a historical recovery of the event. But what ultimately matters for
the survivor, Laub asserts, is “not simply the information, but the experience itself of
“living through testimony, of giving testimony” (85). Giving testimony is “the process
by which the narrator (the survivor) reclaims his position as witness: reconstitutes the
internal “thou,” and thus the possibility of a witness or a listener inside himself’ (85).
Laub describes a situation in which bearing witness or telling one’s story can only 
take place in “the intimate and total presence of an other” (70). This telling may be the 
first time that a survivor has spoken of his or her experience and thus, the telling may 
involve remembering events that the speaker has not articulated even to her or his self. In 
articulating his or her experience, in Laub’s view, the survivor is able to reclaim what 
Laub refers to as an internal witness, an internal Thou. In this situation, the person giving 
testimony does more than claim her experience, she also claims that she is a person.
The presence of another, a sympathetic listener, is vital in cases where a person is not 
able to narrate an event even to his self. In Laub’s view, without the presence of an 
addressable other, the account would be lost. We can say that two things happen when a 
person looking for a witness finds someone she or he can trust. First, he or she is able to 
narrate their experience, thus claiming an internal witness and second, an account of
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experience in the camps is articulated, thus allowing others to consider what has 
happened -  to consider the other’s experience. Both are dependent on the trust between 
the person giving testimony and the person listening who did not turn away.
Laub describes how we can sometimes need the presence of an addressable other 
to speak; however, this was the not case for all survivors. Some survivors were able to 
bear witness. Giorgio Agamben writes “In the camp, one of the reasons that can drive a
27prisoner to survive is the idea of becoming a witness” (1999: 16). This was Primo 
Levi’s conviction as a survivor of Auschwitz. When he returned home, Levi recounted 
his experience to everyone. Levi compares himself to Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner who 
forces the wedding guests to listen to his tale because, Levi relates, “Well, when I first 
returned from the concentration camp I did just that. I felt an unrestrainable need to tell 
my story to anyone and everyone!” (Agamben, 1999: 16). I believe that Laub glosses too 
quickly over the attempts to bear witness through smuggled letters and photographs.
Even in extreme circumstances, people are sometimes able to narrate their experience. 
We can say that Levi is bearing witness. In both situations -  where the presence of an 
addressable other is required to give an account and where the account is shouted out to 
anyone passing by -  finding a witness supports a sense of trust that another has heard 
one’s account and will acknowledge what has been said.
I draw on Patricia Hill Collins to support my claim about the significance of 
privileging face-to-face encounters because the examples she gives illustrate how finding 
witnesses works in ordinary mundane activities that make up our lives: talking around a 
kitchen table, within a church community. I introduce her work also to show the
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epistemological risks and dangers associated with witnessing and the need for the fourth
criterion -  that testimony be amendable to rational work -  for any conception of witness
that is to be used in education. Collins conceptualizes the testimony of African-American
women as a profound act of resistance to oppression. She traces the tradition of
testimonials within the African-American community to church settings, explaining that
Within a narrow use of the testimonial, individuals testify within a 
community of believers such that each testimonial spurs others on to greater 
faith. However, a broader use of the testimonial involves testifying the truth 
to cynics and nonbelievers. Within a more generalized testimonial tradition, 
breaking silence, speaking out, and talking back in academic settings 
constitute public testimonials. (1998: 237)
In Witnessing and Testifying: Black Women, Religion and Civil Rights, Rosetta Ross
helps to understand just what Collins means in church settings. She writes
Testimonies require the presence of witnesses, person who have also seen or 
experienced God’s work and who are able to certify or attest to the truth of it 
in the testimonies they hear. [...] In testimony, people are believed to have 
spoken truthfully about what they have experienced and seen, offering it to 
the community for the edification of all. (2003: 13)
We can note two kinds of testimonials here, one to a community of believers and a
second to cynics and non-believers, even oppressors. The distinction between these two
communities and between private and public knowledge are key in understanding how
Collins uses the term ‘testimonial.’ Private knowledge, Collins explains, is “the
collective secret knowledge generated by groups on either side of power that are shared
in private when the other side’s surveillance seems absent” (49). In Collins’ view, such
knowledge is generated in the kind of discourse or conversation women might have
around the kitchen table. Collins notes “Drawing on traditional African-American
27 Agamben uses witness to refer to a person who has experienced an event from 
beginning to end and can therefore bear witness to it.
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cultures o f resistance, conversations around the kitchen table become classrooms of 
learning how to cope with oppression” (49). In such conversations, women speak about 
their lived experience in ways that challenge the prevailing interpretations of Black 
women’s experience in public discourses. Her description brings to mind an intimate 
relation among friends in which one’s perceptions are affirmed.
Collins describes the sustenance we can gain from conversation that resembles a 
conversation with friends around a kitchen table. The nods of agreement, shouts of 
response, and encouraging presence of others moved by what you say does make speech 
possible -  we find ourselves able to say things that we would not otherwise. Such 
conversation can support speech. Novelist, Edwidge Danticat, says that she “was always 
intrigued by the bond between older women who gathered together and the things they 
told each other.” In an interview, she explains that a lot of the “stories [she has] written, 
including the story of The Farming o f  Bones, came out of listening to those female family 
conversations, which Paule Marshall so wisely calls ‘kitchen poetry.’” As nourishing as 
this can be, it is problematic if the speaker is not thanked for her message.
Looking to church settings, it is sometimes the case that the speaker will be 
silenced or ostracized from the community when a testimonial veers from an established 
pattern and challenges norms or accepted interpretations within the private community. 
This relation conceals a pressure for conformity. I am sure this conformity is not what 
Collins has in mind, and yet it is a danger in her description of a testimonial to a 
community of believers. Anita Hill’s experience illustrates this pressure to conform. 
Reflecting on the Congressional hearings, Hill writes that many saw her testifying against 
Clarence Thomas as a sin that would condemn her to “bum in hell” (1997: 257). Hill
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broke with strong norms in the African-American community in that she, a black woman, 
bore witness against a black man, rather than put the good of the community first. The 
fuming away of many within the African-American community is what June Jordan 
speaks to in her essay “Can I Get a Witness?” Anita Hill did find witnesses in a 
community of women after the hearings; however, she found little support at the time. 
Anita Hill worked at every turn to have her experience heard, by which I mean taken into 
account, but there were no witnesses inside the chambers. As June Jordan notes, only 
Senator Kennedy came close.
Collins takes Sojourner Truth as a paradigmatic example of bearing witness as
resistance stated in public. Collins notes “Truth recognized that the power relations that
the context of her time, Truth was an object to be named at will by masters” (1998: 237).
Sojourner Truth rejected her slave name Isabella Baumffee, in her words, so as not to
keep anything of Egypt on her. Collins explains
Although Sojourner Tmth certainly could have named herself in isolation, 
proclaiming the truth required a community of listeners. It mattered neither 
that many of the listeners in her day cared little for what she had to say nor 
that they were more powerful. In a sense, her boldness foreshadows the civil 
rights, Black Power, and other social movements of the 1960s and 1970s that 
effectively used the media to proclaim new truths. (238)
Sojourner Truth spoke to an audience that had long refused to listen to her. But surely
Truth hopes that there will be some listeners who do not turn away, and who use the
name she calls herself. June Jordan’s questions “Can anyone hear me? Can I get a
witness?” could be Sojourner Truth’s questions as she proclaimed her new name. There
is no assurance that one will be heard, but speech is sustained by the hope that it will
reach someone. Sojourner Truth bears witness to proclaim the truth that she is somebody
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who can name herself. Her testimony illustrates just how vital a secondary sense can be; 
nevertheless, there is the hope of an answer, someone to say “Yes, I hear you.”
In this chapter I have elaborated a conception of witness that begins with the idea 
that we do sometimes look for witnesses. I examined what I hold to be four clear cases of 
looking for a witness and asserted that we look for a witness when it seems that everyone 
has turned away. The response of witness, as I have outlined it, is to listen with moral 
humility and to acknowledge what is said. The primary sense of the relation has a 
completion that ensures trust is answered.
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CHAPTER 5
MORAL DIMENSIONS OF THE RELATION OF WITNESS
In Humanity: A Moral History o f the Twentieth Century, Jonathon Glover claims
that any adequate moral theory must address violence; indeed, he makes it a criterion of
an adequate moral theory. He writes “With disasters on the scale of some in the
twentieth century, any ethical theory which either justifies them or can give no help in
avoiding them is inadequate. The thought at Auschwitz and at other places, ‘never
again,’ is more compelling than any abstract ethical principle” (1999: 406). Glover holds
that it is a false dichotomy to say that either we must have an external foundation to
morality, such as a religious foundation or a foundation in human intellect, or we are left
with Nietzschean amoralism. An alternative, Glover argues, is to keep ethics afloat
without external support by rooting it in human needs and values. He explains
Morality interpreted this way becomes tentative, exploratory and partly 
empirical. It is exploratory on the model of Socrates. Our deepest values are 
not just obvious. They are not all on the surface. Questioning and arguing 
are needed to discover some of them. But ethics is also exploratory in a 
different, more empirical, way. It includes seeing the consequences of living 
by a code or set of values. (406)
Like the caring encounter that Noddings describes, my account of a relation of witness is
rooted in human needs and values. The relation of witness, as I have characterized it, is
rooted in the need to speak our most pressing perceptions and have another person
answer our address. While not by any means a complete ethical theory, the relation of
witness has the potential to assist ethical theories in avoiding violence in that the relation
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helps us to speak and to be heard. I have argued that we look for a witness in a climate of 
indifference or in the face of an outright refusal to listen. Finding a witness supports 
speech and can sometimes be required for a person to speak of his or her experience and 
beliefs. The relation supports speech in that the person looking for a witness feels that 
they have found someone who is genuinely open to hearing what he has to say. The 
person who responds as a witness is willing to listen with moral humility and to 
acknowledge what the other has to say, even though the testimony may challenge his 
understanding of the world and who he is in relation to the other. Thus, the relation of 
witness can contribute to the tentative, exploratory, and partly empirical model of 
morality that Glover proposes. The relation of witness, as I have described it, contributes 
to communicative ethics projects such as those elaborated by Jurgen Habermas, Seyla 
Benhabib, Iris Marion Young, and most centrally in this analysis, Cheryl Misak.
If we construe morality, as it is sometimes broadened, as concerned primarily 
with the question of how I am to meet the other, then the relation of witness is obviously 
a moral relation. In connection with witness being a moral relation, two questions arise. 
First, when must I respond as a witness? I argue that we must always be ready to respond 
as a witness, given how we rely on one another. Second, does witness conceptualized as 
a response to a particular person foreclose on our ability to see the structures of 
oppression? This second question is critical because the purpose of those who bear 
witness is often to challenge oppression, thus an adequate conception of bearing witness 
can not by definition render a challenge to oppression ineffective. Characterizing the 
response of a witness as a response to a particular person appears to present a conundrum 
in that it would seem to direct our attention solely to the individual and away from
120
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
structural oppression. I answer this conundrum by focusing on the inquiry involved in 
acknowledgement drawing on Cheryl Misak’s interpretation of Charles S. Pierce’s 
conception of truth and inquiry.
When Must a Person Respond as a Witness?
I claim that we must always be willing to respond as a witness, to listen and to 
hear what the other has to say. Not only must we be willing to respond as a witness to 
those who we happen to meet; we must also sometimes seek out situations in which we 
may be asked to respond as a witness. I have argued that finding a witness restores or 
sustains trust. Stated in broad terms, the relation of witness is rooted in our need to be 
seen and heard by others, to have our perceptions taken into account. This need, in turn, 
is rooted in the fact that we are ontologically in relation to one another. We are always 
persons in relation, co-constructed as persons in a myriad of ways. We are, in part, 
constituted by the response of others. The fact of our interdependency has ethical 
significance. We see this in a fundamental way in Laub’s analysis of what it means to be 
a witness: if we cannot find an addressable other, then we can lose the ability to narrate 
our experience. In a sense, we cease to be someone. We rely on the response of others to 
be a person. Laub calls this response, the response of a witness -  and it is required for 
the internal witness. In Collins’ account we saw how the response of a witness can 
nourish and sustain us, as for example in sitting with friends at the kitchen table. We are 
co-constructed or constituted, at least in part, by the response of others.
I turn to Laurence Thomas’ idea of moral deference to elaborate how we are 
constituted by the response of other. Thomas describes a face-to-face encounter between
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someone who is ‘privileged' and someone who belongs to what he calls a ‘socially
diminished category’ with the intent of understanding the harm caused by racial
oppression. For Thomas, moral deference is
.. .a mode of moral learning which those who have been oppressed are owed 
in the name of eliminating the very state of their oppression. In the absence 
of such learning, oppression cannot but continue to be a part of the fabric of 
moral life. Indeed, the absence of such learning, the studied refusal to engage 
in such learning, is one of the very ways in which oppression manifests itself.
(247)
Thomas argues that “moral deference is owed to persons of good will when they speak in
an informed way regarding experiences specific to their diminished social category from
the standpoint of an emotional category configuration to which others do not have
access” (244). We need to understand what Thomas means by ‘diminished social
category’ and ‘emotional category configuration’ to unpack this claim. Following David
Hume, Thomas understands we humans to be socially constituted. He explains
We are constituted through others, by which I mean that the way in which we 
conceive of ourselves is, at least in part, owing to how others conceive of us, 
and necessarily so. The way in which we think of ourselves is inextricably 
tied to the way in which others think of us. In a fully just world, all would be 
constituted through others so as to be full and equal members of society. That 
is, each member would be constituted so as to see her or himself in this way.
By contrast, in an oppressive society, the victims of oppression-diminished 
social category persons, I mean-are constituted, in both masterfully subtle 
ways and in ever so explicit ways, so as not to see themselves as full and 
equal members of society. (238)
Characterizing the oppressed as belonging to a diminished social category recognizes the
ways in which persons—as members of groups— are differently socially constituted in an
unjust society. As Thomas describes it, one consequence of oppression is that those
belonging to a diminished social category do not see themselves to be full and equal
members of society and thus, feel a sense of vulnerability. It is this vulnerability that
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defines what Thomas calls an emotional category configuration. The vulnerability one 
feels as a member of a diminished social category means that an innocent black man 
attacked by white men and an innocent white man attacked by black men will experience 
their pain in a radically different manner. Thus, only by listening with an attitude of 
moral deference, Thomas claims, can a person who does not belong to the same category 
begin to understand how oppression causes harm to a particular person. The social 
categories that Thomas identifies are descriptive of how we are differently socially 
constituted and the sense of vulnerability that results from these categories.
For Thomas, moral deference can help to address the emotional walls that develop 
between people in an immoral society. He proposes that we listen with moral deference 
to “persons of good will when they speak in an informed way regarding experiences 
specific to their diminished social category from the standpoint of an emotional category 
configuration to which others do not have access” (244). We listen with moral deference 
in a very particular situation -  a person who is not a member of downwardly socially 
constituted group listens in order to learn how oppression works in the life of someone 
who is a member of downwardly socially constructed group. The educational proposals 
critiqued in Chapter 3 also prescribe particular situations in which students are asked to 
listen or respond as a witness. Roger Simon asks that students respond as a witness to 
texts that the teacher selects in relation to events of historical trauma Megan Boler 
suggests that students engage in a testimonial reading of any text; however, the student is 
asked to attend to where she or he feels discomfort or is resistant to the text. The class 
engages in ‘collective witnessing’ to examine their discomfort in conversation with one 
another. Sandra Bloom and Michael Reichert ask that students and teachers respond as a
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witness to violence -  their list of violence is long and inclusive. Taken together, Simon, 
Boler, Bloom and Reichert claim that one should respond as a witness to historical 
trauma, to any text that causes discomfort, and to all known cases of violence or 
reenactments of trauma. In my view, these prescriptions, as varied as they are, reduce 
witness to seeing violence and in this, do not recognize the myriad of ways that we are 
constituted by the response of others.
In the relation of witness, as I conceptualize it, testimony is not marked by a 
particular content, but rather we look for witnesses in situations where many have turned 
away. Looking for a witness is marked by a need to been seen and heard -  to have one’s 
perceptions acknowledged. The person who responds as a witness listens to the 
perceptions that the other feels he or she should attend to. That we must always be ready 
to respond as a witness is a significant difference from the conceptions of witness 
critiqued in the educational proposals in Chapter 3. One, it means that we may be asked 
to respond as a witness to a person who perpetrates violence. Two, it means that, as in 
the case of Mary TallMountain, we may be asked to respond as a witness to an account of 
what is most valued.
Listening to Accounts of Violence
Wayne Karlin’s essay on his experience in the Vietnam War is in a collection of 
talks given at a conference commemorating the My Lai massacre of March 16, 1968. In 
the opening address of the conference, held in 1994, Robert Jay Lifton invited those in 
attendance to listen and to learn from each other about My Lai, the Vietnam War, 
atrocity, modem warfare, and themselves. In Lifton’s view, we must bear witness to this
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history to learn more about the forces that can push toward atrocity and the possibility of 
resisting atrocity producing situations (Anderson, 1998: 22). Anderson notes that one of 
the most contentious questions has been whether My Lai was an aberration or a normal 
operation and whether the moral burden falls on a few individuals, on the military and 
civilian chain of command, or on the entire American way of war. For Anderson, how 
one answers these questions about the past determines how one lives with the traumatic 
memories in the present and guards against such disasters in the future (6). He argues 
that because “no one can be certain that his or her explanation is definitively right, 
everyone must listen to the other voices” and that the process does not end with listening 
(16). We must carefully collect evidence, analyze it, and construct logical arguments. Or 
in the terms that I’ve employed, to submit the testimony to rational work, both in terms of 
what is said and in terms of our own responses. The conference, like accounts and 
studies of the Holocaust, illustrates why it is important to respond as a witness, to listen 
to testimony in a way that allows claims to be put on the table.
The participants at the conference had all been directly involved in the Vietnam 
War. Anderson reports that they “told their stories that weekend [at the conference] and 
we did our best to hear what they said” (6). Randy Fertal, one of the organizers, asserts 
that “in truth, we in America have never really listened to what the Vietnam veterans 
experienced in Vietnam. What kept us then and keeps us now from listening? Perhaps 
the most formidable obstacle to true listening is ideology” (195). Fertal tells about 
arguing with his father about whether he would serve in Vietnam if called “All we were 
talking about, all we were expressing, were our ideologies. We did not bother—nor 
could we then have found the skill or the sangfroid—to examine the premises of those
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ideologies. And yet only by such examination can we hope ever to hear one another, can 
we hope ever to empathize with another’s point of view” (196). I included a Vietnam 
Veteran among the clear cases of looking for a witness because it illustrates the 
complexity of responding as a witness. The conference illustrates the significance of 
claims being put on the table for determining what happened and examining the 
significance of what happened. In terms of witness as a response to a particular person 
we can think of the retreats where Thich Nhat Hanh listened to the experience of veterans 
and Robert Jay Litton’s ‘rap sessions’ with veterans where he listened openly in the hope 
of helping an individual voice his experience. Both listened to accounts given by those 
who committed atrocities. This can be vital for the very life of the person bearing 
witness or speaking of their experience and for their ability to fully enter back into a 
larger community or feel welcomed home. In responding as a witness, we must also be 
willing to hear these accounts, to consider how we meet those who have caused harm and 
recognize our own potential to cause such harm.
Listening to Accounts of What is Most Valued
As Mary TallMountain’s account exemplifies, we may look for witnesses to have 
others feel what we take to be of significance, to have value in our lives. Mary 
TallMountain’s reading in the writing group is one clear example. Let me give another
28 In “Speaking of Courage,” Tim O’Brien tells of a veteran, Norman Bowker, who 
drives his father’s Chevy around and around a lake in his hometown thinking of what he 
wanted to say to his father and to Sally Kramer, who he would have liked to marry if she 
had not already married someone else. He wants to tell them or anyone, it seems, about 
the night Kiowa died in Vietnam. O’Brien writes “In a soft voice, without flourishes, he 
would have told the exact truth” (1990:148). Bowker does not tell the story. He kills 
himself in a YMCA locker room.
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example. A scene in Charles Frazier’s novel, Cold Mountain, captures the desire to feel
our life reverberate. Inman, a man deserting the Confederate Army in the U.S. Civil War,
spends a night at Sara’s house, during his travel home to the south. Sara’s husband, John,
the father of her infant child, had been killed in the war. Frazier writes:
There was nothing about her story remarkable other than that it was her life.
She told the manner in which she and John had met and fallen in love. The 
building of this cabin and her working like a man beside him, felling the trees 
and raising the dressed logs and chinking the gaps. The happy life they had 
planned in this lost place which to Inman seemed so unlikely of sustenance.
The hardness of the past four years, John's death, the shortness of food. The 
only bright spot was John's brief furlough, a time of great happiness which 
produced the baby sleeping by the fire. Without her, Sara said, there'd be 
nothing holding me to earth. (1997: 244)
Each time that Inman tried to speak, Sara hushed him. "She required of Inman only that
he bear witness [listen] to her tale" (244). For Inman, Frazier continues, “He figured she
had found some calm just in telling to another person what a lonely thin edge of life she
occupied, where one hog could act as a stopple to a demijohn of woes” (245). Sara
wanted Inman to know the significance the log cabin and cleared land held for her. She
spoke not so much of the pain, but of the joy in that time and in the child sleeping by the
fire. Sara did not want to be soothed or comforted. She did not look to Inman to take her
with him, to save her. Sara only asked him to listen to her story and to help her butcher
the last hog. In describing her experience, Sara explains the sustenance that she has
found in a place where Inman could see none. Sara’s intent seems to have been to hear
her life reverberate, and perhaps this is part of what it means to be felt, understood and
remembered by others.
Writing on a relation of care, Ann Diller notes that “When we ask Simone Weil’s 
question “What are you going through?” we tend to hear about suffering, sorrows, grief,
127
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
or pain. All of which constitute an integral part of our lives. But only a part” (1992:
209). William James suggests another integral part of our lives in his essay “On a 
Certain Blindness in Human Beings.” James draws on Robert Lewis Stevenson’s “The 
Lantern Bearers” in which Stevenson describes the details, and the essential glory, of 
those nights when children with a tin bull’s-eye lantern under their top-coat “asked for 
nothing more’” (Diller, 1992: 210). Diller continues “Here we have, as James the 
Pluralist well knew, the clue for a crucial refinement on our claims about knowledge of 
the particular, namely which particulars it is that give us the fullest, the most essential, 
knowledge of someone: “to miss the joy is to miss all” (210). Listening to accounts of 
what is most valued, what gives us joy can help to build bridges, to understand others, 
and is also vital to our lives together. It is this joy that we can sometimes refuse to see or 
are indifferent to. That we are witnesses to the joys and suffering of our lives is in 
keeping with ordinary usages of witness. That this is so, also works to make responding 
as a witness a less arduous responsibility. As Heller noted, we may sometimes be invited 
into a room where the light is very good. Responding as a witness to what another most 
values recognizes the complex ways that we are constituted by others and can also 
support some of the more difficult work of responding to violence.
Turning Away
Are there any times when we might turn away, when we need not respond as a 
witness? We must take care here because we may not know if many others have turned 
away before us. All the same there are times, I believe, when we may refuse to be a 
witness.
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(a) When we know that we cannot accept what we are entrusted with -  from 
exhaustion or we are already questioning some of our central 
understandings and cannot take on more of the inquiry entailed in 
acknowledgment.
(b) When our own pain is too raw to allow us to listen now to the other’s 
account because of our own experience. But we may still aim to listen at 
some point.
(c) Insincerity on the part of the person speaking. We must interrogate our 
assumptions here and yet we do make judgments regarding sincerity.29
In the conception of witness that I lay out, we must always be ready to respond as 
a witness because of the fact of our interdependency. We can see this interdependency in 
that we need others to be a person, to have our trust in others met. We see this in 
situations of violence, such as Laub describes, where we require the presence of an 
addressable other to speak of our experience. This is the case in many situations where 
there is little or no trust, such as in racial oppression in the United States. Second, we see 
the interdependency in the sustenance we get from others listening and willing to believe 
us, as in Collins’ conversation around the kitchen table and in TallMountain’s reading to 
the women in the writing group. Third, we can see our interdependency in how we 
respond to those we do not want to listen to because their experience challenges our view 
of the world, such as in the case of Veterans when they returned from Vietnam. We can 
need witnesses in conditions of trauma and also in the everyday sort of occurrences in our 
lives. It becomes pressing when it seems that everyone has turned away.
Bearing Witness to Oppression
As a response to a particular person, my conception of witness is similar to 
Noddings’ account of a caring encounter and is thus open to a particular critique,
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especially in regard to addressing oppression. Alison Jagger argues that as a mode of
moral reasoning, the perspective of care is not adequate for feminist projects because
attention to a particular person obscures our attention to structures of oppression that
make male-dominance seem normal, justifiable, a description of just the way the world is.
She argues that “care’s emphasis on responding to immediate needs simultaneously takes
those needs as givens, failing to question their source or why they are presently
unfulfilled” (1995: 194). Jagger continues
Moral thinking that focuses on the specificities of particular situations is 
likely to see the source of problems as lying in the personal attitudes of 
individual men, whites or heterosexuals who benefit, sometimes unwittingly 
or unwillingly, from sexism, racism, and heterosexism, rather than in those 
larger institutions that give some individuals power and privilege over others. 
Similarly, attending to an individual’s immediate needs for food, shelter, 
comfort, or companionship is likely to distract from moral scrutiny of the 
social structures that create those needs or leave them unfulfilled. (195)
The reality of social structures means that our individual efforts to meet individual needs
may be virtually impossible. Jagger asserts
Significantly improving the lives of the world’s women certainly requires the 
empathy, imagination, and responsiveness that distinguish care thinking; but 
it also requires a kind of moral thinking that focuses not only on meeting 
immediate needs but on problematizing the structures that create those needs 
or keeps them unfulfilled. (197)
Jagger does not conclude that justice thinking is better suited to feminist projects. This is
the conundrum—neither mode of reasoning works on its own. Jagger argues
Neither care nor justice reasoning, as ordinarily construed, constitutes the 
kind of hermeneutical moral thinking capable of questioning conventional 
definitions of assault as well as of exploring the complex assumptions about 
sexuality, aggression, and gender that make rape not only thinkable but 
predictable and even normal. The feminists of the late 1960's called this kind 
of thinking consciousness-raising. (198)
29 This requirement is in keeping with Thomas’ own qualification that we must listen to 
persons of “good will.”
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In insisting that witness is a response to a particular person, my analysis risks foreclosing 
on the recognition of injustice in just the way Jagger describes, i.e. the ability to see the 
structures of oppression.
In the next section, I will argue that the relation of witness as I have 
conceptualized it, does not foreclose on a shift to the frame, to structural oppression. 
Acknowledgment entails inquiry. If this inquiry is to sustain and, at a minimum, not 
foreclose on attention to structural oppression, then it must be an open sort of inquiry.
The inquiry that best meets the criteria, I hold, is a pragmatist conception of inquiry and 
truth. I look to Cheryl Misak’s elaboration of Charles S. Pierce’s work to answer the 
conundrum Jagger poses and to give shape to the inquiry entailed in acknowledgment. 
First, let me return briefly to what is meant by structural oppression.
Structural Oppression
In her analysis of structural oppression, Iris Marion Young asserts that the new 
usage of oppression includes the tyranny of one group over another, but also refers to the 
systematic constraints on groups that are not necessarily the result of the intentions of a 
tyrant. Young holds “oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the results of a few 
people’s choices or policies” (41). As noted in Chapter 1, the causes of structural 
oppression are “embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the 
assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following 
those rules” (41). The systemic character of oppression means that there may not be a 
group that oppresses; however for every oppressed group there is a privileged group.
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Young defines a social group as “a collective of persons differentiated from at 
least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life” (43). She holds that 
groups are an expression of social relations; a group exists only in relation to at least one 
other group. Unlike an aggregate or an association, a group constitutes individuals. 
Young explains “A person’s particular sense of history, affinity, and separateness, even 
the person’s mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly 
by her or his group affinities” (45). This ontology is in contrast to a theory of justice that 
presumes “the individual is ontologically prior to the social -  the authentic self is 
autonomous, unified, free, and self-made, standing apart from history and affiliations, 
choosing its life plan entirely for itself’ (45). Emphasizing and supporting Young’s 
analysis, is Thomas’ point that the way in which we conceive of ourselves is, at least in 
part, owing to how others conceive of us. Thomas notes that victims of oppression are 
constituted, “in both masterfully subtle ways and in ever so explicit ways, so as not to see 
themselves as full and equal members of society” (1992: 238). We are constituted within 
groups by how another group perceives us as well as by the history, traditions, and 
discourse patterns of our group affinities. Young is clear that we should not deny the 
reality of groups—that it is foolish to do so. Social justice, Young argues, “requires not 
the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect 
for group differences without oppression” (47). Group differentiation is not in itself 
oppressive.
One way we can see structural oppression is by examining privilege. In his book, 
Slaves in the Family, Edward Ball explores the legacy of oppression and privilege in his 
own family. A descendent of slave-owners, Edward Ball recounts “From time to time in
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his stories, Dad mentioned the people our family used to own. They were usually just
“the slaves,” sometimes “the Ball slaves,” a puff of black smoke on the wrinkled horizon
of the past” (1998: 8). Ball reflects that despite having left the South, the plantation past
seemed etched in his unconscious. The plantation lived on in a sense. Ball writes
If we did not inherit money, or land, we received a great fund of cultural 
capital, including prestige, a chance at education, self-esteem, a sense of 
place, mobility, even (in some cases) a flair for giving orders. And it was not 
only “us,” the families of former slave owners, who carried the baggage of 
the plantations. By skewing things so violently in the past, we had made sure 
that our cultural riches would benefit all white Americans. (14)
In this Ball names the privilege he, and all white Americans, inherit from this violent
past.
For an example of a legacy of oppression embedded in the structures of society, 
we need only look to our public school system. At an elementary school I visit each 
week, it is common to see only African-American boys on the bench outside the 
principal’s office. This is true in spite of the fact that the school population is less than
O A
twenty percent African-American. Ann Arnett Ferguson records this pattern in her 
book, Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making o f Black Masculinity (2001). The boys 
have more than likely acted in a way that their teachers feel justified in sending them 
from the classroom. And yet, there is something deeply wrong when week after week it 
is African-American boys who are excluded or exclude themselves from class. This 
example illustrates how we can see oppression working in everyday practices by 
examining comparisons between groups and the consequences of assumptions, attitudes,
30 The demographics of this elementary school of 450 students are 18% African 
American, 7 % Asian, 52% Hispanic, 1% Native American, 1% Pacific Islander, 21 % 
White. Ninety-four percent of the students participate in the free or reduced lunch 
program.
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and institutional policies. Structural oppression is not apparent in the intentions of 
individuals. By listening to a child or teacher’s account of what has happened, we would 
not see the structures of oppression that we can see in looking at the patterns of who sits 
on the bench day after day.
Jagger argues that it is not enough to respond to the individual, but that we must 
also problematize attitudes that work to normalize oppression. Responding to the 
immediate needs of individual makes the needs seem normal, simply something that is; 
we are not pushed to question why the needs are unfulfilled. I show first that the relation 
of witness does not foreclose on seeing the structures of oppression. And further, that is 
it likely, though not guaranteed, that our inquiry will bring us to consideration of the 
structural oppression. Thus inquiry as to what the other’s testimony means to us must be 
characterized by an open kind of inquiry. If inquiry is to have the potential to move us 
from the individual to the frame, it will need to be the kind of inquiry that Misak has in 
mind. I begin to answer the conundrum Jagger poses with an overview of Misak’s 
project. Witness is not the same relation as care. The second move of the response of a 
witness is characterized by acknowledging the other’s testimony. Acknowledgement can 
require that we engage in inquiry by turning toward ourselves with a particular posture of 
mind or willingness to question everything; however, no way of listening is a guarantee 
that we will see the wrong.
Truth and Inquiry
To elaborate Charles Sanders Pierce’s notion of inquiry aimed at truth, Cheryl 
Misak begins with the phenomena of our beliefs. On the pragmatist view of truth, as
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Misak explains it, when we aim at empirical adequacy, predictive power, understanding 
the way things work, understanding ourselves, and the like, we aim at truth (2000: 1). 
Pierce held that a true belief is one that would be agreed upon at the hypothetical or ideal 
end of inquiry. Building on Pierce’s conception, Misak claims “A true belief is one upon 
which inquiry could not improve—belief which would fit with experience and argument 
and which would satisfy the aims of inquiry, no matter how much the issue was subject to 
experiment, evaluation, and debate” (1). I will take up this conception of truth more fully 
in the next chapter, for now it will suffice to say that on this account, the aim of inquiry 
and true belief cannot be separated. When we engage in inquiry, we aim at getting the 
best beliefs we can.
Misak argues that we can see moral deliberation and deliberation about how best
to live our lives as being “truth apt.” She roots her argument that moral claims are truth-
apt in the phenomenology of beliefs. She explains
For it seems that when we make moral judgments and when we act in the 
ways which we think are morally right, we take ourselves to be aiming at 
something objective -  at the truth or at getting things right, where ‘right’ does 
not mean merely ‘right by the lights of my group.’ [...] We want not the 
illusion that our projects, plans, ambitions, and relationships are 
worthwhile—we want good reason to think that they are worthwhile. (3)
We want our beliefs to be right as evidenced in how we are prepared to question our
judgment. Because we want to get things right, Misak argues we must accept certain
commitments to hold our beliefs open and to engage in inquiry. Misak holds that
“Inquiry begins with the irritation of doubt and ends with a stable, doubt-resistant belief.
But we can’t know when this is -  and so should focus on inquiry and getting the best
answers that we can” (53).
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Inquiry is defined broadly. Misak explains that seeing moral inquiry as being
truth-apt or aiming at truth does not force us to think of moral inquiry as the active testing
of hypothesis. The inquiry is not so organized, nor the questions always clear. The
process of inquiry “can take all kind of forms, not all of them resembling self-conscious,
organized, and systematic investigation’" (108). Inquiry can begin in any number of
ways. Misak elaborates
Challenges can come from within, when my own judgments and principles 
conflict and I feel a pull toward revising them. Or they can come from 
without, when I see that the judgments and principles of others, from within 
my circle or from afar, conflict with my own judgments and I feel a pull 
towards reconsidering them. (53)
In Misak’s view, a minimal characteristic of good inquiry is that which takes experience
seriously. And so, in this view, if we fail to take the experience of others seriously, then
we fail to have beliefs that are genuinely aimed toward truth. In a relation of witness, I
do not only mean that we must take the experience of others seriously. I want to be clear
that it is their account of their experience that we must take seriously to meet the minimal
characteristic of inquiry.
In moral deliberation in particular, Misak holds that “we must not underestimate
the value of listening to ordinary people’s own stories — their accounts of how injustice,
for instance, has played a part in their lives” (96).
Moral deliberation displays a kind of epistemological democracy. We are all 
involved in moral discussion and in experiments in living, to borrow a phrase 
from Mill. Moral judgement is inextricably bound up with our relations to 
theirs and anyone who stands in such relationships has plenty of engagement 
in moral deliberation. Truth requires us to listen to others, and anyone might 
be an expert. (96)
There is an expectation of convergence -  but it is a normative presupposition of inquiry, 
differing in strength as our needs for convergence differ” (99). Misak holds that
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engaging in genuine moral inquiry— searching for principles and for 
particular judgments which will not be susceptible to recalcitrant experience 
and argument—requires that we take our beliefs to be responsive to new 
arguments and sensibilities about what is good, cruel, kind, oppressive, 
worthwhile, or just. Those who neglect or denigrate the experiences of others 
because of their gender, skin color, or sexual orientation are adopting a very 
bad means for arriving at true and rational beliefs. They can be criticized as 
failing to aim at truth properly. (104)
And so as inquirers, people who want to get it right -  to have true beliefs -  we must listen
to the experience and reasons others put forward.
In responding as a witness, as I’ve characterized it, we may be drawn into the 
inquiry of the person bearing witness or begin a related inquiry. For example, if we think 
of Mary Solberg in El Salvador, in acknowledging the testimony of those she lived and 
worked beside there, her inquiry may be broadly described as directed by the question 
“Knowing what I know now, how should I live?” Wayne Karlin is engaged in a sort of 
inquiry to understand his experience in Vietnam. Those who refuse to listen to his 
testimony or that of other Veterans cease to have rational beliefs regarding the Vietnam 
War, or perhaps any war, and in a sense, block inquiry into the significance of the 
Vietnam War.
We can expect Misak’s conception of inquiry to direct our attention to the 
structures of oppression because of the openness of the inquiry -  the requirement that we 
listen to experience and reason. We may not attend to the structures of oppression in 
every case. In some cases it may not be that salient.
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CHAPTER 6
EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE RELATION OF WITNESS
In the same way that we must ensure that our conception of a relation of witness 
does not foreclose on our ability to see the structures of oppression, we must take care 
that the relation does not rest on an epistemology that in its self perpetuates oppression. 
This latter charge is made against many ‘standard knowledge' or ‘traditional 
epistemology’ projects. I argue that the relation of witness can make a significant 
contribution to the generation of ‘situated knowledge’ and therefore is not susceptible to 
this charge. In this chapter, I explicate the contribution the relation of witness makes to 
the generation of situated knowledge. I begin with a contrast of ‘standard’ and ‘situated’ 
knowledge, and argue that pragmatists have long been engaged in the generation of 
situated knowledge. I then turn back to the relation of witness to elaborate the 
commitments of each side that work to support the epistemological functions of the 
relation.
Impact of Epistemology as Usual
One traditional epistemological project centers on Descartes’ notion of a 
universal “subject” who variously recalls, receives, or creates knowledge. Within this 
project, one view of knowledge that has guided epistemology for centuries can be 
summarized as follows:
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We can say that S knows p when
1. S believes that p.
2. P is true.
3. S is justified in (has good reasons for) believing that p. (Noddings,
1995: 100)
Much contemporary debate in epistemology has to do with the nature of the subject and 
whether we can presume there is a universal subject who recalls, receives or creates 
knowledge. Another key topic of debate is what counts as objectivity.
On the positivist view, objectivity is defined as the scientific inquiry’s 
independence from the “subjective” values, interests, and emotions of those who engage 
in scientific inquiry or who deal with its results. Alison Jagger notes that in this view 
“good scientists are detached observers and manipulators of nature who follow strict 
methodological rules, which enable them to separate themselves from the special values, 
interests or emotions generated by their class, race, sex, or unique situation” (Jagger, 
1983: 356). The good scientist of positivism resembles the abstract individual of liberal 
political theory who is “able to detach herself or himself from such “contingent” 
properties as race, class or sex” (357). This view of objectivity is challenged on the 
grounds that we cannot make a sharp distinction between fact and value, nor is there any 
such standpoint as that of a neutral observer.
What Jagger calls a ‘traditional Marxist’ conception of knowledge challenges two
basic assumptions of this liberal epistemology. Jagger names these as follows
First, since praxis is necessarily a social activity, it challenges the view that 
knowledge can be the achievement of a single isolated individual. Instead, 
Marxism views knowledge as socially constructed and the expansion of 
knowledge as a social project. Secondly, since knowledge is one aspect of 
human productive activity and since this activity is necessarily purposive, the 
basic categories of knowledge will always be shaped by human purposes and 
the values on which they are based. (358)
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Traditional Marxist thought recognizes that there is no Archimedean point outside the 
world where we may stand to gain a perspective on reality that is neutral between the 
interests and values of existing social groups, and thus no knowledge can be objective in 
the liberal or positivist sense (362). The ways in which we conceptualize the world are 
always shaped by our interactions with the world (362). A limitation of structuralist 
Marxism is that the only two standpoints acknowledged are determined on the basis of 
one’s relation to the means of production: ruling class and proletariat. On this view, 
taken to the extreme, the abolishment of capitalism will abolish women’s oppression.
This view is challenged on the basis that it is not a complex enough account of relations 
of dominance and oppression.
The positivist view poses a universal subject who is in fact not universal, but 
assumes a specific kind of experience and worldview. The impact of the positivist view is 
that we lose sight of the particular people who make knowledge claims utilizing certain 
evidence to meet certain purposes. The traditional Marxist view recognizes that 
knowledge is necessarily shaped by human purposes and values, but acknowledges only 
two standpoints. Jagger argues that neither is adequate to feminist projects; I would add 
that neither is adequate to projects in schools that seek to address oppression.
Jagger looks to standpoint theory as represented by radical feminism and socialist 
feminism as promising directions in feminist epistemology. One strength of socialist 
feminism over radical feminism is that the standpoint of women is not considered an 
innocent position, rather it is understood that all standpoints are shaped, at least in part, 
by dominant ideologies or modes of thought. Donna Haraway’s conception of situated 
knowledge fits within what Jagger calls socialist feminism. Like Jagger, I accept that
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knowledge is a social product shaped by and for human purposes; however, Jagger does 
not consider a pragmatist conception of truth. I do. Indeed, I argue that Pierce’s 
pragmatist conception of truth supports situated knowledge. Let me outline what 
Haraway means by objectivity and the subject in her conception of situated knowledge.
Situated Knowledge
Donna Haraway argues that in objectivity we do not need transcendence— 
immortality and omnipotence—but we do need some enforceable, reliable accounts of 
things not reducible to power moves and agonistic, high status games of rhetoric or to 
scientistic, positivist arrogance (1991: 188). Haraway proposes that we look to the 
metaphor of vision for a usable account of objectivity. We can look to ‘embodied 
vision’ as opposed to the vision where we leap out of our bodies and into a conquering 
gaze from nowhere (188). In what Haraway calls a doctrine of embodied objectivity, 
feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledge. Borrowing the term from 
Kuhn, Haraway advocates a ‘passionate detachment’ that requires more than 
acknowledged and self-critical partiality. “We are also bound to seek perspective from 
those points of view, which can never be known in advance, which promise something 
quite extraordinary, that is, knowledge potent for constructing worlds less organized by 
axes of domination” (192). Haraway argues for “politics and epistemologies of location, 
positioning, and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being 
heard to make rational knowledge claims. These are the claims on people’s lives; the 
view from a body, always a complex, contradictory, structuring and structured body, 
versus the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity” (195). Haraway describes
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the subject in the complex terms of a cyborg -  a cybemectic organism that is a hybrid of 
machine and organism (149). The cyborg is problematic in that it’s difficult to say just 
what it is. For the purposes of my project, I stay with particular flesh and blood persons 
with ‘passionate attachments’ engaged in relations with one another.
To describe who engages in situated knowledges, Donna Haraway draws on “the 
complex history of “witnessing” and being a “witness” within the stories of science 
studies in relation to Robert Boyle’s development of the experimental method in the 
seventeenth century” (1997:158). Boyle’s modest witness is invisible, that is, “he is an 
inhabitant of the potent unmarked category, which is constructed by the extraordinary 
conventions of self-invisibility” (23). Haraway argues that this self-invisibility is the 
specifically modem, European, masculine, scientific form of the virtue of modesty that 
pays off its practitioners in the coin of epistemological and social power (23-24). The 
experimental way of life, Haraway notes, was supposed to be in a public space; however, 
the public space was rigorously defined, not everyone could come in, and not everyone 
could testify credibly (25). For example, Margaret Cavendish was allowed into the Royal 
Society laboratory as a part of the ‘witnessing community’ in 1667 and a woman was not 
allowed again until in 1945 when the society was advised by lawyers that it could no 
longer continue to exclude women (32). In this interim of nearly 300 years, women were 
sometimes allowed to watch a demonstration or experiment, but they were not allowed 
the status of a witness who could reliably report on their observations. Thus, women 
were effectively excluded from the epistemic community capable of generating 
“knowledge.” Hobbes repudiated the experimental way of life precisely because its 
knowledge was dependent on a practice of witnessing by a special community, like that
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of clerics and lawyers. “Hobbes saw the experimentalists as part of a private, or even 
secret, and not civil, public space” (25). Similar to Hobbes, Haraway’s intent is to open 
the witnessing community. To do this, she refigures Boyle’s ‘modest witness’ into the 
‘mutated modest witness.’
Haraway’s mutated modest witness is about “telling the truth, giving reliable 
testimony, guaranteeing important things, providing good enough grounding—while 
eschewing the additive narcotic of transcendental foundations—to enable compelling 
belief and collective action” (1997: 22). Haraway argues for a strong objectivity that 
“insists that both the objects and the subjects of knowledge-making practices must be 
located” (37). Locating, in Haraway’s view, is not a listing of adjectives or assigning of 
labels such as race, sex, and class. Haraway asserts that “Location is not the concrete to 
the abstract of decontexualization. Location is always partial, always finite, always 
fraught play of foreground and background, text and context, that constitutes critical 
inquiry” (37). Boyle’s modest witness understands rational knowledge to be disengaged, 
“to be from everywhere and nowhere, to be free from interpretation, from being 
represented, to be fully self-contained or fully formalizable” (196). Haraway’s mutated 
modest witness understands rational knowledge to be a “process of ongoing critical 
interpretation among ‘fields’ of interpreters and decoders” (196).
I do have in mind concrete persons who can be located in actual places. By this 1 
do not mean a list of adjectives and labels such as race, sex, and class. I agree with 
Haraway that this list is only sometimes descriptive of a location, and never fully 
descriptive. Neither will a list of adjectives and commas tell us where we might be 
surprised by that which will give us knowledge to create worlds less dominated by axis of
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oppression. I do not want the “addictive narcotic of transcendental foundation.” But I do 
not adopt Haraway’s ‘mutated modest witness.” I look to Cheryl Misak’s interpretation 
of Charles Pierce’s conception of truth and inquiry introduced in the previous chapter.
Truth, Inquiry, and Situated Knowledge
Cheryl Misak holds that the best kind of pragmatist replaces the old dichotomy 
between neutral standards and no-standards-at-all with a substantive, low profile, 
conception of truth and objectivity, a conception which nonetheless can guide us in 
inquiry (14). Notice this is the same problem that Haraway addresses in her conception 
of ‘embodied objectivity.’ Misak links truth, objectivity, and inquiry. Truth is a property 
of belief- a belief is a product of our deliberation and investigation (50). I outline 
Misak’s conception o f ‘truth’ and ‘inquiry,’ followed by the requirements of objectivity.
I then turn back to ‘situated knowledge.’
In Misak’s view “Inquiry begins with the irritation of doubt and ends with a 
stable, doubt-resistant belief. But we can’t know when this is -  and so should focus on 
inquiry and getting the best answers that we can” (53). Truth is a normative assumption 
of inquiry and serves as a regulative ideal. The idea of truth guides inquiry but, as Misak 
interprets Pierce’s position, we never really reach the end of inquiry. Misak writes 
“Pierce insisted that we need a conception of truth which ‘can and ought to be used as a 
guide for conduct’ (MS 684: 11). We need a conception of truth which can guide inquiry 
and deliberation” (56). For Pierce, truth is not some transcendental, mystical thing that 
we aim at for its own sake (54). Truth guides inquiry with the idea of a rational belief. 
The conception of a ‘rational belief closes the gap between truth and inquiry and in
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Misak’s terms “explains why some of our current beliefs are considered rational, or more
likely to be true, than other beliefs, even if we cannot know that they are true” (57).
If truth is the belief that would best fit with the evidence, were we to have so 
much by way of good evidence that no further evidence would overturn the 
belief, than a rational belief is the belief which best fits with the evidence that 
we currently have. If truth is what would be justified by the principles of 
inquiry were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go, then a 
rational belief is one which is justified by the current principles of inquiry.
There is no gap between what we take, after careful consideration to be 
rational and what is rational. Although we are never in a position to judge 
whether a belief is true or not, we will often be in a position to judge whether 
it is the best belief given the current state of inquiry. (57)
Truth is connected to inquiry with a subjunctive conditional -  “a true belief is one which
would fit with the evidence and which would measure up to the standards of inquiry were
inquiry to be pursued so far that no recalcitrant experience and no revisions of inquiry
wold be called for” (68, emphasis in Misak). Pierce claims that bivalence, the idea that a
belief is either true or false, is a regulative assumption of inquiry (68). We assume that
there would be an upshot to our investigations, that it would emerge that either p is true
or that it is false. This assumption explains why we inquire into the issue.
Rational beliefs are the best we have. We can say that rational beliefs are 
knowledge. This fits with John Dewey’s sense that truth is a subset of knowledge, rather 
than knowledge understood as a subset of truth. Noddings writes “The more that p has 
been tested and used successfully, Dewey said, the greater the warrant for asserting it. 
Notice that Dewey’s is a form of forward looking epistemology; it emphasizes 
verification in use rather than justification through reasons referring to antecedent 
conditions” (1995: 107). Truth is verifiable. The emphasis is not on justification.
Misak holds that moral beliefs hold the mark of objectivity in that we understand 
them to be sensitive to reasons. We change our mind. Misak continues “One additional
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mark of objectivity is that the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, 
reason, argument, and thought experiments where we, for instance, place ourselves in 
another’s shoes. Such responsiveness is part of what it is to make a moral decision and 
part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (52). This responsiveness meets the 
requirement of objectivity -  “an objective area of inquiry must be such that its beliefs are 
sensitive to something that can speak for or against them” (52). I do not accept thought 
experiments as sufficient for moral deliberation for the reason that we cannot know what 
the other experiences by putting our self in his or her shoes. We must take into account 
the testimony of concrete others.
Misak’s notion of inquiry supports situated knowledge, if we understand situated 
knowledge to be an ongoing interpretive practice of coming to rational beliefs. This 
requires that we speak our beliefs and listen to the experience and reason of others. I turn 
now to an elaboration of the epistemological tasks for both the person bearing witness 
and for the person who responds to the testimony in what I call a relation of witness. I 
elaborate the epistemological tasks for each side of the relation utilizing Cheryl Misak’s 
pragmatist conception of inquiry aimed at ‘truth.’
Bearing Witness
I have been concerned with cases in which a person has to look for a witness. In 
these cases, a person bears witness in a context of indifference or in the face of an 
outright refusal to listen. Such testimony is not marked by a particular content, but by the 
context or situation in which it is given. The testimony is often a challenge to what is 
generally accepted to be true. In this section, I outline the responsibilities of the person
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who bears witness if the testimonies are to make a strong challenge to what counts as 
‘legitimated’ knowledge.
Patricia Hill Collins notes that “Like Black women’s giving testimonials that
often disrupt public truths about them, when Black women valorize their own concrete
experiences, they claim the authority of experience” (48). Collins continues
By invoking the authority of lived experience, African-American women 
confronted seemingly universal scientific truths by citing examples from their 
own lived experiences. The purpose was not simply to insert the missing 
experiences into prevailing wisdom. Instead, when effectively done, 
claiming the authority of concrete experiences used wisdom to challenge 
legitimated knowledge. Thus, breaking silence by claiming the authority of 
individual lived Black female experience offered an effective challenge to 
elite discourses claiming the authority of science. (48-49)
In Collins’ view, it is the authority of individual lived experience that offers a challenge
to legitimated knowledge. Some examples of such testimony are collected in a book
called Walking on Fire: Haitian Women’s Stories o f Survival and Resistance. Author
Beverly Bell writes “through the decades I have been consistently struck by the
dissonance between how Haitian women experience and understand their lives, and how
those lives are presented and perceived in the larger world” (2001: 2). Bell believes that
in voicing their experiences and what they make of their lives, the women are
“challenging control of the production of information and knowledge. Like Anacaona,
all are freedom fighters in one way or another. Some do not read or write. Few have had
the opportunity to influence the public record” (3). Bell speaks on the women’s behalf,
and carries their testimony to a broader audience. As does Lelenne Gilles, a journalist in
Haiti whose testimony is included in the collection. Gilles writes of her conviction to
speak: “If I didn’t have a radio to speak in, I’d stand under a tree to speak out. If I didn’t
have a microphone to speak into, I’d stand in the middle of the street. The people would
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pass me by and I’d tell them, “Ladies and gentlemen, here’s what’s going on. In this 
rural area they just fired fifty workers for their union activities’” (72). Gilles says that 
she speaks so people have space to breathe. The testimony is meant as a challenge to 
‘legitimated knowledge’ and it is hoped that the challenge will work to transform the 
situation o f the women and perhaps our own lives, those of use who read the collection.
We also see that in each of the clear cases in Chapter Four, the testimony 
challenges the status quo. June Jordan states what she saw happen in the Senate 
hearings— Anita Hill tried to tell the truth amid “jackals and mad dogs.” In claiming that 
the hearings were representative of a larger picture of violence against women, Jordan 
voices her understanding of the significance of the hearings. Thich Nhat Hanh tells us 
what he saw The village was bombed, every soul was killed.” And he writes on the 
significance “Let me raise my voice to denounce this dreadful war, this murder of brother 
by brother.” In bearing witness, each recounts an event and expresses her or his belief 
regarding the significance of the event. But we must address under what conditions such 
testimony represents a viable epistemological challenge.
Misak argues that “Once it is acknowledged that we have beliefs, then we can say 
that qua believers, we must abide by certain principles” (46, emphasis in Misak). In 
Misak’s terms, a knowledge claim or belief must be held open to reason and to the 
experience of others if it aims at truth. To assert'p, is to assert that p is true. In making 
an assertion, in Misak’s view, a person commits herself
(a) To defend p by arguing that she is, and others are, warranted in asserting 
and believing it.
(b) To giving up the belief in the face of sustained evidence and argument 
against it.
(c) To saying what could speak against the belief. (73-74)
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By definition, genuine beliefs are responsive to experience and reason. It is only when 
both sides of the relation hold what Misak calls ‘genuine beliefs' that the relation can 
function to challenge knowledge. In the paragraphs that follow and in the next section, I 
critique the commitments that Misak lays out above for the person making an assertion 
and turn again to consider the response of a witness.
In bearing witness, a person makes an assertion in a climate of indifference or an 
outright refusal to listen. The testimony may be an account of a person’s lived 
experience or the person bearing witness may be speaking on behalf of another. An 
account of experience necessarily includes some kind of judgment regarding the 
significance of this experience. I’ll take this point up shortly. The testimony is both an 
assertion and a belief in Misak’s terms. Misak’s first requirement is that in making an 
assertion the speaker must defend p by arguing that she is and others are warranted in 
asserting and believing it. If I give testimony regarding an injustice I have experienced, I 
must be willing to argue that others are warranted and justified in seeing it as an injustice. 
I do not want others to appropriate my experience in easy understanding -  the passive 
empathy that Boler speaks against. At a minimum, I expect that others will consider 
whether what I have named is an injustice. This consideration is what is demanded in 
acknowledgement. There need not be agreement on the significance of the testimony for 
the witness relation to be completed. The commitment to defend p by arguing that she is, 
and others are, warranted in asserting and believing it is tempered by Misak’s claim that 
because we experience something as injustice does not mean that it is injustice.
To move to Misak’s second condition for making an assertion, if the person 
bearing witness speaks in a climate of indifference, disbelief, or the face of an outright
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refusal to listen, then what speaks against the belief may be being said loud and clear.
That this is so does not mean that what is said offers good reasons against the belief. The 
experience of Vietnam veterans who were unable to find anyone to listen to their account 
of their experience provides an example of my concern here. Experience and evidence 
may be lost, given up, in the face of sustained inability or refusal to question a particular 
ideology or way of looking at the world. The second requirement for making assertions 
is difficult to meet by someone giving testimony if one’s experience has not been taken 
into account in larger epistemic community or has been routinely dismissed. However, 
difficulties in finding uptake -  in finding a witness in my terms -  does not refute Misak’s 
point. The person bearing witness must hold his or her belief open. So, while it is the 
case that with testimony that is counter to what is generally believed, the person bearing 
witness often faces resistance to her testimony, if her or his testimony is to count as a 
genuine claim to knowledge the person giving testimony must be prepared to give it up in 
the force of sustained evidence and (good) argument against it.
The third requirement Misak identifies, that the person must say what could speak 
against the belief, fits with Pierce’s insistence that a belief must be responsive to 
something that we can experience, must turn on something. If it does not, it is a spurious 
belief. In Misak’s terms “A belief, hypothesis, or theory which pretends to be above 
experience, which thinks so well of itself that it pretends to be immune from recalcitrant 
experience, is spurious” (51).
Assertion and belief must be grounded in experience. Misak notes that our senses 
do not provide us with information about how the unconceptualized world is -  what we 
have are ‘perceptual judgements.’ Perceptual judgments, Misak holds, are “descriptions
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or interpretations (of whatever hold a person had on what actually impinged on her)
which can be true or false and subject to error” (79). All experience entails perceptional
judgements, thus experiencing something as x is not an infallible judgement. For Pierce,
the authority of sensory perceptions is rooted in the fact that we have no choice but to
take seriously the force of the experience. Pierce writes
Any judgement that is compelling, surprising, brute, unchosen, or impinging 
is an experience, regardless of what causes us to feel compelled and 
regardless of whether we can identify the source of compulsion. All 
‘compulsions of thought’ count as experience (CP 8.101). (Misak, 2000: 80)
Misak elaborates “The key feature of perception, observation, or experience is its
insistence. And that it is fully general. Experience is not tied to what our ears, eyes,
nose, and skin report” (80).
Misak argues that Pierce’s notion of experience extends into the moral realm 
because we do find ourselves compelled in moral matters. This compulsion takes two 
forms. One is something like what gets called ‘intuition’ or ‘felt response.’ In this case 
moral perception is kin to direct perception, as for example, where we see that an act is 
generous without much reflection (90). The second form of experience “is that we find 
some reasons, arguments, imagined situations, and thought experiments compelling and 
may, in light of them, revise our moral judgements” (90). Misak does not privilege the 
second kind of experience where it seems that we test our intuitions. In both cases, our 
perceptions are fallible. We begin inquiry with our experience or ‘perceptual 
judgements’ because “we happen to be compelled to face experience and our method of 
inquiry should acknowledge this compulsion” (81). We cannot avoid starting here -  it is 
the only place available. Misak argues “All we have to go on in our deliberations about 
what is valuable is our experience—what we see as valuable and our refinements of those
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thoughts, in light of the arguments of others and in light of reflection” (81). These 
deliberations are vital, because finding something so does not mean it is so. The person 
bearing witness is engaged in inquiry, although it may not be the formal sort of inquiry of 
testing a hypothesis. Testimony is an assertion that arises from this inquiry.
In sum, if testimony is to be able to offer a strong challenge to ‘legitimate 
knowledge’ as Collins refers to it, then the person who bears witness or gives testimony 
must hold a genuine belief in Misak’s terms. The epistemological tasks of the person 
bearing witness are to speak with sincerity and to hold a ‘genuine belief.’ This entails 
being prepared to give up a belief it in the face of sustained evidence and (good) 
argument.
Testimony makes the strongest challenge to what counts as ‘legitimated 
knowledge’ when the person bearing witness meets all three of the commitments that 
Misak identifies for a ‘genuine belief.’ However, not all of these commitments will be 
met in every case. That a person bearing witness can not meet all of the commitments of 
a ‘genuine belief at the time of giving testimony does not mean that the relation fails to 
have an epistemological function in terms of the generation of situated knowledge, but 
only that this function will come later.
Response of a Witness
The response of a witness, as I’ve claimed, entails listening with an attentiveness 
characterized by moral humility and acknowledging what is said. In listening with moral 
humility, one takes on the task of understanding the experience of the other. In 
acknowledgment, we engage in the open sort of inquiry that Misak describes. Our
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inquiry involves interrogating who we are and what we understand to be true on the basis 
of the other’s testimony. This inquiry need not be conducted within the confines of the 
encounter for the relation to be completed in the strong sense.
In listening with moral humility we strive to understand the other’s experience as 
she or he does. Thus, there is an epistemological task at the heart of our attentiveness to 
the other. This kind of listening can be a requirement for some experiences to be spoken. 
Acknowledgment entails looking to our selves. The person who responds as a witness to 
the other’s testimony must hold his or her beliefs open in the same way as the person 
bearing witness.31 We must listen to the experience of others if our own beliefs are to 
aim at truth. But if witness is to be a relation that can foster knowledge, then it also has 
to be the case that the one listening may refute, or can in principle refute, what the other 
says. Just when this is done and by whom is dependent on the particular situation and 
must be sensitive to the trust that is formed in the relation. This point is clear in 
considering listening to survivors who speak of their experience for the first time.
Geoffrey Hartman, who was involved in filming the testimony of survivors,
believes that the best interviews resulted from the testimonial alliance or trust-relation
that Dori Laub formed with the interviewee because in these interviews the search for
facts did not displace everything else. This alliance was part of what Hartman calls the
communal frame of the project. He explains
When I talk of the project’s communal frame, a return of trust, a wounded 
trust, is involved. The interviewers-indeed, all persons associated with the 
project-form a provisional community and become, for the survivor-witness, 
representative of a potentially larger community, one that does not turn away
31 Disrobe -  in Dewey’s terms -  look at one layer of our thought back and forth -  through 
and through -  from as close as we can come to another’s point of view.
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from but recognizes the historical catastrophe and the personal trauma 
endured. (2000: 10)
Hartman notes that the idea of the archive project was “to put people with direct 
knowledge of those grim events before the camera and let them speak with the least 
possible intervention” (7). In listening as witnesses, standing in for the community who 
turned away, the testimony of the survivors was not questioned. And indeed, it would 
seem wrong to interrogate the testimony when it may be being spoken for the first time.
In listening to the experience of the other in an open way we allow beliefs to be 
put on the table. The importance of allowing beliefs to be put on the table cannot be 
overstated. We cannot trust our own accounts of our experience -  because we see 
through an inherited and constructed place, we have a partial standpoint and we may be 
mistaken. To perceive something as so, does not make it so. The response of a witness 
does not require that we accept as ‘true’ what the other has said. Responding as a witness 
requires that we do not immediately disregard or refute the other’s account, though there 
must be room for argument if the relation is to have an epistemological function.
The pragmatist takes correct judgement to be a matter for the community of 
inquirers, even though it is the individual who does the judging. “Individuals are the 
possessors of belief, but whether or not a person’s belief is correct is a matter of what the 
community would determine. What fits with my experience is not of paramount 
importance as far as truth is concerned. What is important is what fits with all the 
experience that would be available, what the community of inquirers would converge 
upon” (95). But we will not always converge to one set of beliefs. Misak sees just one 
epistemic community. However, although we belong to one epistemic community, this 
does not mean that we must converge to one set of beliefs. There will always be some
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under determination in rational beliefs or knowledge, particularly moral knowledge. But 
it is the case that, in Misak’s terms “we will often improve our views by taking into 
account what other people find compelling” (95). The point is for the beliefs to hold up 
to inquiry -  to the experience and reason of others.
Let me give you an extended example that I take to be a clear case of 
acknowledgment without agreement. In an article titled “Talking With the Enemy” 
published in the Boston Globe on January 28, 2001, leaders on both sides of the abortion 
debate give the first public disclosure of private meetings they have had over a period of 
six years. The meetings were motivated by John Salvi’s twenty minute rampage in which 
he opened fire in a Planned Parenthood clinic outside of Boston, killing one person and 
seriously wounding three others, and in a second clinic in Boston directly following the 
first shooting, killing one person and injuring two others. Massachusetts Governor 
William Weld and Cardinal Bernard Law, among others, called for talks between prolife 
and prochoice leaders. The six women who write the article -  three prolife and three 
prochoice -  were among those who responded to the call. They report “The goal of the 
conversations would be to communicate openly with our opponents away from the 
polarising spotlight of media coverage; to build relationships of mutual respect and 
understanding; to help de-escalate the rhetoric of the abortion controversy; and, of course, 
to reduce the risk of future shootings” (Fowler, et al, 2001: FI). Ground rales for the 
meetings included the following: The women agreed to speak for themselves, not their 
organisations. All would seek to use terms agreeable (or at least tolerable) to all 
participants. Each agreed to shift focus away from arguing for their cause. These ground 
rales were important, and many meetings focused on finding terms that were acceptable
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or tolerable to the other. The women conclude in the article “Knowing that our ideas 
would be challenged, but not attacked, we have been able to listen openly and speak 
candidly” (FI).
All participants stated their beliefs in a way that drew on their experience. The
women write “At one session each [woman] told the group why she had devoted so much
of her time, energy and talents to the abortion issue. These accounts— all deeply
personal— enlightened and moved us” (FI). The women report
In these and all our discussions of differences, we strained to reach those on 
the other side who could not accept—or at times comprehend— our beliefs.
We challenged each other to dig deeply, defining exactly what we believe, 
why we believe it, and what we still do not understand. (FI)
The women found that their differences on abortion reflected two worldviews that were
irreconcilable. But they kept meeting. The women gave two reasons for continuing to
meet.
First, because when we face our opponent, we see her dignity and goodness. 
Embracing this apparent contradiction stretches us spiritually. [...] We’re 
stretched intellectually, as well. This as been a rare opportunity to engage in 
sustained, candid conversations about serious moral disagreements. It has 
made our thinking sharper and our language more precise. (FI)
The women conclude -  “Since that first fear-filled meeting, we have experienced a
paradox. While learning to treat each other with dignity and respect, we all have become
firmer in our views about abortion” (FI). Throughout the course of the six years the
women met in private, the women report that
while we struggled over profound issues, we also kept track of personal 
events in one another’s lives, celebrating good times and sharing sorrows. As 
our mutual understanding increased, our respect and affection for one another 
grew. This increased understanding affected how we spoke as leaders of our 
respective movements. The news media, unaware that we were meeting 
began noting differences in our public statements. (FI)
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That the women spoke of each other differently—their language changed and what they 
were willing to say about the other—is evidence that learning to treat each other with 
respect and dignity is not an empty phrase.
The women were witnesses to one another. From the tone of the jointly written 
article and the specifics disclosed about the meetings, we can say that the women listened 
to each other with moral humility. Acknowledgment—turning to their own views and 
understanding of the world—is not negated in that fact that each became firmer in their 
own views. The aim of this inquiry was not adjudication between different points of view 
as much as understanding one another in the hope of de-escalating the violence between 
the different sides. The inquiry taken up was whether or not the two sides could live 
together — could treat each other with dignity and respect, rather than the “correction” of 
their view on abortion. In the course of extended conversations with one another, the 
women became more committed to their own positions regarding abortion. There was 
not convergence of beliefs about abortion; however, it seems that trust was not betrayed.
Flere in this example, we see how the relation of witness, as I’ve characterized it, 
can function to
(a) Get claims on the table for the person bearing witness
(b) Support the interrogation of experience for both sides of the relation
(c) Establish a broader epistemic community.
(d) Encourage consideration of the implications of our actions that follow from 
what we have heard.
Thus, I argue, my conception of witness has a significant contribution to make to the 
generation of knowledge. If we accept that knowledge or truth of our assertions must be 
rooted in wide experience and responsive to reason, then we can see that the possibility of 
knowledge is dependent on our attentiveness to another -  a willingness to be present,
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rather than turn away.
In bearing witness, a person gives testimony regarding experience that they 
believe others should take into account. In responding as a witness, we first listen with 
moral humility and second, acknowledge what is said. Moral humility entails an 
epistemological task in that we work to understand the testimony from the other’s point 
of view. We feel and understand the other’s experience and the significance of that 
experience for the other. The new understanding gained both by those who listen with 
moral humility and those who experience it from others can plant the seed of doubt or 
unease that is the start of inquiry. The inquiry begins in acknowledgment. We may not 
be involved in inquiry when we listen to testimony, but responding as a witness can entail 
taking up an inquiry. Whether or not we engage in inquiry is dependent on what we are 
entrusted with by the person bearing witness. If truth and knowledge can only be 
established in community -  a community of inquirers -  then, the obligations of 
witnessing rest not solely with the person who bears witness, but also with the person 
who responds as a witness. We should be ready to believe testimony when someone tries 
to speak in an unfavorable climate. The relation of witness is sometimes necessary for 
putting claims on the table. It never gets in the way of inquiry and can help with the 
conditions for continuing inquiry. In the meantime, the relation of witness holds 
potential for finding ways to live together, to see each other, and for the generation of 
knowledge less controlled by axes of domination and oppression.
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CHAPTER 7
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATION OF WITNESS AS A RELATION
In this last chapter, I sketch a broad educational framework and place the relation 
of witness, as I have elaborated it, within this framework. I provide a brief summative 
comparison of my account of witness with those offered by Simon, Boler, Bloom and 
Reichert -  contemporary theorists who, as we have seen, advocate for students to respond 
as witnesses. I see education as involving students in ongoing inquiry; an inquiry that is, 
at times, broadly directed by the question “Who am I?’ Such inquiry, I believe, is central 
to liberatory aims. The relation of witness supports such inquiry. Writing, and writing 
workshop in particular, is a means by which and a place where students take up this 
broad existential question. Our response as teachers, the way we listen to and take up 
student work, can work to support or to thwart their inquiry, or it can be completely 
tangential to and of little consequence to students in their inquiry. This is also true of 
students’ responses to one another. I compare the response of a witness to ways of 
responding to student writing advocated by Carl Anderson, Peter Elbow, and Timothy 
Lensmire. I conclude the chapter with what I take to be three clear examples of students 
looking for a witness in a classroom setting. These cases illustrate how responding as a 
witness can support the more complex and personal critical literacy that I have in mind.
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Liberatory Aims of Education
Students in schools should, I believe, be engaged in inquiry that is broadly 
directed by the existential question “Who am I in the world?” William Ayers asserts that 
such inquiry is central in education; that, in fact, all education comes from this question.32 
Without defending this very broad claim of his, we can see that inquiry directed by this 
existential question is at the heart of taking seriously the experience students bring to 
school and has the potential to open less-oppressive possibilities in schools and in our 
lives together. It is my central contention that the relation of witness supports such 
inquiry.
Before turning to how witness supports inquiry broadly directed by the question 
“Who am I?” let me draw on two more arguments to elaborate how central such inquiry 
is to education. Dwight Boyd writes that “Education is one of the main ways we have as 
humans to define our humanity, to practice our humanity, to maintain our humanity, and 
to change our humanity. It is how we seek to connect ourselves today to ourselves of the 
past, and it is how we project ourselves into the future” (1992: 161). Boyd continues “It 
is through education, at least in part, that human beings work together to realize the 
visions we have of what sort of creatures we should be as human beings” (161). 'What 
sort of creatures we ought to be is not the kind of thing that is figured out once and for 
all, so one of the challenges is to find a way to keep the question open, for both ourselves 
as educators and for students. If we accept this, then making more explicit inquiry into 
who we are makes perfect sense. In this shared inquiry, we engage in discussion about 
what sort of creatures we should be as humans. It matters how we answer these questions
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both for our own humanity and for the humanity of others.
“Who am I?” is, of course, linked to other questions. In an article entitled 
“Learning, Teaching, and Existential Meaning,” Nel Noddings observes that natural 
responses to the question “What am I to do?” emerge from answers to the question “Who 
am I?” and that this latter question is largely ignored in schools. She argues, as 
educators, we have the responsibility to see that the question “Who am I?” is not ignored. 
Noddings names succinctly the student's dilemma: "How can I decide what I am to do 
when I do not know who I am?" (1997: 51) Noting that the best education has often 
deepened the student’s dilemma by acknowledging the centrality of the question “Who 
am I?,” Noddings argues that it is especially important to do so today because “increasing 
numbers of children enter adolescence with no recognizable traditions or coherent life 
stories to furnish the continuity [needed for learning and even for change]” and “others 
find nothing in school that connects to the traditions with which they do identify” (55).
In Noddings’ view, educators can address both concerns by encouraging students to take 
up the question “Who am I?”
Recently, Noddings has taken up the question of how critical thinking can help us 
to understand ourselves better and come to terms with our attitudes toward war (2004: 
490). In relation to the war atrocities and what we might call the “reality” of war, 
Noddings advocates that students consider the question “Am I the sort of person who 
looks forward toward war? What justifies my attitude? How did I get this way?” (491).
I understand these questions to be versions of the question “Who am I?” Noddings 
continues “To ask the question “Am I this sort of person?” is to invite a study of how we
32 William Ayers used this phrasing of the question in his talk at the Philosophy of
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are socialized. Indeed, a critical study of how we are socialized may be the single most 
important function of education” (491). In considering our attitudes toward war, 
Noddings states that our aim should be to increase self-understanding, not to convert 
students to a particular view. She asserts that it is one function of critical thinking to get 
things in the open, connected to feeling and moral commitment. “The alternative to open 
discussion is a world in which patriotic fervor and hatred arise again and again. In the 
words with which [Gunter] Grass ends Crabwalk: “It doesn’t end. Never will it end.” It 
is the job of education to make it more likely that such cycles will end.” (494). As stated 
here, Noddings’ aim sounds very much like the aim of the proposals for ‘witness’ in 
education offered by Simon and Boler, as well as Bloom and Reichert. So we can see 
how putting such questions at the heart of education can easily lead into questions related 
to conditions of oppression and violence, questions that are the concern of critical 
theorists and other liberatory educators.
Roger Simon proposes the response of a witness within a ‘pedagogy of 
commemoration’ as a means by which students can rethink the logic that makes 
justifiable and normal relations of exploitation, dominion, and indifference between 
groups. In responding as a witness, students claim a complex legacy in a ‘living 
memory’ that changes who they see themselves to be in relation to those in another 
group. For Megan Boler, a primary responsibility of the teacher is to teach critical 
thinking in a way that the Flolocaust could never happen again. Such critical thinking 
rests on the practices of ‘testimonial reading’ and ‘collective witnessing.’ Sandra Bloom 
and Michael Reichert believe that education has a part in interrupting the cycles of
Education Society meetings, April 2001.
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violence that are engulfing our society. Teachers must step forward as witnesses engaged 
in social activism; they must make their classrooms safe places for children; and, they 
should encourage children to see themselves as their brother’s keeper. Each of these 
aims broadly addresses violence in our relations with one another and seeks liberation 
from or transformation of relations that perpetuate oppression.
Heller’s proposal that the women in the Tenderloin district of San Francisco came 
to the writing group to find witnesses contrasts with Boler’s, Simon’s, and Bloom and 
Reichert’s proposals for being witnesses in educational contexts. First, Heller is 
concerned primarily with the person speaking or reading her writing -  the woman who 
has come to find a witness. Finding a witness, Heller asserts, makes it possible for the 
other social, political, and educational functions of the group to be accomplished. Boler, 
Simon, Bloom, and Reichert are concerned primarily with the person who hears or who 
responds as a witness. On their accounts, the response of a witness entails taking a stand 
against the oppression and violence by understanding differently who one is in relation to 
others and taking action against the oppression or violence. A second contrast is found in 
assumptions regarding who gives testimony and who must respond as a witness. Heller 
describes a site that is, in her words, “far from the centers of power.” The women look 
for witnesses, in Heller’s words, to claim the richness of their complex experience. Both 
Simon and Boler seem to assume that those who respond as witnesses are in a position of 
relative privilege. Boler assumes that students are part of the obstacles the other faces. 
Simon, in his extended example of remembering the conquest of the Americas, aims to 
“change the moral character of the non-indigenous student” (1994: 13). This contrast, I 
suggest, reflects a similar contrast we find in critical literacy approaches in general, in
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that students seem to be positioned on one or the other side of oppression. Neither 
position, I believe, fully acknowledges the complex relations we have to oppression and 
power. My conception of witness does not place us on one side or the other of 
oppression, but bridges the divide by focusing more broadly on why we look for 
witnesses and what happens when we find a witness. I have argued that we must always 
be ready to respond as a witness and just what acknowledgement will entail is dependent 
on the particular situation. The conception of witness that I put forward takes into 
account both the person who looks for a witness and the person who responds as a 
witness; two sides of what I have argued can be conceived of as a relation in a strong 
sense.
The Relation of Witness and Liberatory Aims
In the previous section, I argued that inquiry broadly directed by the question 
“Who am I in the world?” is vital to education in general, and to liberatory education, in 
particular. The broad lines of my argument are first, existential inquiry is best answered 
with ‘situated knowledge’ because situated knowledge does not obscure claims about 
oppression and privilege and inscribe relations of oppression and privilege in knowledge 
construction practices (Ford, 1995). Second, the relation of witness can be generative of 
situated knowledge, and in some cases, may be required for it. Thus, we can say that the 
relation of witness, as I have conceptualized it, supports liberatory aims of education. In 
this section, I briefly state how the relation of witness can support inquiry directed by 
“Who am I in the world?” and summarize how my conception meets the criteria laid out 
in Chapter 1 for an adequate conception of witness for liberatory aims of education.
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We are always involved in some kind of inquiry into who we are in the world, 
even if below the surface of our awareness, in that we act on our theories of who we are. 
These theories which may take the form of stories we tell of ourselves or are told to us by 
others; stories that give meaning to our actions and guide our moral choices. The relation 
of witness can support conscious, purposeful inquiry into who we are in the world and 
what this means for how we should live. The relation of witness supports liberatory 
education in that in looking for the truth and trying to get it right, we can and do -  in the 
process o f speaking and listening -  create different possibilities, transform our 
experience, and transform who we are. In that the relation of witness implicitly fosters 
expressing your beliefs regarding who you see yourself to be in relation to others, it 
seems very basic to education. Because it can matter not just that we are given uptake, 
but how -  we can say that the relation of witness is vital to this inquiry. The conception 
of witness that I have laid out recognizes that students may, at times, be looking for a 
witness.
Answering the existential question “Who am I?” is a part of Roger Simon’s, 
Megan Boler’s, and Sandra Bloom and Michael Reichert’s projects. We could say that 
Simon’s aim is for students to consider who they are in relation to four events of 
‘historical trauma” -  the Holocaust, the Middle Passage, the conquest of the Americas, 
and violence against women. He asks that students answer these questions in ways that 
lead to less violence; ways that lead to a change in relations of dominion, exploitation, 
and indifference of one group toward another. The terms of the inquiry are largely set by 
his identification of the elements of the response of a witness. In Boler’s ‘pedagogy of 
discomfort,’ students might be said to ask “Who am I in relation to the text I have read, in
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relation to what makes me uncomfortable?” In the shared inquiry involved in ‘collective 
witnessing’ students take up the questions “How have my emotions been shaped by 
dominant discourses?” and “How am I part of the climate of obstacles that the other 
faces?” Both questions are more specific variations of the question “Who am I?” And 
lastly, Bloom and Reichert suggest that we must all ask ourselves “Who am I in relation 
to violence?” and “Who am I in relation to those who perpetrate violence?” and “What is 
my responsibility?” The authors propose that we are all responsible for ending the cycles 
of violence; that we are perpetrators of violence, in a sense, if we do not step forward as 
witnesses to do something to end it. This inquiry is vital, but in each proposal the 
conception of witness is reduced to these aims: to seeing violence. Further, the inquiry is 
largely set by the teacher and does not take into account that students in our classrooms 
may be looking for witnesses.
I have said that we look for a witness in a climate of indifference and an outright 
refusal to listen. A witness is someone who hears and attends to apprehensions that we 
believe others should be attend to. In finding a witness -  someone who answers -  trust is 
established or restored and we hear the experience or most pressing perceptions that 
another believes should be attended to. But, for me, there is an important distinction 
between inquiry that begins with the student, an inquiry that the student brings with them 
in a sense, and inquiry that begins with the curriculum. Recognizing that our students 
may, at times, be looking for witnesses, opens the door to the more personal and more 
complex critical literacy. It does not exclude questions raised in the curriculum, but more 
fully recognizes the purposes and needs that students bring with them.
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My conception of witness as a relation is in keeping with ordinary' usages of the 
term in that both sides of the relation are engaged in seeing and listening to one another 
and the world around us. The relation can heighten our awareness of who we understand 
ourselves to be and our beliefs about what is good and just. My conception of witness as 
a relation is in keeping with ordinary usages of seeing, hearing and being there in person 
or telling others what you have seen and heard. I have argued for a broad response that 
includes oppression and also beauty or joy; whatever it is that another feels is being 
overlooked. Witness includes this usage in religious traditions and more broadly, in the 
sense that witness is to see. Our most pressing perceptions will sometimes include taking 
a stand against oppression, but not always. My conception of witness is not reduced to 
my aims -  though it does support the conditions we need to speak and to examine our 
experience.
My conception privileges face-to-face encounters. I argued that we sometimes 
require the presence of another to speak and to build or restore trust. Further, we are 
nourished and challenged, in face-to-face encounter in ways we can not be in more 
distant relationships. My conception does not foreclose on seeing the structures of 
oppression, on the contrary, it is likely that we will see them because of the kind of 
open inquiry that I’ve incorporated into witnessing through acknowledgement. The 
testimony is available to rational work, as are our responses to testimony. Issues of 
class, race, gender come to the fore as personal experience, the lived experience of these 
categories. In responding as a witness -  the teacher becomes an active instrument in the 
student’s search for meaning.
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Students in our classrooms may be looking for witnesses. As Heller observed in 
the Tenderloin Women’s Writing Workshop, the format of writing workshop offer 
participants a place to bear witness. In schools, it can be one of the rare opportunities 
for students to say what is on their minds and share their writing with others. It has also 
been a focus of writing workshop advocates to attend to how we listen to students, a 
listening that is akin to the kind of attentiveness entailed in the response of one-caring 
and in the response of a witness.
Response in the Teaching of Writing
I compare three accounts of listening to students in teaching writing -  Carl 
Anderson’s, Peter Elbow’s, and Timothy Lensmire’s -  to the response of a witness, as I 
have elaborated the conception. Each account of listening is akin to what I have said 
characterizes the response of a witness. My account of witness is distinguished from 
these other accounts of listening in that my account requires acknowledgement and more 
readily prompts inquiry.
Carl Anderson specifically discusses meeting with the student one-on-one in a 
writing conference. He has a somewhat contradictory position on listening to students. 
On one hand, Anderson cautions teachers against getting sidetracked during conferences 
and losing sight of why they’re conferring -  we confer to help the child become a better 
writer. On the other hand, he considers how we, as teachers, ought to fall in love as if  for 
the first time when we confer with students. Regarding getting sidetracked, Anderson 
elaborates “Some teachers, for example, get mesmerized by what their students are 
writing about. They end up having long conversations with Demeka about her
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Salamander or with Daniel about the summer he spent in Alabama, conversations that do
little to help children grow as writers” (2000: 8). In Anderson’s view, this way of
listening too easily turns into a therapy session. He is clear: “we need to remember that
we are writing teachers, not therapists” (8). About being in love, Anderson notes “To
teach writing well—to confer with student writers well—we must be affected by our
students and the details of their lives. That is, we need to fall in love with our students
for the first time” (189). In Anderson’s view, this listening nurtures a genuine connection
that pays off in the success of our conferences.
By truly listening to [our students] as we confer, we let them know that the 
work they’re doing as writers matters. It’s the way that we listen, more than 
anything else, that will nudge our students to talk about what they’re trying to 
do, to use the words they haven’t used before, to look at us with a smile 
instead of a frown when we kneel down beside them and ask, “How’s it 
going?” (22)
Anderson wants to foster a particular quality of relation by listening attentively to 
students. He writes “Think about it. If an acquaintance asks you, “How’s it going?” you 
probably don’t give a detailed -  and honest -  answer about what’s going on with you 
unless you really know and care about and trust the person who’s asking” (191). My 
concern is that this listening -  or genuine relationship -  is not all that genuine, because 
the aim is always to get at better writing, to help the child to grow as a writer. This is 
problematic in that Anderson never says what he means by ‘good writing.’
The listening that Anderson describes is similar to what I have said characterizes 
the response of a witness; however, our educational aims are different. I do not want to 
dismiss Anderson’s caution that we must remember that we are there to help the student 
become a better writer, but more needs to be said about what it means to be a good writer. 
Our response to writing, even within writing workshop, has grown narrow and is often
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reduced to criteria on a rubric, such as use of descriptive words. Anderson does not 
advocate the use of such rubrics and yet he does nothing to counter it. Good writing 
means more than writing that uses descriptive words. Indeed, to my mind, we write as a 
means of thinking and communicating and potentially acting in the world. Anderson 
describes listening attentively to the child, but this does not seem to include taking up the 
content of the writing. The content of the writing is taken up more in Peter Elbow’s 
believing game.
In Sharing and Responding, Peter Elbow recommends the “believing and 
doubting game” as a form of response that zeros in on the content of the writing. In this 
mode of response, the first step -  believing -  one simply has to “ask readers to believe 
everything you have written, and then tell you what they notice as a result of believing” 
(Elbow and Belanoff, 2000: 37). Elbow further instructs that if they don’t believe, they 
should pretend to agree (emphasis in Elbow and Belanoff, 37). What you will get from 
the response, Elbow advises writers, are more reasons or evidence for what you have 
written; the response can give you different and better ways for thinking about your topic. 
The second step is to turn to doubting. Elbow instructs “Now ask readers to pretend that 
everything you’ve written is false—to find as many reasons as they can why you are 
wrong in what you say (or why your story doesn’t make sense)” (37). On the surface, 
the response does not seem to demand much engagement and bears little resemblance to 
the relation of witness as I have conceptualized it; however, the believing and doubting 
game is more complex than it sounds here in this version meant for quick use in class.
The believing and doubting game is one way that Elbow advocates a kind of 
binary thinking that “tries to heighten dichotomies yet maintain the balance and affirm
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both sides equally” (Elbow, 2000: 63). Elbow writes “Eve come to think that this
approach to dichotomies honors the complexity of experience and the wandering
narrative of events. The approach invites experience to precede logic” (63). Here there
is a tradition, Elbow reminds us: “an empirical, inductive, pragmatic tradition that we see
in William James and John Dewey” (64). Elbow feels that this epistemological aspect
has not been taken up by writing theorists:
We increase our chances of seeing more complexity and contradiction in our 
experience—and find new theories or theories that surprise us—if we make 
an effort to honor and attend to experience as closely as possible and hold off 
theorizing for a while. This process can even lead us to theories we are not 
predisposed to believe—theories we don’t like. (64)
Elbow’s critics charge that students in his workshops do not seem to be held answerable
to each other as intellectuals. To this critique, Elbow responds “I was trying to show the
power of a disciplined and methodological uses of believing, listening, affirming,
entering in, attending to one’s experience, and trying to share one’s experience with
others.” My concern again is that the intent is still to simply get at better writing -
without saying more about our purposes in writing.
Timothy Lensmire critiques what he sees to be the “the narrow, technical work 
imagined for teachers—work that abandons students to the current world, to dominant 
meanings and values, rather than engages students in deliberation about that world, in 
criticism and transgression of those meanings and values. Work that might actually help 
students move with power and responsibility, help them be free” (89). In Powerful 
Writing, Responsible Teaching, Lensmire argues that sharing time in writing workshop 
should be characterized by deliberation. For Lensmire “deliberation changes what 
students’ stories are in the classroom community. Instead of mindless direction, students’
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stories represent mind-full experiments of how we might live, testable hypotheses of 
better and worse ways to quickly and slowly wind and unwind our legs, arms, hands, in 
space and time” (100). Lensmire names three responsibilities the students have in 
sharing time: The first is to listen carefully to the stories and comments of others. Such 
listening depends on the assumption by students that their peers have something to say, 
and that this something might contribute to their understanding of themselves and the 
world” (100). Lensmire stresses that we want children to attend to what is said, the 
meanings and values, the direction, expressed by stories, as well as the effectiveness of 
the text. A second responsibility in deliberation is that we do not move to criticism too 
quickly, but seek actively to understand the others’ ideas. This is similar to Elbow’s 
believing game. And the third responsibility is that our students be open to learning, 
growth, changing their minds (101). Changing your mind means changing your habits, 
your dispositions to act, think, and feel in certain ways; it means changing your self. The 
teacher has two additional responsibilities: first, teachers must stand with the underdog 
by taking sides, and second, the teacher must bring story lines to deliberation that are not 
necessarily represented in the students’ stories, so as to expand, again, what is available 
as direction for living (107). This response is the closest to what I have described as the 
response of a witness. Lensmire explicitly recognizes that writing is a kind of inquiry 
and that the response might contribute to students’ understanding of themselves and the 
world. Interestingly, Lensmire does not focus on the quality of relationship formed in 
listening as much as Anderson does is in his account. I move to three clear examples of 
looking for a witness in the classroom to illustrate how the relation might look in the 
classroom and, in the last case, what is at stake when a student fails to find a witness.
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Finding A Witness in the Classroom
Students will sometimes be looking for a witness. I have characterized looking 
for a witness by noting that the testimony is spoken in a climate of indifference or an 
outright refusal to listen. What we speak of when we bear witness carries a certain force 
for us. We do not commonly use the term bearing witness lightly. We can not always 
recognize when someone is looking for a witness nor what may be testimony simply by 
content. Paula Salvio writes “Testimonial literature documents human suffering and 
human triumphs; it shows raw historical accounts that have gone unnoticed* that have 
been fragmented or shattered” (41). In common with Salvio, I argue that it is pertinent to 
notice that with testimony what is significant is that the account has gone largely 
unnoticed.
Ana and the Lost Princess
Ana’s story La Princesa Perdida en la Selva (The Princess Lost in the Jungle) 
begins “In a far off place where there are few people there is a beautiful valley that has 
animals and everything. No one knows this place. It is a hidden valley. But one day in 
this valley appeared a beautiful and pretty girl with a nature very inviting to the animals. 
The girl was lost, no one knew where to find her.” In the story, a young princess 
somehow finds herself on her own in the hidden valley. The king and queen sent men to 
look for her, but they don’t find her and finally give up looking. The princess grows up 
with the animals of the forest. Ana chose to read aloud a selection to a group of some 
two hundred of her peers and teachers at the end of the school year, including the
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following portion.
But the girl was growing a little more every day until the day arrived 
that she governed all of the animals of the forest. She felt happy, content 
with all that she had and what she saw because the forest was beautiful and so 
passed the years. She didn’t have memories of her parents or of anyone, she 
had completely forgotten her family.
She felt happy in all the nature that was around her, but one day she asked,
"Where did I come from?” She didn’t remember how she had arrived in this 
place. She felt distressed in her jungle and went around worried and a little 
sad and what more she felt that there was something she was looking for.
As the story continues the princess goes to a village searching for someone who looks
like her. Wandering on the streets, dressed in the bear hide, she meets a young man
who talks to her until their eyes meet. When they meet eyes, the young man runs away
because she has the eyes of a tiger. Soon after, the princess meets a prince who is not
afraid of her. With his help, she is able to speak twice to her father, the king (although
neither of them knows yet that they are father and daughter). The first time she appears
before the king, he fires a barrage of questions at her and the princess flees the town and
returns to the forest. The king dreams about the young woman, and in talking to the
queen about his dream they both come to believe that the strange visitor is their
daughter. The second time, the prince tells the king that the princess can speak when
she is not afraid. The king listens this time and recognizes the young woman dressed in
a bearskin as his lost daughter. At the end of the story, at the fiesta, the princess asks
the prince to speak to the people for her about the forest, her love for the animals.
Because Ana is of indigenous descent, an Indio, orphaned or separated from her 
family, she is near the bottom of a class-stratified society. Finding witnesses can be 
needed to be ‘somebody’ depending on our situation. Being seen -  known as a 
particular person was also central the women in the Tenderloin Women’s Writing
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Group. Like the women in the Tenderloin, Ana faced indifference and disdain daily, 
perhaps directed at them from individuals, but also conveyed to them in multiple ways 
through the structures of society. In both cases, the message of larger society -  the 
dominant discourse -  must be taken into account to understand the significance or need 
to find a witness -  or what is gained from it, in a sense. Ana defied the status assigned 
to her in surprising ways. Her story and her public reading are one example.
In finding a witness, Ana sees herself as someone whose perceptions will be 
heard and taken into account, and closely related, being actually heard, having her trust 
answered. In the terms that Caroline Heller adopts from Paulo Freire, Ana can come to 
see herself as a thinker and as someone who takes action. Being heard, in turn, changes 
something in the classroom as an epistemic community. Ana’s story is rich, and so our 
lives become richer in being a witness. As Heller writes about listening to Mary 
TallMountain’s writing, we have the sense that we are invited into a room where the 
light is good. There is pleasure and delight in Ana’s story and we share in it by being 
witnesses. In Ana’s words, we are entrusted with something marvelous and all that she 
went on imagining. In acknowledgment, the listener might take the story into his or her 
life, as I have. I have questioned when my actions, questions, or attitude makes it 
difficult or impossible for others to speak. And I think of her story at the times when I 
find myself afraid and unable to speak. Ana’s story has added much to my thinking 
about speech and fear and finding ‘home.’ This is not to detract from the specifics of 
the princess’ situation or Ana’s exploration through her story; however, there is an 
inquiry about speech and fear that many of us take up in different ways or may after 
listening to Ana’s story.
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Inquiries are linked in complex ways. Themes of home and voice ran through 
many of the children’s stories. For example, Eduardo wrote a story about a boy named 
Edwin who made it past the insults of the guard to speak to the mayor about an 
adequate playing field for his soccer team. We risk limiting our own inquiry and 
understanding in failing to respond to Ana. If we accept Misak’s claim that the quality 
of our inquiry is dependent on taking into account diverse experience, then we need 
Ana in the epistemic community. Indeed, if we accept Misak’s claim, we should teach 
with the expectation that all children will become part of a community that engages in 
inquiry, a broad epistemic community. As literature, the piece takes up the question 
“Where did I come from?” a version of the question “Who am I?” Ana is, as many 
writers are, involved in a kind of inquiry broadly directed by the question “Who am I?” 
Such inquiry is one way we can use writing to shape our lives; however, we cannot do it 
on our own. We need others.
Alison’s Account of the Birth of Her Son
In a university class for prospective teachers, Alison was asked to write on any 
topic that she chose. My intent as a teacher was to focus on the writing process rather 
than on the particular content of the writing. Alison chose to write about the birth of her 
first child. She was sixteen when her son was bom. Her piece began in a quiet time after 
the birth, describing how mother, child, and father were resting together in the hospital 
room. And then hours passed and no one came to visit. The refrain—no one came—is 
repeated until we, the listeners, gradually realize that the young mother is being shunned 
by her family and by the nurses on the ward. It’s a powerful piece of writing in the way
176
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that this tension builds. In the class discussion after she read the story aloud, Alison 
explained that she wanted her classmates to hear this story so that they would not judge 
mothers o f the children in their classes. Alison also claims her experience -  she tells the 
class that she is not ashamed, that she loves her son and takes good care of him, and that 
she finished high school and college on time and was now enrolled in a fifth-year 
program. Everyone had said that she could not do it, that she had ruined her life. Alison 
spoke clearly, directly looking around the room at us, and stated that she had not ruined 
her life. Like Jordan, Alison directs our response, telling us exactly what she wants us to 
do as listeners.
In For Crying Outloud: Women's Poverty in the United States (1996), Robin 
Robinson opens her chapter with the words “I bear witness to teen motherhood.” I draw 
on her essay here to illustrate how firmly we base our impression of another on our image 
of the other or stereotypes, what we believe to be the case, and can refuse to acknowledge 
that we are wrong. Robinson tells the story of a well-regarded economist telling her that 
she (that is, her experience as a teen mother using welfare and ancillary services as 
income support) did not count. She was white, intelligent, attractive. Robinson 
answered, “Let me see if I have this straight. Your profile of teen mothers, upon which 
you base your considerable influence on policy at the national level, rests on assumptions 
that we teen mothers are poor, black, dumb, and ugly?” He did not disagree, even though 
statistics show the majority of teen mothers in the United States are white. The man 
refused to see, to listen even when confronted. Robinson names the stigma and betrayal 
of young mothers. She argues that the young mothers need respect as human beings and
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as citizens of the social world in which they live” (115). In regard to a refusal to see, 
Robinson notes
Perhaps this social world, the United States in the 1990's, blames teen 
mothers and holds them in contempt because we are afraid that we created 
these desperate children, and we don’t know what to do about them now. 
Perhaps we are afraid our children will become them. Perhaps we are afraid 
because we do not know, as adults, how to make it all better, and that is 
difficult to admit. We cling to myths rather than seek new truths. (119)
In her reading, Alison challenged her classmates in a way similar to the way Robinson
challenged the economist. Her writing was effective -  but it was her purpose that se
wanted us to attend to. She said exactly what she wanted us to take into account.
Another student in the class wrote to me about the reading.
By having the group share we were able to get to know each other in ways 
that we had not already been given a chance. I feel that sometimes education 
is not always just learning information but learning about others and where 
they come from and why they react in a certain manner. We are an eclectic 
group and it helps to see a different side to people. I would like to thank you 
for giving us this experience together. It was powerful. I do not look at some 
of the people in the class in the same manner.
The last sentence is key.
Huy Tran and Soldiers on Veterans Day
The third and last example, I want to give here - In Children Who See Too Much, 
Betsy McAlister Groves tells of an interaction between a teacher and a student in a 
second-grade classroom. In observance of Veterans Day, the class was asked to write 
letters or draw pictures to soldiers to thank them for keeping our country safe. Groves 
explains that the teacher emphasized the important role of military and stressed that 
soldiers were unrecognized and unappreciated by most people, especially in peacetime. 
As might be expected, most of the drawings were similar. Groves writes
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One picture stood out, however. Huy Tran, a Vietnamese child, drew a 
picture of soldiers killing people. It was a jumbled and chaotic picture, with 
red blood on each person. He talked about the picture in a dispassionate tone, 
simply stating that it was about soldiers who fought in a war. A closer look 
at the picture showed a dismembered body in the lower comer. The teacher 
made no comment to the class. (2002: 91-92)
The teacher later expressed her irritation at the drawing, dismissing it as another
example of Huy Tran’s failure to follow directions. She described him as an “odd
child” who didn’t seem to want to learn in school. In discussing the example, Groves
notes “We wondered if Huy Tran’s picture was an accurate reflection of his reality
concerning soldiers and war. We also worried that his perspective was not validated by
his teacher, who saw his picture only as an act of disobedience” (92). Groves reflects
that Huy Tran’s teacher missed a unique opportunity to learn about his life. She could
have asked him to talk about his picture or about his experiences with soldiers or war.
She could also have asked about his family (92). I believe the child might also have
had the opportunity to learn about his life. And in telling it, claimed his experience, as
this seems be at least part of what Huy Tran is after. Huy Tran lost the opportunity to
pursue inquiry, to sort out the differences in his perceptions and those of his classmates.
From my perspective, what happened is a clear example of a child looking for a 
witness and the teacher turning away. If on the other hand, the teacher had responded 
as a witness, she would first ask the child about the drawing and second, question her 
own assumptions about soldiers and keeping our country safe, and about Huy Tran as a 
disobedient child. Huy Tran’s questions and her own might have lead to a shared 
inquiry in the classroom. The class might have included literature that portrays a flight 
from Vietnam through a child’s eyes, along with other books that portray the pain of 
war in a language accessible to second graders. The class might also have read
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collections of children’s drawings and poems of their experience in war. Discussion 
around these books and Huy Tran’s drawing would inevitable include some of the 
ambiguities of war. The student is clearly bearing witness -  challenging the dominant 
discourse. But the teacher is unable to respond as a witness. And so, Huy Tran cannot 
claim his experience and challenge or complicate the teacher’s message or lesson. And 
the teacher continues to see Huy Tran has a disobedient and odd child. Further, the 
understanding of all the children is compromised in this situation, and students miss an 
opportunity to develop the skills and experience of listening to experience that is 
different from their own.
Notice that in neither Alison’s nor Huy Tran’s case was the testimony quite 
expected. Indeed, I am not sure that we can assign testimony that will have the force 
that it does when driven by the purposes or needs of the person bearing witness. As 
teachers, what we can do is to create the space and be ready to respond. I propose that 
we should work to create spaces for testimony in schools and support students in 
shaping their own testimony. We, as teachers, cannot respond as a witness if students 
are not permitted the space to bear witness. To support testimony, particularly 
testimony that addresses what is not being taken note of or adds depth to our lives 
together, requires the support of teachers and the structure of the classroom as a whole. 
In the best case scenarios, the testimony will be sparked by and will spark inquiry. 
Inquiries will include those that students bring with them and those that are initiated as 
part of the curriculum. This means that the curriculum must allow for genuine inquiry. 
Being witnesses has to do with what we need from one another -  the response allows 
the refinement of writing, but has more to do with figuring out what it is we do believe.
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In looking for the truth, trying to get it right -  examining who we are in the world and 
who we ought to be — we can and do, just in the process of listening, create different 
possibilities, transform our experience, and transform who we are. In that the relation 
of witness supports expressing our beliefs about who we take ourselves to be in relation 
to others, invites acknowledgement of those perceptions, and further, supports inquiry 
into the significance of what is said, the relation of witness is fundamental to any 
education that has liberatory aims.
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